ये पुरुषे ब्रह्म विदुस्ते विदुः परमेष्ठिनम्

Those who know Brahman in Man
know the Being who is supreme.

—अथर्ववेद, १०.७.१७

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

Vowels

अ	a,	आ	ā,	इ	i,	ई	ī,	उ	u,	ऊ	ū,
ऋ	ṛ,	ऌ	ḷ,	ए	e,	ऐ	ai,	ओ	o,	औ	au.

Consonants

क्	k,	ख्	kh,	ग्	g,	घ्	gh,	ङ	ṅ,
च्	c,	छ्	ch,	ज्	j,	झ्	jh,	ञ्	ñ,
ट्	ṭ,	ठ्	ṭh,	ड्	ḍ,	ढ्	ḍh,	ण्	ṇ,
त्	t,	थ्	th,	द्	d,	ध्	dh,	न्	n,
प्	p,	फ्	ph,	ब्	b,	भ्	bh,	म्	m,
य्	y,	र्	r,	ल्	l,	व्	v,	श्	ś,
ष्	ṣ,	स्	s,	ह्	h,	ं	ṁ,	:	ḥ.

ABBREVIATIONS

C.I.	Coorg Inscriptions
E.C.	Epigraphia Carnatica
E.I.	Epigraphia Indica
E.R.E.	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics
S.B.E.	Sacred Books of the East
S.B.H.	Sacred Books of the Hindus
S.B.J.	Sacred Books of the Jainas
V.S. or Vik. Sam.	Vikrama Saṁvat
S.S.	Śaka Saṁvat
V.N.S. or Vir. Nir. Sam.	Vīra Nirvāṇa Saṁvat

FOREWORD

I have very great pleasure in writing these few words by way of introducing the thesis 'JAINA ETHICS' by Dr. Dayanand Bhargava which is now appearing in print. This work was submitted by Dr. Bhargava for his Doctorate Degree of the Delhi University and he has revised it with a view to making it more comprehensive as well as useful both to the general reader and the student seriously interested in Jaina Studies. Jainism has made very significant contribution to Indian thought and has added both to its variety and richness. Dr. Bhargava's present work attempts to study and highlight the contribution to the ethical thought. His study is deep and wide in extent and critical and original in approach. He has also discussed the metaphysical concepts since these are vitally connected with ethics in any system. He has attempted to carry out a comparative as well as historical study of this ethics and discussed the ethical thought of the six systems of Indian Philosophy. I have no doubt that the work will be very widely welcomed and appreciated by scholars and students alike.

Delhi, 29th April, 1968.

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PREFACE

The metaphysical Reality or the Truth of logical coherence must remain merely a theoretical possibility unless it is translated into good of life through right-living. In fact, the Reality or Truth is supra-logical and can be better realised by living it practically than by speculating on it intellectually.

Indian philosophy in general and Jainism in particular, therefore, ascribes the supreme place, of all the branches of philosophy, to ethics. Śilāṅka, a great commentator on Jaina Āgamas, considers all the branches of philosophy only subsidiary to and meant for ethics. Yet there is no work, written on the lines of modern research, dealing with the Jaina view of life in its entirety. The present work is a humble attempt to cover up that lacuna.

I do not lay claim either to perfection or to originality. I could only pick up a few pebbles out of the vast ocean of Jaina scriptures and explore the scattered theme of my thesis from the original sources to arrange it into a systematic whole. I am presenting the ethical views of the ancient Jaina thinkers, as faithfully as I can, before the world of scholars, who are the best judges of the degree of success achieved in this effort and whose satisfaction will be my best reward.

I have adopted a synthetic view of things, while making comparisons and emphasised the unity existing in the diversity of Indian thinking. I believe that this is in keeping with the traditional Jaina way of looking at problems. Syādvāda, which has become almost a synonym for Jainism, teaches us that the same truth could be differently expressed without involving us in any real contradiction. As I have always kept the problems of modern society in view, and shown the utility of Jaina ethical concepts for humanity in general, I hope that the book would interest the general reader also.

Jaina ācāryas have always stood for the dignity of man, and equality of all, advocated the birth-right of indepen-

dence of all individuals and have preached the elevated ideal of non-violence. I dedicate my work to these noble and lofty causes for which all right-thinking men of all times and nations have striven.

Before I conclude, I have to place on record my sincerest gratitude for Dr. Indra Chandra Śāstri, M.A., Ph.D., Śāstrācārya, Nyāyatīrtha and formerly Head of the Department of Sanskrit in the Institute of post-Graduate (Evening) Studies, University of Delhi, for his invaluable guidance without which the thesis for my Ph.D. would have been a Herculean task for me. My sincerest thanks to Dr. R.V. Joshi, M.A., Ph D., D Litt. (Paris), my teacher, to Late Babu Jai Bhagwan Jain, and to Rev. Ksullaka Jinendra Varṇī, whose assistance and guidance have served as beacon-light during the progress of my research-work. Pandit Dalsukh Bhai Malavania, Professor, University of Toronto (Canada), one of the examiners of my thesis deserves special thanks for his valuable suggestions.

Dr. T.G. Mainkar, M.A , Ph.D , D.Litt , Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit in the University of Delhi, who has the rarest combination of benevolence and scholarship in him, has very kindly contributed a foreword to this book for which he deserves my sincere gratitude.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to Lala Sundar Lal Jain, the proprietor of M/s. Moti Lal Banarsidass, for his keen personal interest in the publication of this work. The Manager and the staff of the Jainendra Press also deserve my thanks for their active co-operation. Shri J.L. Shastri,who spared no pains in reading the proofs, also deserves my gratefulness.

Needless to say that suggestions for improvement will be most welcome and incorporated in the next edition.

Delhi, Dayanand Bhargava
27th May, 1968.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What is Ethics?

The word Ethics is derived from ἦθος, meaning character, and ἦθος is derived, from ἔθος, meaning custom or habit. The term 'moral', closely associated with ethics, comes from the latin word 'mores', which primarily stands for 'custom' or 'habit' and secondarily means 'character'.[1] In India also, the word '*dharma*'[2] has been explained in two ways. On the one hand, it stands for preservation of traditional values as reflected in social customs; on the other, it means moral qualites of universal nature like non-violence and truth. The former view is emphasised by *Pūrvamīmāṁsā,* which defines *dharma* as 'rules laid down by the *Vedas*',[3] which are repositories of the traditional social virtues. The latter view is emphasised by Jainism, which says that *dharma* is made up of 'non-violence, self-control and austerity'.[4] *Manusmṛti* fuses both of these views together when it says that *dharma* is characterised by *Veda, Smṛti,* good conduct and that which appeals to the conscience.[5]

1. Muirhead, John H., *The Elements of Ethics*, London, 1910, p. 4
2. The word '*dharma*' has been defined as conduct (*cāritra*) cf. चारित्तं खलु धम्मो—Pravacanasāra, 1.7. Also धर्मश्चारित्रलक्षणम्—Abhayadeva on *Sthānāṅga sūtra*, 4.3.320.
3. चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः धर्मः।

   —*Mīmāṃsādarśana*, Benaras, 1929, 1.1.2.

   The defintion of 'dharma' of *Mīmāṁsādarśana* can be compared with the following words of Mahāvīra "आणाए मामगं धम्मं" (Dharma consists in following my commandments).

   —Ācārāṅgasūtra, 1.6.2.180.
4. धम्मो मंगलमुक्किट्ठं अहिंसा संजमो तवो।

   —*Daśavaikālika*, 1.1.
5. वेदः स्मृतिः सदाचारः स्वस्य च प्रियमात्मनः।
   एतच्चतुर्विधं प्राहुः साक्षाद्धर्मस्य लक्षणम् ॥

   —Manusmṛti, Bombay, 1894, 2.12.

In the West, ethics has been precisely defined 'as the study of what is right or good in conduct'.[1] What do, however, the terms 'right' and 'good' signify ? An answer to this question may help us in understanding the nature and scope of ethics.

(i) *Right* : This term, derived from Latin word *'rectus'*, means 'according to rule'. Its Greek synonym, *ßikaios*, also signifies the same sense. Right conduct, therefore, would mean a conduct 'according to some rules'.

(ii) *Good* : This term, derived from Greek *ἀγαθός*, means 'which is valuable for some end'. Good conduct, therefore, will mean a conduct which is 'valuable for some end'.

It will be observed that the same conduct may be termed both 'right' and 'good' from two different angles. Rules are framed with some end in view. Therefore, a conduct, which will be 'according to rules' or right will also be 'valuable for some end', which is kept in view while framing those rules, and therefore it will also be good.

It is this main problem of ethics, viz. the study of what is 'good' or 'right' in conduct, which has many more corrolaries. For example, "Is happiness the ultimate end of action ? Is virtue preferable to pleasure ? How do pleasure and happiness differ ? What is meant by saying that I ought to perform some particular action or to respect some general precept, such as the keeping of promises ? Am I under any obligation to seek the welfare of other persons, as well as my own ? If so, what is the right proportion between the two welfares ? What is meant by 'freedom of the will' ? Is feeling or reason the right guide to conduct ? What do the terms 'good', 'right', 'obligation', 'duty', 'conscience' signify practically and theoretically ?"[2] Thus, there are many dilemmas at every step in our life, when we cannot escape the responsibility of passing a moral judgement on problems arising from such conflict as that of self and others, pleasure and duty, freedom and necessity, law and liberality and circumstances and character.[3]

1. Mackenzie, John S., *A Manual of Ethics*, London, 1929, p. 1.
2. Rogers, A P., *A Short History of Ethics*, London, 1913, p. 1.
3. Muirhead, John H., *The Elements of Ethics*, p. 1.

Summum Bonum of our life

All these problems are to be answered by referring to certain rules of conduct, which are to be framed with some end in view. Ethics does not deal with any particular conduct but with conduct in general. Therefore, the rules under a system of ethics are not to be framed for a particular end; but for the attainment of the supreme good, which is termed as summum bonum of life. People with different tastes and set-up of mind have different ends in view. Some crave for wealth; others for knowledge, still others for fame. There are people who would sacrifice one of these for the sake of others. Many of these aims cannot be regarded as ultimate. Wealth, knowledge and fame are not ends in themselves; they are means to some end. True, that many of the philosophers have preached the theory of 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge' and have opposed any attempt at attributing any ulterior motive to it; but no philosopher can afford to neglect the impact of knowledge on life. One may differ as to his conception of happiness, as he may differ about the ways through which he seeks happiness; but there is no denying the fact that every man, and every sentient being for that matter, seeks happiness and repels misery. There is no dearth of men who voluntarily impose sufferings on themselves; but in fact they find happiness through sufferings. The question why we seek happiness is as absurd as the question why water is cold or fire is hot. Reasoning stops here. The inherent nature of things cannot be reasoned out.[1] It is the inherent blissful nature of the self that makes us repulsive to misery. We can, therefore, conclude that all conduct should be such as would bring us the maximum of happiness and remove miseries from our lives. This, of course, is a very general sort of statement and requires some further clarification in as much as the terms like 'happiness' and 'misery' are very vague.

Happiness and misery

Wealth, health, beautiful persons, good food, clothing and houses are some of the objects which an average man general-

1. स्वभावोऽतर्कगोचरः—*Pañcādhyāyī*, Indore, Vir. Nir. Saṁ. 2444, 2.53.

ly likes to have. The anti-thesis of it may be called misery which includes poverty, ill-health, ugly faces, starvation or ill-feeding, and absence of proper clothing and residence. A vivid description of objects of pleasure have been given in Indian scriptures.[1] Similarly, the miseries of the world known as *trividhatāpa* also form the subject-matter of many a good number of books on philosophy and religion.

Preyas and Śreyas

The above account of happiness and misery, however, is obviouly very gross and incomplete. Our rich possessions do not make us necessarily and fully happy.[2] Nor are poor people always unhappy. Happiness does not depend merely on possessions or their absence but is mainly dependent on our mental attitude. A state of mental poise and calmness, which springs forth from self-control and integrity of personality, cannot be bought for money or worldly possessions. There is a happiness which comes from within and not from without, which is more commonly known as 'bliss' or 'beatitude'. Sometimes this state is explained in negative term as absence of pain. In fact, this state is inexplicable in words. The two ends of worldly happiness and spiritual bliss are termed as *preyas* and *śreyas*, respectively.

Śuddhopayoga and Śubhopayoga

We may point it out here that the main concern of Jaina ethics is *śreyas* and not *preyas*. It means that it aims at spiritual upliftment of the individual rather than his worldly well-being. It implies a supra-moral plan of life, where one transcends both, good and bad. Any extrovert activity, whether vicious or virtuous, is a deviation from the path of liberation. Kundakunda says that vice and virtue are shackles of iron and gold respectively, both of which bind us to the physical world.[3]

1. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, 1 1 23-25 (For this and other *Upaniṣads* see '*the Principal Upaniṣads*', London, 1953).
2. न वित्तेन तर्पणीयो मनुष्यः ।
—Ibid., 1.1.27.
3. सोवण्णियं पि णियलं बंधदि कालायसं पि जह पुरिसं ।
बंधदि एवं जीवं सुहमसुहं वा कदं कम्मं ॥
—*Samayasāra*, Delhi, 1959, *Gāthā* 146.

A state of self-absorption, with inner awakening, is the highest moral ideal. This lofty ideal of transcendental morality should, however, be no excuse for obliteration of distinction between vice and virtue. The supra-ethical plan of life can be realised only by persons with higher spiritual attainments, who have dived deep into the realm of self.

Everybody should aspire for this lofty ideal but with due consideration to one's limitations. At the initial stage, the force of habit does not allow the aspirant to remain self-absorbed. Here he is required to be vigilant, lest he should go astray. *Pūjyapāda* says that virtuous life is definitely to be preferred to licentiousness, for it is better to wait, if we have to wait at all, in the cool shade rather than in the hot sun.[1] Thus the distinction of good and bad is not to be totally obliterated. The path of virtuous activities, leading to worldly and heavenly pleasures, is known as *śubhopayoga*, as against the path of transcendental morality, known as *śuddhopayoga*. As we shall deal with this problem in a later chapter separately, we may here point out only this that the above mentioned emphasis on the transcendental morality in Jainism has made it highly spiritualistic and individualistic. *Dharma* as a means to wordly prosperity (*artha* and *kāma*), as mentioned by the *Mahābhārata*,[2] does not occupy an eminent position in Jainism.

The problem of ethics—removal of misery

The problem of ethics has been differently stated by different schools of Indian philosophy. These schools can be broadly classified under the following three heads :

(i) Those who are mainly concerned with the enjoyments of this world and the world beyond, but are silent about the concept of liberation. This is the older tradition of the *Vedas* represented by *Pūrvamīmāmsā* school.

1. वरं व्रतैः पदं दैव, नाव्रतैर्वत नारक ।
छायातपस्थयोर्भेदः, प्रतिपालयतोर्महान् ॥
—*Istopadeśa*, Bombay, 1954, verse 3.

2. धर्मादर्थश्च कामश्च स किमर्थं न सेव्यते ॥
—*Mahābhārata*, Poona, 1933, 18.5.62.

(ii) Those who are mainly concerned with the spiritual well-being of the man. This tradition, represented by the *Upaniṣads* includes *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya* and *Vedānta* amongst orthodox school, and Buddhism and Jainism amongst the unorthodox systems.

(iii) The third category consists of those who strike a balance between the two opposite views mentioned above, and give equal importance to both of them. *Vaiśeṣika* system may be mentioned amongst this category.

The attitude of Brāhmaṇism

In the *Vedic* period, the *Ṛṣis* seem to be anxious for long life, progeny, wealth and fame. It was in the *Upaniṣadic* age that the pressure of the problem of misery was acutely felt. In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, *Nārada*, who had mastered all branches of knowledge, including the *Vedas* could not find out the way to get rid of misery. He approached *Sanatkumāra* in all humbleness, and told him that though he had heard that a man with self-realisation crossed miseries, he himself was not capable of overcoming them. "O Lord ! I am in grief; lead me to the shore that lies beyond grief",[1] he requested. In response to this request, *Sanatkumāra* unfolded the mysteries of life to *Nārada*.

The attitude of Buddhism

The credit of dealing with this problem of misery in a systematic way goes to Lord *Buddha*, who expounded an elaborate ethical system for the removal of misery. He realised the universality of suffering and explained its existence in these words : "Birth is misery ; old age, decay, sickness, death, sorrow, grief, woe, lamentation and despair are misery; not to get what one desires is misery. In short, the five groups based on grasping are misery."[2] Lord *Budddha* preached not only the existence of misery but also brought the hope of redemption therefrom for the suffering humanity. He asserted

1. सो ह भगवः शोचामि तं मा भगवञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयत्विति ।
—*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 7.1 3

2. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, London, 1951, 3 62 10 PTS translation (slightly modified.)

that sufferings can be avoided, and should be avoided, by properly following the ethical discipline of self-control. He asserted not only that there is (i) misery (*dukkha*), but also that (ii) it has causal chain (*dukkhasamudaya*), (iii) that it can be stopped (*dukkhanirodha*) and that (iv) there is a way to check it (*dukkhanirodhagāminipatipadā*). These are known as four noble truths.[1] Lord *Buddha* did not accept that misery was an inevitable part of life, nor could he agree with those absolute fatalists who would believe that misery would be automatically removed at a fixed time and we need not make any effort for it.[2]

Six systems of Philosophy

Amongst the six orthodox systems of philosophy, the earliest trend of search for happiness is represented by the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* school, which, as already pointed out, did not conceive of liberation but conceived of heaven only. The means of attainment of heaven include performance of actions prescribed by the *Veda* and avoidance of actions prohibited by it.[3] Some of the *karmans*, called *nityanaimittika* are to be performed by everybody without any exception. Negligence in their performance entails sin. Other *karmans*, called *Kāmya*, are to be performed only with a certain object in view. The actions prohibited by the *Vedas* are called *Niṣiddha* and should be avoided absolutely. Thus in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, the *Veda* is the highest authority, the actions prescribed therein are the highest duty and heaven is the highest goal. For *Mīmāṁsā* there is no contradiction in a prosperous, rich life and religious life.

The *Sānkhya* school, on the other hand, is perhaps the oldest orthodox system which conceived of renunciation as a necessary condition for spiritualism. It begins with the idea that our mundane life is beset with three types of sufferings viz. (i) *ādhyātmika* i.e. arising from psychophysical nature of man, e.g. pain caused by physical or mental disorders. (ii) *ādhibhautika* i e. arising from some agencies other than the perso-

1. Ibid. 3 61.1-13
2. Zimmer, Heinrich, *Philosophies of India*, London, 1951, p. 246
3. *Mīmāṁsādarśana*, 1.2.1.

nality of the sufferer e.g. pain caused by beasts or enemies. (iii) *ādhidaivika* i.e. arising from supernatural powers, including six calamities (*ṣaḍītis*), planets and elemental agencies.[1]

It may be argued that there are tangible means of getting rid of these miseries, e g. disease can be cured by medicine; and therefore one need not worry about ethics. But there are two objections to it. In the first place, it is not sure that a particular misery can be cured by a particular tangible means without fail, e.g. a medicine may or may not cure the disease. Secondly, the relief is only temporary. Therefore, we cannot depend on tangible means. The root cause of these miseries will have to be found and a check imposed so as to uproot miseries premanently and unfailingly. Hence the necessity of a moral discipline.[2] In *Sāṅkhya* the element of *rajas*, which represents misery, is said to be present in all our experience and, therefore, all our intellectual operations are said to be beset with misery.[3]

Coming to *Yoga*, which represents the ethical aspect of the same system of which *Sāṅkhya* is the metaphysical representation, we find that even so-called pleasures of life have also been considered as miseries; and a check on those miseries, which are yet to come, has been advised.[4] *Yoga Sūtra* gives many reasons for condemning even so-called pleasures as misery. In the first place, they are not stable. Secondly, even these temporary enjoyments are achieved with a lot of trouble and struggle. Thirdly, dependence on these objects bereaves us of independence. Fourthly, desires never die. Fulfilment of one desire leads to multiplicity of desires, and thus the chain never ends. Fifthly, hankering after worldly objects brings us in clash with those who are running after the self-same object.

1 Miśra, Vācaspati on *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, Poona, 1934, *kārikā* 1.

2. दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥
—*Sāṅkhyakārikā*, Poona, 1934, *kārikā* 1.

3. तदेतत्प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यते प्रत्याख्यातुम् ।
—Miśra, Vācaspati on *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 1.

4. हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ।
—*Yogasūtra*, Gorakhapura, Vik. Saṁ. 2013, 2.16.

Sixthly, in illness or in old age, after impairment of senses, on which alone such enjoyment depends, we cannot remain happy.[1] Therefore, the *Yoga* system strongly opposes the tendency of hankering after temporary gratification of lust which is generally mistaken for happiness.

According to *Nyāya* system, suffering is said to be the very nature of the world. There is a causal chain behind pain, at the root of which is false notion (*mithyājñāna*). On the removal of the following in turn, there is automatic removal of the preceding one :

(i) Pain
(ii) Birth
(iii) Activity
(iv) Fault
(v) False notion.[2]

The *Vaiśeṣika* system reconciles the two attitudes—one represented by *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and the other represented by *Sāṅkhya, Yoga* and *Nyāya*. It gives worldly prosperity as well as spiritual happiness as the aim of *dharma*.[3]

According to *Vedānta*, bliss is the nature of self. As soon as the veil of ignorance is removed, the fetters that shut ourselves out from the reality, which we are, are broken asunder and then the self experiences no misery but bliss.

Thus we see that the various systems of Indian philosophy agree on this point that a state of complete mental poise, free from discords and uncertainties of life, is the ultimate aim of life.

1. परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ।
—Ibid., 2 15

2. दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरापाये तदन्तरापायादपवर्गः ।
—*Nyāyasūtra*, Poona, 1939, 1.1.2

Also सुखसाधनमाप्तुमिच्छति दुःखसाधनं हातुमिच्छति । प्राप्तीच्छाप्रयुक्तस्यास्य सुखसाधनावाप्त्यै समीहाविशेष आरम्भः । जिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य दुःखसाधनपरिवर्जनं निवृत्तिः ।
—Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra*, Poona, 1939, 3.2.34.

3. यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः ।
—*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Allahabad, 1923, 1.1.2.

Jaina view

The existence of misery and suffering is as much recognised by Jainism as by its sister religions, Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism. "The world is afflicted, miserable, difficult to instruet and without discrimination",[1] says the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*. *Śīlāṅka*, a commentator of *Ācārāṅgasūtra* begins his commentary with the following words : All creatures, overcome by attachment, aversion and delusion, tormented by various, excessively bitter physical and mental miseries should try to know what is good and what is bad for the removal of that misery, and this is not possible without a peculiar type of discrimination [2] The *Uttarādhyayana* says that all worldly pleasure is suffering in the ultimate analysis. All "singing is but prattle, all dancing is but mocking, all ornaments are but a burden, all pleasures produce but pain."[3] The same eternal question haunts the mind of the thinker again and again : "By what acts can I escape a sorrowful lot in this unstable, ineternal *saṁsāra*, which is full of misery ?"[4] "Birth is misery, old age is misery, and so are disease and death."[5] The main attraction 'is a safe place in view of all, but difficult of approach, where there is no old age nor death, no pain nor disease.'[6] "The transitory condition is like a wheel at a well where before one bucketful of distress is got over a large number of afflictions overtake the soul".[7]

Out of the seven fundamental elements of Jaina philosophy, only two, the 'self' and the 'non-self' are dealt with

1. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, SBE, Vol XXII, 1 1 2 1. (p 3).
2. इह हि रागद्वेषमोहाद्यभिभूतेन सर्वेणापि संसारिजन्तुना शारीरमानमा (सा ?) नेकदु:खोपनिपातपीडितेन (त) दपनयनाय हेयोपादेयपरिज्ञाने यत्नो विधेय: । स च न विशिष्टविवेकमृते ।
   —*Śīlāṅka*, on Ibid., p 3
3. Uttarādhyayana, Gurgaon, 1954, 13.16.
4. Ibid., 8.1.
5. Ibid , 19 15
6. Ibid., 23 81.
7. विपद्भवपदावर्ते पादिकेवातिवाह्यते ।
   यावत्तावद्भवन्त्यन्या: प्रचुरा विपद: पुर: ॥
   —*Iṣṭopadeśa*, 12.

from a metaphysical point of view; the other five are mere corrolaries of the problem of getting rid of miseries. *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* very beautifully summarises the position when it says : "*Āśrava* (inflow of *kārmic* matter causing misery) is the cause of mundane existence and Saṁvara (stoppage of that inflow) is the cause of liberation : this is the *Jaina* view (in short), every thing else is only its amplification."[1]

Metaphysics and Ethics

Buddhistic View

Where is the necessity of dealing with self and non-self at all ? To quote the famous example of Lord *Buddha*, a man hit by an arrow, need not, and should not, ask such superficial questions as to the caste of the doctor who comes to his rescue, or the details of the arrow which hit him. He need know only this that the arrow has hit him and the doctor can cure him. To those who asked Lord *Buddha* about the nature of self, he did not answer, rejecting their question summarily as unexplained (*avyākṛta*) [2] This attitude of Lord *Buddha* was probably a reaction to those thinkers of his time who would go on philosophising everything without improving the daily conduct of life

Jaina View

The Jainas, however, true to their tradition of reconciliatory attitude, followed the middle path. They did realise that a strict moral discipline is necessary for purity of life. But they did not overlook such metaphysical questions as the nature of self. Our behaviour cannot be isolated from our metaphysical beliefs. Truth and valuation are inseparable. Without knowing what truth in reality is how can that reality be realised, which is the ultimate aim of all philosophy. Therefore, metaphysics and ethics are the two sides of the same coin. There could not have been a better proof of the realisa-

1. आश्रवो भवहेतु. स्यात्सवरो मोक्षकारणम् ।
इतीयमार्हती दृष्टिरन्यदस्याः प्रपञ्चनम् ॥
—*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Poona, 1951, p. 80.

2. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Saranatha, 1933, 2.2.3.

tion of this relation between metaphysics and ethics than the employment of the word '*dharma*' for the 'essential nature of things' (*vastusvabhāvaḥ*) on the one hand, and for 'moral duties' on the other. *Samantabhadra* goes to the extent of saying that without knowing the real nature of things, which is permanency in transitoriness, all moral distinction between the antithesis of bondage and liberation, *punya* and *pāpa*, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain will be blurred.[1] Belief, for example, in the metaphysical view that the nature of things is absolutely transitory would make it impossible to carry on any financial transaction, or to explain the fact of memory, or to have any relation like that of husband and wife.[2]

1. पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात्प्रेत्यभावः फले कुतः ।
बन्धमोक्षौ च तेषा न येषा त्वं नासि नायकः ॥
क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि प्रेत्यभावाद्यसम्भवः ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यभावान्न कार्यारम्भ. कुतः फलम् ॥
—*Āptamīmamsā*, Śolāpura. Śak. Saṁ. 1826, 40-41

Also
न बन्धमोक्षौ क्षणिकैकसंस्थौ
न संवृतिः सापि मृषा स्वभावा ।
मुख्याहृते गौणविधिर्न दृष्टो
विभ्रान्तदृष्टिस्तव दृष्टितोऽन्या ॥
—*Yuktyanuśāsana*, Saharanapura, 1951 verse 15.

Also
नैकान्तवादे सुखदुःखभोगौ
न पुण्यपापे न च बन्धमोक्षौ ।
दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनासिनैवं
परैर्विलुप्तं जगदप्यशेषम् ॥
—*Syādvādamañjarī*, Bombay, 1935, verse 35.

2. प्रतिक्षणं भङ्गिषु तत्पृथक्त्वा-
न्न मातृघाती स्वपति. स्व-जाया ।
दत्तग्रहो नाधिगतस्मृतिर्न
तत्वार्थसत्यं न कुलं न जातिः ॥
—*Yuktyanuśāsana*, 16.

Seven fundamentals of Jainism[1]

It is due to this close relation between metaphysics and ethics that *Jainācāryas*, though as much interested in the ethical problem of removal of misery as the Buddhists, begin their philosophy with a metaphysical discussion of self and non-self, which are the first and second fundamental truths of Jainism. Thus Jainism is a dualistic system, bifurcating the universe into two exhaustive categories : *jīva*, soul; and *ajīva*, matter. This division of the universe comes nearer to the division of '*puruṣa*' and '*prakṛti*' of *Sāṅkhya* system.

The mystery of how the *jīva* or self joins hands with *ajīva* or non-self in mundane existence still remains unexplained. In Jainism, *Kārmic* matter or subtle material particles are held to be the medium of holding the gross body with the conscious soul. The soul has an inherent quality of attracting these particles towards itself. This is psychophysical process. Whenever the soul entertains any such idea as that of attachment or aversion (called *bhāvāśrava*), it attracts some very subtle particles, which differ in each case in accordance with the nature of the idea entertained by the soul (*dravyāśrava*). This, in short, is the third fundamental truth of Jainism.

The mere inflow of this *kārmic* matter is no obstacle. But four fundamental passions (*Kaṣāya*) viz anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed, together with wrong belief (*mithyādarśana*), non-discipline (*avirati*), negligence (*pramāda*), and psychophysical activities (*yoga*), hold the *kārmic* matter in bondage (*bandha*) with soul. This is the fourth fundamental truth of Jainism.

The fifth fundamental truth is that this inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter is to be checked (*Saṁvara*). This requires a constant vigilance against such trends of mind, deeds and words as may lead to such inflow.

The sixth fundamental truth is regarding shedding (*nirjarā*) of such *kārmic* matter as may already be accumulated by the soul. This is rendered possible by penance and meditation.

The seventh fundamental truth is that of liberation, where the soul, engulfed in the mud of *kārmic* matter from times immemorial, after getting rid of it, shines forth in its intrinsic purity of infinite knowledge, intuition, bliss and potency.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, Banaras, 1952, 1.4.

These seven fundamentals of Jainism, it will be seen, are the corrolaries of the famous doctrine of *Karman*, on the foundation of which not only the edifice of Jaina ethics but of all ethical systems of India stands. 'As you sow, so shall you reap' is the most fundamental doctrine of all ethical systems. Man is the architect of his own fate. It is this belief which holds him responsible for his own miseries and happiness. It is this belief again, which inspires him to ethical considerations in his conduct. The brief sketch of seven fundamentals of Jainism, which is given here, is a bit difficult to grasp at the beginning and shall be dealt with in detail in the following chapter. But before that, the basis of these principles viz. the doctrine of *Karman*, should be examined now and here, because of its supreme importance for any ethical discussion.

Doctrine of Karman

What is known as the law of cause and effect in the sphere of physical science is known by the name of *karmasiddhānta* in the sphere of ethics. It is not possible to behave in a particular way and escape its concommitant result. Similarly, no result ensues without a corresponding action. No effort, however small, goes for nought. We do not meet any result, which is not justified by our own past doings. This, in short, is the doctrine of *karman*, which is accepted by Brāhmaṇical, Buddhistic and Jaina schools of thought. But even this doctrine of *karman* has not gone unchallenged in the history of philosophy. We shall refer to some objections to the doctrine of *karman* at the end of this chapter. Herebelow we give a description of some schools of thought, which hold different factors to be responsible for our miseries and pleasures. We shall also try to explain the Jaina attitude towards these schools.

Different schools

The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* gives a beautiful summary of the various schools of thought regarding the causes of misery and happiness prevalent in ancient India. It enumerates seven schools of thought which give prominence to either one or the other of the following factors :

1. Time (*Kāla*)
2. Nature (*Svabhāva*)
3. Fate (*Niyati*)
4. Chance (*Yadṛcchā*)
5. Matter (*Bhūta*)
6. *Puruṣa*
7. A combination of all these (*Saṁyoga eṣām*).[1]

There is reference to many of these sects in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Gommaṭasāra* also. Before we proceed to discuss these schools individually, let us note in the very beginning that the Jaina thinkers have not rejected any of these schools outright. What they have rejected, is the rejection of any one of these factors. The mistake that others have committed, according to Jainism, is that they have over-emphasised the role of one of these factors and have not taken others into consideration at all.[2] Therefore, the seventh school of thought, taking into consideration all these factors together, seems to represent the Jaina school of thought. This attitude of Jainism is in consonance with its general attitude of non-absolutism (*Syādvāda*). Now, we discuss below each of the schools individually.

(i) *Time*

The *Kālasūkta* of *Atharvaveda* gives a vivid description of time. "It is he (time) who drew forth the worlds and encompasseth them.... There is no power superior to him".[3] *Gommaṭasāra* summarises this theory in these words : "Time

1. कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा
भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्याः
सयोग एषां नत्वात्मभावादा-
त्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ।
—*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 1.12

2. परसमयाण वयण मिच्छं खलु होइ सव्वहा वयणा
जेणाणं पुण वयणं सम्म खु कइचिवयणादो ।
—*Gommaṭasāra*, Lucknow, 1937, *Karmakānḍa*, 895.

3. स एव सं भुवनान्याभरत् स एव सं भुवनानि पर्यैत् ।
...तस्माद् वै नान्यत् परमस्ति तेजः ॥
—*Atharvaveda*, Aundha, 19.53.4.

creates all, time destroys all; time is waking among sleeping people. Time can be deceived by none."[1] This is an absolutistic (*ekānta*) view according to which everything is determined by time.

Obviously, time cannot be the sole factor in controlling our misery or happiness. Otherwise, how is it that some people are happy and others unhappy at the same time ? Time is something unconscious and cannot be held responsible for miseries and happiness which obviously result from our conscious efforts.

While rejecting this theory for such obvious reasons, the force of time-factor should be fully recognised. It is one of the factors affecting our condition. It is not easy to nullify the effects of old age, for which time is primarily responsible. In every walk of life, we do watch that time plays an important part. The mistake lies in believing that everything else is impotent before time.

(ii) *Nature*

Nature stands for inherent properties of things. Some philosophers, called *Svabhāvavādins*, hold that events are determined by their own inherent nature. They argue out that if nature is not the cause then 'who makes the sharpness of thorns, and who creates variety in deer and birds' ? Therefore, they establish that everything behaves according to its own nature.[2]

This school of thought denies any freedom of action. A thief must remain a thief for he is so by nature. This leaves no scope for human effort. We become puppets in the hands of our nature. In fact, the Jainas believe that nature, which does influence our conduct to a remarkable degree, is of our own making and we can unmake or modify it by our efforts. If the *Svabhāvavādins* want to refute the existence of any ultramundane controller of this universe, the Jainas join hand

1. *Gommaṭasāra, Karmakāṇḍa*, 879.
2. को करइ कंटयाण तिक्खत्तं मियविहंगमादीणं ।
   विविहत्तं तु सहाओ इदि संव्वपि य सहाओत्ति ॥
   —*Gommaṭasāra, karmakāṇḍa*, 883.

with them. But to say that there is no freedom of will, amounts to denial of moral responsibility for action. Obviously, such a theory cannot become the basis of any sound ethical system.

(iii) *Fatalism*

Fate means that whatever happens, happens necessarily. Everything is predetermined. We cannot choose between good or bad, for our future course of action is already fixed. Amongst modern philosophers, name of Spinoza may be mentioned, who was a staunch believer in determinism. "Only ignorance makes us think that we can alter the future; what will be will be, and the future is as unalterably fixed as the past. This is why hope and fear are condemned : both depend upon viewing the future as uncertain, and therefore spring from lack of wisdom."[1]

The *Mahābhārata* has a long discussion on the controversy of fate vs human efforts.[2] Amongst contemporaries of *Mahāvīra* and *Buddha*, *Makkhali Gosāla* (or *Maskarin Gosāla*) seems to be an absolute fatalist. According to him, the soul after completing the number of inevitable births is automatically freed of miseries.[3] There is no punishment or reward for any conscious practice of vice or virtue. Not that vice and virtue are not connected with bondage or release, but to quote Zimmer : "According to this "hempen shirt" doctrine of Gosāla, man's moral conduct is not without significance......Our words and deeds, that is to say, announce to ourselves—and to the world—every minute, just what mile stones we have come to......pious acts, then, are not the causes, but the effects; they do not bring but they foretell release."[4]

Another fatalist with a difference but again a contemporary of *Mahāvīra*, was *Purāṇakāśyapa* (or *Pūrṇakāśyapa*). He says : 'that to one who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into house, who commits dacoity, or

1. Bertrand Russel, *History of Western Philosophy*, London, 1948, p. 597.
2. *Mahābhārata*, 13.6.7-12.
3. *Dīgha Nikāya*, Pt I, Bombay, 1942, 1.2.20.
4. Zimmer, H., *Philosophies of India*, pp. 267-268.

robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies; to him thus acting there is no guilt'. Again, 'in generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking the truth there is neither merit nor increase of merit'.[1]

The distinction between these two can be easily noticed. *Makkhali Gosāla* does make a distinction between good and bad, but he denies a man any right of improving his lot which is predetermined. In other words, a man would automatically become good when the time for his release approaches. But for *Purāṇa Kāśyapa* there is nothing like moral. It seems that these two thinkers were misrepresented by their opponents by exaggerating their emphasis on fatalism. But it is also true that any such philosophy which over-emphasises fatalism may prove detrimental for moral progress of a man who may become inert. It was this aspect of fatalism which made Buddha retort such philosophers in these words : "There exists a 'heroic effort (*vīryam*) in man, there exists the possibility of a successful exertion (*utsāha*) aimed at the disengaging of man from the vortex of rebirths.. provided he strives whole-heartedly for this end."[2]

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* summed up this doctrine of fatalism in these words : "But misery (and pleasure) is not caused by (the souls) themselves; how could it be caused by other (agents, as time etc.)? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not caused by (the souls) themselves, nor by others; but the individual souls experience them; it is the lot assigned them by destiny."[3] This attitude is criticised in the following words : "Those who proclaim these opinions, are fools who fancy themselves learned; they have no knowledge and do not understand that things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion.[4] Thus the Jainas have a synthetic view in this respect also. There are passages in Jaina literature which favour ralative determinism; but it is never done at the cost of human effort,

1. *Digha Nikāya*, 1.2.
2. Zimmer, H., *Philosophies of India*, p. 226.
3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, Bangalore, Vik. Saṁ. 1993, 1.1.2.2-3. SBE. Translation.
4. Ibid., 1.1.2.4.
   Also cf. *Gommaṭasāra, Karmakāṇḍa*, 882.

which the Jainas hold to be of supreme value for all moral progress. This synthetic position is not self-contradictory. We shall deal with this problem of determinism vs. freedom of will at the end of this discussion separately. For the present we can say that if our miseries and happiness were to be guided by some blind fate, all ethics, religions and instructions will lose their importance.

4. *Chance* (*Yadṛcchā*)

This school of thought is called by the name of 'accidentalism' by modern thinkers. These accidentalists believe that there is no so-called 'cause and effect' relation between any objects. Their argument is that we cannot show the ultimate cause of any event. Therefore, they conclude that every event is merely a matter of chance.

The only good that this theory can do to us, according to the Jainas, is that it reminds us of the subordinate position of instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) as against the substantial cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) which holds the primary position. In the history of Western philosophy, Plato and Aristotle are inclined towards accidentalism. Stoics, on the other hand, realised that a law is working in this universe and every effect can be traced to some cause.[1] Grier Hibben has remarked that accidentalism is a view of the world which characterises a pre-scientific period of thought."[2]

5. *Bhūta* (Matter)

Materialists hold unconscious matter to be responsible for everything. They only believe in *pratyakṣa* (authority of perception) and therefore, do not agree with other systems of Indian philosophy with regard to the existence of soul. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* gives the ethical implications of this theory. 'There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be'.[3]

1. James, Hastings, (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, New York, 1955, Vol. I, p. 65.
2. Ibid., p. 64.
3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, SBE Vol. XLV, Oxford, 1895, 1.1,1.12 (p. 237).

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha summarises the attitude of materialism towards pain and pleasure in these words : "They (i. e. opponents) conceive that you ought to throw away the pleasures of life because they are mixed with pain; but what prudent man will throw away unpeeled rice which encloses excellent grain because it is covered with husk."[1]

It is clear from this that materialism glorifies gratification of the lust of senses as the highest good of life. There are, however, reasons to believe that materialism has been misrepresented by the opponents of this school. Materialists did caution us against being too much other-wordly. They tried to organise society not on any theocratic but on a secular basis. They launched an agitation against many baseless superstitions of society, e. g. they argued that if the animal killed in a sacrifice went to heaven why did the sacrificer not kill his own father and send him to heaven.[2]

The 'matter' is as real to Jainism as to materialism. But to say that matter is the only reality would be against all principles of Jainism. It is not conceivable how consciousness can be the result of natural forces. We shall open another chapter with this discussion. For the present, suffice it to say that the very idea that we can escape the responsibility of our actions is repulsive to ethics. Unrestrained sensualism is self-destructive. Unchecked desires of the members of society may lead to anarchism. If we accept that there are only two aims of life, money and sex (*arthakāmau*), and righteousness and liberation (*dharmamokṣau*) are mere fabrications of human mind then where is the

1. त्याज्यं सुखं विषयसङ्गमजन्म पुंसां
दुःखोपसृष्टमिति मूर्खविचारणैषा ।
व्रीहीञ्जिहासति सितोत्तमतण्डुलाढ्यान्
को नाम भोस्तुषकणोपहितान् हितार्थी ।
—*Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*. p. 4.

2 पशुश्चेन्निहतः स्वर्गं ज्योतिष्टोमे गमिष्यति ।
स्वपिता यजमानेन तत्र कस्मान्न हिंस्यते ॥
Ibid., p. 13.

distinction between a man and an animal and where is the necessity of any ethics ?

6. *Puruṣa*

The word *puruṣa* has many connotations in Indian philosophy. The more important of them are (i) Human beings (ii) *Brahman* and (iii) God or *Īśvara*. All of these are held responsible for misery by one or the other school of thought.

(i) *Human beings*: This school believes that there is no exterior cause of human miseries except the efforts of human beings themselves. There is complete freedom of will. A man may do whatever he likes. There are no limitations on our efforts. This is called theory of indeterminism as against the theory of determinism which is a modern name for fatalism.

This theory is quite congenial to ethics because it does not hold environments responsible for our actions of commission and omission. We cannot be charged for an immoral action which we did not commit of our own choice. Therefore, this theory believes in the capability of a man to choose a path of his own choice. Jainism supports this theory so far. But the force of circumstances should also be recognised, or else what is the use of our previous actions if they do not and cannot mould our present ? The past actions do not go for nought. They leave their impressions on us. We are, therefore, free only to the extent we have not curtailed our freedom by our own past actions.

(ii) *Brahman* : We have discussed above the case of materialism, holding matter to be the only reality. The *Vedāntists* hold just the opposite view. They hold consciousness to be the only reality. This one conscious entity, called *Brahman*, is the substantial as well as the instrumental cause of this universe. It pervades the whole universe.

Samantabhadra in his *Āptamīmāṁsā* has given the following implications of this theory :

"If we accept monism, no distinction between the doer and the action can be made. The existence of good and bad actions, pain and pleasure, this world and the next world, knowledge and nescience, and bondage and liberation, implies duality. And logical conclusion can be drawn only on the basis of two premises, which again imply

duality. If monism is based on scriptures and not on logic, dualism may also be said to be based on scriptures. Nothing is contradicted unless it exists ; and therefore non-duality, which contradicts duality, from this very fact accepts the existence of duality."[1]

(iii) *God* : Many popular religions, together with some systems of philosophy, assert that there is an eternal Lord of the universe who creates, sustains and destroys it. It is He who sends us misery and happiness. Of course, according to some religions, He does so in accordance with the actions that we perform. Thus the idea of God is not always disconnected with the doctrine of *karman* in India. But Jainism does not hold it logical to believe that there is an eternal God ruling over the universe and sitting on us in judgment. Before we give reasons for it as forwarded by Jainism, let us examine what the popular religions like Christianity, Islam and Hinduism say about this interesting problem.

Popular theories about God

(A) *Hinduism* : The popular devotional approach of Hinduism towards God is best represented by the *Gītā*. God is all-in-all. We are just puppets in his hands. We should surrender ourselves unconditionally to the will of Almighty.[2] Nothing can be done without His will. He is situated in every heart, moving every body according to His will.[3] The fruit of every good or bad action must be surrendered to Him.

It is, however, repeatedly told by Hindu Scriptures that the consequences of an action performed by a man must be borne by him. So there is no denying the responsibility.

(B) *Christianity* : Coming to Christianity, the old Testament presupposes the existence of God. It does not consider it necessary to give any arguments to prove it. It teaches us to worship one and one God alone and not to pay any attention to lesser deities.

1. *Āptamīmāmsā*, 24-27.
2. *Gītā*, Madras, 1930. 18.66.
3. Ibid., 18.61.

God is one.[1] He is Spirit,[2] holy and righteous,[3] merciful and forgiving. He cares for the lowliest[4]. Jesus, who is the son of God, knows his father as no other can.[5] Added to these two, God and His Christ, Spirit makes the Holy Trinity of Christianity complete. "The Father is the primal source, the son the mediating power, the spirit the executive energy ; and every Divine act is to be understood as a working of the Father, through the son, in and by the Holy Spirit."[6]

Evidently, there is not much difference between the idea of God as represented in these popular religions. In Christianity, the mediating power of Christ is an extra entity. He may be compared to the incarnation of Hinduism. The second thing is the denial of any deity other than God. In Hinduism also, Sikhism and Ārya Samāja show the same tendency.

(C) *Islam* : Islam lays even greater emphasis on Oneness of God. It condemns the trinity of Christianity in the following words : "Believe, therefore, in God and his apostles, and say not, "Three" ; forbear, it will be better for you. God is only one God. Far be it from His Glory that He should have a son."[7] "...And when God shall say : 'O Jesus, son of Mary, hast thou said unto mankind : Take me and my mother as two Gods beside God ?" He shall say : "Glory be unto thee ; it is not for me to say that which I know to be not true."[8]

Muslim theologians have given the following seven attributes of God : (i) Life (*hayāh*) (ii) Knowledge (*ilm*) (iii) Power (*qudra*) (iv) Will (*irāda*) (v) Hearing (*Sam*), (vi) Seeing (*baṣar*) and (vii) Speech (*Kalām*).[9]

All these attributes hardly make any difference for the ethical discussion with which we are concerned presently. The basic

1. Mark, 12.29 (*The Holy Bible*, London, year is not mentioned).
2. John, 4.24. (*The Holy Bible*).
3. John, 17.11, 25. (*The Holy Bible*).
4. Matthew, 6.30. (*The Holy Bible*).
5. Matthew, 11 27. (*The Holy Bible*).
6. Hastings, James, *E.R.E.* Vol. VI, p. 261.
7. Ibid., Vol. VI. p. 300.
8. Hastings, James, *E.R.E.* Vol. VI., p. 300.
9. Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 300.

truth about these theistic religions is that they all believe in one eternal God, who is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient and who is the author of not only this universe but also of our fate, miseries and happiness. Now, let us examine this contention.

The theory of God is based on the idea that every action must have an agent. So there should be some power which created this universe. Now, the question is whether the supposed creator created this universe out of nothing or out of some material which already existed. He could not create it out of nothing because nothing can be created out of nothing. "There is no existence out of non-existence nor is there destruction of what exists."[1] This is an axiomatic truth. The other alternative that God created this universe out of a pre-existent matter, leaves unanswered the question how a non-creative God suddenly became creative at a particular time.

Ethically also, theistic theory of creation is not free from doubts. "The Dilemma of Epicurus is still with us; if God wishes to prevent evil but cannot, then He is impotent; if he could but will not, he is malevolent; if He has both the power and the will, whence then is evil."[2] W. D. Niven has tried to analyse the problem. There are, according to him, three alternatives : (1) God is not good or (2) He is not impotent or (3) Evil is not what it seems to be. He has discussed the pros and cons of every alternative and this is how he concludes : "......Every proposed solution either leaves the old question unanswered or raises new ones. The problem is for the human mind insoluble."[3]

The so-called orthodox systems of Indian philosophy were also familiar with the difficulties about the theistic hypothesis. *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, a commentary on *Sāmkhyakārikā*, says : "......It becomes impossible to assume that the creation

1. नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।
   —*Gītā*, 2.16.
   Cf. *Pañcāstikāya*,, Bombay, Vik Saṁ. 1972, 15
2. W.R. Sorley and other, *The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human life*. p. 48. quoted from *ERE*, Vol. XXII, p. 1.
3. Hastings, James, *ERE*, Vol. VI. p. 324.

of the world was due to conscious action. For a God, whose wishes are all fulfilled, can have had no personal interest whatever in the creation for kindness, since before the creation souls suffered no pain......from what could the kindness of God wish to have souls released? Further, a God who is actuated by kindness would create only joyful creatures."[1]

Besides, *Kumārilabhaṭṭa* in his *Ślokavārtika*, has held that there could be no creator of this universe.[2] Even *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*, according to new researches, were originally atheistic.[3]

Jaina view about God :

Keeping in view all these difficulties in accepting a universal Lord of the world, the Jainas believe that the hypothesis that an eternal self-subsistent God made this world, which stood in need of maker, does not hold good. If God could be eternal and self-subsistent, there is no difficulty in holding that the universe, with all its constituent spiritual and material forces, is also eternal and self-subsistent. Substances, which are endowed with certain qualities, can produce new sets of qualities by the process of permutation and combination. These substances are independent of any external agency in their functioning and do not obey any superior power. Of what use is the inherent quality of a substance if it works only under God's supervision? If fire burns and water cools, it is not due to the will of God; it is due to their inherent qualities. To say that these inherent qualities were bestowed on these substances by God is also an impossibility. Can we imagine these substances bereft of their qualities at any time? Therefore, this physical world is ruled by physical law and not by any divine law.

This, however, does not mean that there is no God. "God is only the highest, noblest and fullest manifestation of the powers which lie latent in souls of men."[4] There is no eternal God sitting upon judgement on human beings. Human souls themselves attain Godhood or *Siddhhood* by shedding away all impurities. Such human souls become completely free and

1. Miśra, Vācaspati, on *Sāmkhyakārikā*, 57. cf. Also *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, p. 228.
2. *Ślokavārtika*, Calcutta, 1909, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 47-59; 74-88.
3. Hastings, James, *ERE*, Vol. II, p. 186.
4. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, London, 1941, Vol. I, p. 331.

are possessed of infinite knowledge, potency, perception and bliss. These *Siddhas* are far more above gods or deities. They neither create nor destroy any thing. They have conquered, once for all, their nescience and passions and cannot be molested by them again.

These *Siddhas* do not and cannot return our prayers. They do not take the law in their hands so as to show to their devotees any grace or forgiveness for which there is no place in the strict law of *karman*. How can they, who have completely conquered attachment and aversion and are equanimous to all, be pleased or angry with anybody ?

This does not mean that prayer has no place in Jaina-scheme of life. By meditating upon the attributes of *Siddhas* and by showing respect to them we neither flatter them nor please them but simply try to awaken in us the latent potentialities of Godhood The *Siddhas* do not come to our rescue but a constant mental association with our ideal, through their medium, helps us in its realisation. Therefore, it is insisted that 'even though one may be inclined towards the knowledge of *padārthas*, and devotion of *tīrthaṅkaras* and may have interest in the scriptures and may observe self-control and penance, yet *Nirvāṇa* is far away from him (without self-realisation)'.[1]

Some objections to the doctrine of Karman

We have seen above that accidentalism has no scope in modern times. Nothing can fall outside the circle of cause and effect. The interacting causes may cooperate or oppose or neutralise one another in such an intricate manner that the resultant combinations are not predictable easily. If we do not know this intricate chain of causes, we may call an incident accidental; but all the same, it is not without cause. On the same ground, the theories of Time, Nature or Blind Fate or Matter can be dismissed as overlooking the universal rule that there is no effect without a cause

1. सपयत्थं तित्थयरं अभिगदबुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स ।
दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवसंपओत्तस्स ॥
—*Pañcāstikāya*, 170.

and there is no cause without an effect. Logically, we have noticed, that even a creator God cannot be the author of our fate. In fact, we are left with no other alternative but to accept that man is the architect of his own fate. Our deeds are like the seeds, the fruits of which are the miseries and happiness of life. '*Vidhi*', the *Saṁskṛta* word for destiny, literally means a 'law' and not accident. Every belief, liking, disliking and tendency of life goes to form our temperament, inclinations and capabilities. Every thought, word and deed bears its full fruit. Thus the doctrine of *Karman* involves a great faith in human effort. In spite of this inevitability of the doctrine of *karman* for all moral considerations, Western scholars do not agree with it. As examples, we quote below some of the important objections raised against the doctrine of *Karman* by Mr. John Mckenzie in his book "*Hindu Ethics*' :

(i) "The kind of actions that are supposed to produce good and bad fruits respectively, are by no means always actions that most of us would regard as ethically good and bad."[1]

(ii) "Reward and punishment are given twice over, once in heaven or hell, and again in a new birth on earth."[2]

(iii) "The idea of the grace of God is in contradiction to the *Karma* doctrine."[3]

(iv) "The doctrine of *Karman* makes our admiration of pain and suffering endured by men for the sake of others absurd."[4]

(v) Mckenzie thinks that one should not demand justification for suffering which humanity endures.

(vi) Mckenzie thinks that in the theory of *Karman* no provision is made for the intentions underlying the action of the doer and that the doctrine works mechanically and does not take the psychological aspect of morality into consideration.

(vii) Doctrine of *Karman* implies fatalism and leaves no room for human efforts.

1. Mckenzie, John, *Hindu Ethics*, London, 1922, p. 218.
2. Ibid., p. 220.
3. Ibid., p. 223.
4. Ibid., p. 224.

These objections have been raised by a scholar like Mckenzie and need careful examination. Here below we would endeavour to examine them one by one :

The first objection can be raised against three types of actions : (a) to quote Mckenzie himself, 'many kinds of rituals and magical acts'; (b) such negative and individual virtues as non-violence and meditation; (c) acts of kindness to small insects and animals, which are hardly considered to be ethical by Western thinkers. As far as the rituals are concerned they do form a part of popular religion in India as elsewhere. Whether we believe in doctrine of *karman* or not, popular forms of religion always develop certain rituals, which are important for religious discipline in life. Of course, these rituals become meaningless in the absence of a genuine moral consciousness. The institution of sacrifice (*yajña*), when it lost its moral background, was condemned not only by the Jainas and the Buddhists but by the *Upaniṣads* also.

As regards the negative virtues, like non-violence, it may be pointed out that negation of evil is also an important part of ethics. Similarly, virtues like meditation may not come under morality according to Western scholars; in fact, they think that only those virtues which have a social bearing can be termed as ethical. But society is made up of individuals; and, therefore, to exclude virtues which lift up the individual from the realm of morality will not be proper.

As regards such actions as showing kindness to small insects, we should remember that Jainism particularly believes in equality of all life. Man is superior to other animals; but that does not give him the licence to tyrannise them. They demand as much of our attention as other fellow beings in the society. The Christian conception that beasts are made for men is not acceptable to *Karmavādins*, who believe in the theory of reincarnation; and, therefore, believe that an animal in this birth may have been a human being in his previous birth.

(ii) Mckenzie seems to confuse the Vedic conception of the other world, which does not conceive of rebirth, with the later conception of hell and heaven, which is much more

rational. It is not necessary, according to *karmavādins* to take birth on earth for receiving punishment or reward for past deeds. Even going to hell or heaven is a sort of rebirth. It is wrong to say that the same deeds are punished or rewarded twice, once in hell or heaven and again in a new birth on earth. One deed yields its fruit only once; it may be either in hell or heaven or on earth. A deed which has vielded its fruit once exhausts, and cannot yield the same fruit again.

(iii) It is perfectly true, as already explained, that the idea of 'grace of God' is in contradiction to the doctrine of *Karman*. But where is the necessity of bringing in a merciful God in human affairs ? 'Man thou art thy own friend, why wishest thou a friend beyond thyself ?", asks the Jaina scripture, *Ācārānga Sūtra*.[1] The doctrine of *Karman* teaches us self-dependence and not dependence on some imaginary grace of an imaginary God.

(iv) Here Mckenzie seems to miss the distinction between the real point of view (*niścayanaya*) and practical point of view (*vyavahāranaya*). The former takes substantial cause to be main factor whereas the latter takes instrumental cause to be predominating.[2] Both of them are to be taken in their proper perspective. From the real point of view nobody can inherit the acts of others and every body suffers the results of his actions all alone. Therefore, we cannot share the miseries of others. On this view-point is based the conduct of a monk, whose life is devoted to the higher cause of self realisation and emancipation. He is above social obligations. His contribution to the society is limited to the spiritual enlightenment that he gives and of which he is a living embodiment.

The case of a householder is different. His conduct is based on practical point of view. He is always ready to help his fellow beings. To undergo sufferings for others is a highly meritorious action and strongly recommended for a householder. If a householder shirks helping his fellow beings under the pretext of being unable to share the miseries of

1. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1 3.3 4. Max Müller (ed.), SBE, Vol. XXII, p. 33.

2. आत्माश्रितो निश्चयनयः पराश्रितो व्यवहारनयः ।
—*Amṛtacandra on Samayasāra*, Delhi, 1959, *gāthā* 272. (p. 352).

anybody else, he is a great hypocrite, who tries to rationalise or justify his selfish motives by quoting the scriptures.

Our obligations, therefore, vary as we ascend the ladders of spirituality. Spiritual realisation and not social service is the ultimate aim of life. But social service can and often does prove a stepping stone to spiritual realisation.

(v) The answer to this question is simple. There should be a cause for every effect. The sufferings, which humanity endures, should have also some cause. It will be a pity to accept that anybody can be miserable without any moral lapse on his part. It amounts to suggest that even a moral man can be miserable and even an immoral man can be happy. Then we will have to confess that there is no justice in the universe. If we believe in God, it must be admitted as a sheer cruelty on His part to inflict miseries on innocent creatures. If we do not believe in God we will have to say that the fates of human beings depend either on the vagaries of nature or on mere accident. We have already indicated that this is not tenable. Why should, after all, an action be considered good or right if it does not bring any good to the agent ?

(vi) The docrine of *Karman*, as expounded by Jainism, takes notice of the 'motives' behind actions fully. There are two aspects of an action : (i) psychological or subjective; and (ii) physical or objective. The law of *Karman* is inexorable, but it does not mean that it is mechanical. The same action may yield different results in accordance with the motive of the agent. There are examples where a lesser sin was met with heavier punishment on account of the intensity of the feeling of the agent. The story of *Tandulamatsya*, a small fish, sitting in the ear of a bigger fish, can be quoted in this connection.[1] The bigger fish was eating smaller fishes while the *Tandulamatsya* looked on. The bigger fish ate some of the fishes and left others. The *Tandulamatsya* always thought that had he been in the place of the bigger fish he would not have left a single fish alive. Merely by entertaining this violent idea with great intensity the *Tandulamatsya* had to go to lower hells than the bigger fish who actually committed

1. *Upāsakādhyayana*, pp. 141-142.

the sin of violence. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the doctrine of *Karman* does not take into account the psychological aspect of our actions.

(vii) The last, but not the least, objection against the doctrine of *Karman* is its fatalistic tendency. This question needs to be examined in greater detail, for it is a complicated problem of Jaina ethics. Even in modern times there are as many views regarding this question as there are sub-sects in Jainism. Great controversy seems to continue even among the thinkers of the same sect and, therefore, the question requires a careful study.

The question is : is it possible and consistent to hold the view that freedom of will exists, while accepting the doctrine of *Karman* ? In other words, while admitting the inevitable forces of habit, inherited character and circumstances, can one rise above these and move in a different direction ? If one can, then alone the ethical commandments, whether negative or positive, have any meaning and then only can we hold somebody morally responsible for his actions.

Modern thinkers have shown how a deterministic view of life makes one irresponsible towards moral obligations. Pringle Pattison says that on the basis of determinism one may "really seek to excuse himself in sequel, by trying to show that it was impossible for a man with his particular antecedents to act otherwise than he did . "[1] Butler dismissed necessity with a 'disrespect amounting to contempt'[2] from the same point of view. According to this view, the course of things cannot be changed ; and praise and blame, punishment, obligation and the hope of progress are illusions.

Kant has viewed this problem from two different angles.[3] Man, as an intellectual, demands coherence in experience. Character is empirical from this point of view, i.e. it falls under the law of causation. But as intelligent moral beings, we feel that we fix our ends for ourselves. Viewed from this angle, man seems to possess freedom of will. How to reconcile these

1. Pattison, Pringle, *The Philosophical, Radicals*, Edn. 1907, p. 101.
2. Gladstone W.E., *Studies subsidiary to Butler's Works*, Oxford, 1896, p. 268.
3. Hastings, James, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VI, p. 124.

two views is the problem before a thinker on moral problems. He cannot reject either of them and yet it seems difficult to accept both because of their apparently contradictory nature.

Dr. Green has pointed out that 'if I could be something today irrespective of what I was yesterday, or something tomorrow irrespective of what I am today, the motive to the self-reforming effort, furnished by regrets, for a part of which I reap the fruit, that growing success of the effort that comes with habituation, and the assurance of a better future which animates it, would alike be impossible.'[1] Mr. W. James, on the other hand, says that free will gives some ground of hope to those who feel the burden of the past and thus is 'a doctrine of relief.[2]

Jaina View on Freedom of Will

It has been already pointed out above that Jainism neither rejects fate nor efforts. *Samantabhadra* has attributed our success or failure to the following three factors : (1) *Bhavitavyatā* or fate (2) *Upādānakāraṇa* or substantial cause, which means human efforts (*puruṣārtha*) in the case of human beings[3] (3) *Nimittakāraṇa* or instrumental cause which includes past actions and the forced circumstances. Thus there are many, and not one, factors which act and counteract in the process of liberation. No action takes place in isolation. Our efforts are affected by our circumstances. But it does not mean that we are puppets in the hands of circumstances.

Nevertheless, future is predictable to some extent. In *Dvādaśānuprekṣā* it has been said that process of birth or death of a person is already known to the omniscient *Jinas* and nobody can change it[4] *Padmapurāṇa* says that a person gets a

1. Green, T.H., *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1899. p. 129.
2. James, W., *Pragmatism*, New York, 1948, p. 121.
3. अलंध्यशक्तिर्भवितव्यतेयं
   हेतुद्वयाऽऽविष्कृत-कार्य लिङ्गा ।
   —*Svayambhūstotra*, 33.
4. जं जस्स जम्मि देसे जेण विहाणेण जम्मि कालम्मि ।
   णादं जिणेण णियदं जम्मं वा अहव मरणं वा ॥
   तं तस्स तम्मि देसे तेण विहाणेण तम्मि कालम्मि ।
   को सक्कदि वारेदुं इंदो वा अह जिणिंदो वा ॥
   Kārtikeyānuprekṣā, Agas, 1960. 321-322.

thing at a time and place predetermined by fate.[1] In *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, a verse is quoted which says that our intellect, effort, and helpers turn the same way as our destiny.[2]

Now, if we accept so in absolute sense, then all moral teachings become futile. It is no use telling a person what he should or should not do, if he has no freedom of choice. The dangers of determinism are evident. It may paralyze all our efforts. It may make us immoral. Therefore, generally the *Ācāryas* speak about determinism with great caution. They generally praise human efforts and avoid referring to determinism. But all the same truth has to be faced. The theory of omniscience and the theory of *karman* do favour determinism in a certain sense. But they need neither paralyze our effort nor make us immoral. Let us explain it.

Kundakunda says that all of us have two-fold consciousness (i) knowledge-consciousness (*jñānacetanā*) (ii) Action-consciousness (*karmacetanā*).[3] Knowledge consciousness means the state of absolute freedom from the sense of being an agent of an action (*kartṛtvabhāvanā*) : In this state of knowledge-consciousness, the soul remains absorbed in its pure intrinsic, blissful, conscious state. It has no desire or initiative for action. This is a state of supra-moral plane of life which is beyond good and bad both This is not a state of inertia but a state of sense of fulfilment of the purpose of life. This is the ultimate end of life. Determinism paralyzes not only the good activities but bad activities also and what remains is the pure consciousness of blissful nature of the self. This is spoken of

1. यत्प्राप्तव्यं यदा येन यत्र यावद्यतोऽपि वा ।
   तत्प्राप्यते तदा तेन तत्र तावत्ततो ध्रुवम् ॥
   —*Padmapurāṇa*, Kashi, 1959, 29.83.
2. तादृशी जायते बुद्धिर्व्यवसायश्च तादृशः ।
   सहायास्तादृशाः सन्ति यादृशी भवितव्यता ॥
   —Quoted by Sūri, Vidyānandī, on *Āptamīmāṁsā*, Rajnagar, Vik. Saṁ. 1993, 5.
3. परिणमदि चेदणाए आदा पुण चेदणा तिधाभिमदा ।
   सा पुण णाणे कम्मे फलम्मि वा कम्मणो भणिदा ॥
   —*Pravacanasāra*, 2.31.

as the real point of view. This is a state of complete freedom from attachment and aversion.

From practical point of view, however, it is action-consciousness (*karmacetanā*) which predominates. The aspiant has not as yet risen above the sense of being an agent of an action (*kartṛtvabhāvanā*). He has, therefore, not transcended moral obligations of life. He has not wiped away passions and has, therefore, always to choose between the good and bad. Herein comes the role of human efforts (*puruṣārtha*). We cannot escape the responsibility of being overpowered by passions if we choose to follow the immoral path. A common man cannot be led by consideration of determinism, which is a feature of knowledge-consciousness (*jñānacetanā*) only. Knowledge-consciousness is not to be confused with action-consciouness, because both of them are exclusive of each other and cannot exist side by side. A man with action-consciousness aims at knowledge-consciousness, but it is not possible to attain knowledge-consciousness without perfect detachment. The path to supra-ethical plane of life is only through practical path of morality and not through immorality.

The doctrine of *karman*, therefore, does not license us to act in a wanton manner. The ultimate aim is the complete cessation of all activities and attainment of knowlegde-consciousness and from this point of view determinism may be justified, but a man with action-consciousness has no knowledge of future and from his standpoint of view everything is indetermined. It is only his effort and exertion which brings him nearer his goal.

Paṇḍita Ṭoḍara Mala has put the problem in this way[1] : The self makes effort and brings about its liberation. Other factors of time or fate or subsidisation of delusive *karmans* syncronise with human efforts. Efforts on the part of self automatically imply that the time and fate is favourable and the delusive *karmans* have subsided. It is human efforts (*puruṣārtha*) which leads to liberation ; the other two factors of time and fate are passive. In fact, we have no knowledge of our future ; and even though it may be determined we can depend only on our efforts.

1. Ṭoḍaramala, *Mokṣamārgaprakāśa*, Mathurā, 1948, pp. 279-280.

We have here tried to show that the doctrine of *karman* of which partial determinism is a corollary, neither teaches us to be immoral or idle nor does it deprive us of the right of improving our lot by overcoming the force of circumstances and past actions. Even an inherited character is the making of the agent and he can blame nobody for impairing his freedom of will except himself.

This problem of 'freedom of will' can be viewed from another angle also. No action takes place in seclusion. Human beings are also affected by circumstances and environment. The main factor, however, remains human effort (*puruṣārtha*). Here we accept the existence of freedom of will over circumstances. The position is like this : there are two types of causes, (i) substantial cause (*Upādānakāraṇa*) and (ii) instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). The inherent power of the agent is the substantial cause and every other factor is only an instrumental cause. It is the substantial cause which predominates and the instrumental causes merely subsidise. The reality is that no object can interfere with the working of another object, whether animate or inanimate. The self accordingly is the agent of its own psychic modifications (*paryāyas*). It is only from practical point of view that we speak of ātman as the agent of various activities. Jainism believes in the independence of each and every object. Our freedom implies freedom of others also. Therefore, *Kundakundācārya* favours *svakartṛvāda*, viz. the idea that the self is the agent of its own modification; but rejects *parakartṛvāda*, viz. that the self can interfere in the activities of others.[1]

This attitude, which gives subsidiary position to instrumental causes, accepts the doctrine of freedom of will and glorifies human efforts. This attitude makes Jaina ethics inclined towards introversion also. 'The self, within self, satisfied with self' is the motto of all individualistic systems of philosophy. This has a far-reaching impact on Jaina ethics, as will be observed during our study at many places. Extroversion, whether it is due to our incapability of self-control or for the cause of social service, never leads us nearer the goal. It is

1. *Samayasāra*, 372.

rather withdrawal from the outside world which takes us nearer to self-realisation.

Here again, we are faced with the danger of an immoral man defending himself on the ground that he is not the real agent of the action for which he is being blamed. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* refers to some schools of philosophy known as *akriyāvādins*.[1] The adherents of *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhists are reckoned as *Akriyāvādins*[2]. According to Sāṅkhya, the puruṣa or self is transcendental and does not participate in mundane activities. According to Buddhists, and *Śūnyavādins* also, either the self changes every moment or it does not exist at all. It is clear that these systems are faced with a dilemma. Either they have to accept that the self suffers for such actions which he does not perform or they have to deny the common-place experience that the self suffers.

The *Kriyāvādins* are those who ascribe the quality of activity or non-activity to soul (*ātman*).[3] Jacobi thinks that they were perhaps the ritualists because *Śīlāṅka* informs us that the *Kriyāvādins* held constructions of sanctuaries (*caityakarma*) to be the principal means of attainment of liberation.[4] Sometimes, even the Jainas are mentioned as *Kriyāvādins*.[5]

We have explained above the position of Jainism in this respect. To take a concrete example, a murderer may try to get rid of the responsibility of the murder either by (i) saying that he is not the agent of the action or by (ii) contending that the death of the victim has been brought about by his own actions and that he is merely an instrumental cause in the murder. Both of these arguments can be counteracted, according to Jainism, effectively. As regards his first argument, he may not be an agent of death of the victim but he is an agent of entertaining the idea of murdering the victim and then he is also responsible for acting in a way which led to the death of the victim. Therefore, he cannot escape the

1. Max Müller (ed), SBE. Vol. XLV, p. 316.
2. Ibid., p. 316, foot-note 3.
3. Ibid., p. 83, foot-note 2.
4. Ibid., p. 242, foot-note 3.
5. Ibid., p. 319, foot-note 2.
   cf. *Mahāvagga*, Bihar, 1956, 6.19.31.

moral responsibility. Similarly, we can answer his second argument : though he is an instrumental cause as far as the death of the victim is concerned, yet he is the substantial cause of the idea of violence in which the victim had no hand.

Thus the realisation of predominance of substantial cause should lead to self-absorption and not to wanton activities.

Conclusion

We have tried to discuss some fundamental problems of Jaina ethics in this chapter. From this discussion some of the chief characteristics of Jaina ethics can also be inferred. Here, below we mention a few of the salient features of Jaina view of life :

Firstly, Jaina ethics is based on the fundamental doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*). This has saved Jaina-ethics from being one-sided. Jaina ethics always takes into account all the different views and tries to reconcile them. We have seen, for example, that various factors of time, nature, fate, accident and matter find their proper place in Jaina view of life. The approach of Jainism towards opponent schools of thought is constructive and not destructive. We can mention how non-absolutistic view led to the balanced view between such opposite conceptions as that of practical morality and transcendental morality, between fate and human efforts, between *kartṛvāda*, and *akartṛvāda* and between the efficacy of substantial cause and instrumental cause. Many more instances can be added to the list. In fact, we shall feel the impact of non-absolutism at every step during the course of our study. All other characteristics of Jaina view of life may be said to be the corollory of this one main characteristic.

Secondly, Jaina ethics does not confuse the science of spirituality (*mokṣaśāstra*) with science of social righteousness (*dharmaśāstra*). It has thus been able to distinguish the essential nature of dharma from its non-essential beliefs, which change from time to time and place to place. The acts of public welfare (*iṣṭāpūrta*) can be dealt with separately in books of social sciences; but they should not be confused with the essential problem of ethics which is emancipation. On account of the influence of sister religions like Hinduism, the

Jainācāryas also spoke of social duties, including duties towards city, nation and family; but they never confused them with *Mokṣaśāstra*, which—they are very clear on this point—deals with the conquest of animal passions (*kaṣāyavijaya*) in man

Thirdly, Jaina ethics lays emphasis on the unity of faith, knowledge and conduct. Thus Jaina ethics is not merely a system giving certain code of morality, but it is a religion to be lived in practice. There are many adherents of Jainism, both among householders and monks, who scrupulously practise the rules of conduct in their lives. Thus, it is a living system of ethics. Its study becomes more fascinating if we compare the lives of the present Jaina householders and monks with the rules given in their scriptures. Equal emphasis on faith, knowledge and conduct saves Jaina ethics from being either a mere speculation of philosophy or merely a religion of rituals.

Fourthly, Jaina ethics assigns primary place to the life of a monk and the life of a householder occupies only a secondary place. It is due to this fact that Jaina ethics lays more emphasis on individual and ascetic virtues than on social and positive virtues. The ultimate aim of life being liberation, nothing short of complete renunciation of the mundane life could satisfy Jaina *ācāryas*.

Fifthly, Jaina ethics is based neither on oneness of life as in *Vedānta*, nor on momentary nature of self as in Buddhism. It is based on equality of life. Basically, all souls are equal. Therefore, no wonder that such precepts as non-violence in Jainism take into account not only the human beings or animals or insects but even plant-life or one-sensed elemental life, like water etc.

Sixthly, the social organisation as anticipated by Jaina ethics, does not make any distinction on the basis of caste, creed or colour. At present, however, the Jaina society has borrowed caste system from Hinduism and observes it as strictly as the latter.

CHAPTER II

THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND

We have already spoken of the close relation of ethics and metaphysics in the foregoing chapter. The *Daśavaikālika sūtra* asks, "one, who does not know the self and the non-self, how can he know the path to self-control (*saṁyama*)".[1] In this connection, we have also referred to the seven predicaments of Jainism.[2] We propose to elaborate the following seven predicaments in the present chapter as they form the metaphysical background of Jaina ethics :

1. Self (*jīva*)
2. Non-self (*ajīva*)

3, 4 The inflow of *kārmic* matter (*āśrava*) and bondage (*bandha*).

5, 6. Checking (*saṁvara*) and shedding (*nirjarā*) of *kārmic* matter.

7. Liberation (*mokṣa*).[3]

The Nature of Self (jīva)

The first of these predicaments is 'self' (*jīva*). Self is subject as well as object of all meditation. The nature of self is, therefore, the most fundamental of all problems. Self is the stay of all our experience. It is the truth of truths. But for it, there is neither any reality nor any truth.

The Upaniṣads

According to the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* the basic problem of ethics—the removal of misery—can be solved only by self-realisation.[4] The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* clearly says that it is

1. *Daśavaikālika*, 4.12
2. *Supra*, p. 13.
3. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.4.
4. तरति शोकमात्मवित् । *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. 7.1.3.

the self which we should perceive, hear, of which we should meditate.[1]

The Cārvāka view

To the category of *Cārvāka* view philosophers, there is only one reality and that is 'matter'. Self is body, characterised by consciousness.[2] It is wrong to say that matter cannot possess consciousness. Just as the mixtures of certain ingredients give birth to the power of intoxication, similarly combination of certain material elements results in consciousness.[3] On the dissolution of body, the self is annihilated.[4]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view

The first and foremost to give proof of the existence of soul are the *Naiyāyikas*. They hold that the existence of a permanent *jīvātman* can be proved through inference and authority.[5]

Nyāyasūtra has given the following signs to prove the existence of *ātman* (i) desire, (ii) hatred, (iii) effort, (iv) pleasure, (v) pain and (vi) consciousness.[6] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* added the following to these : (i) The vital airs—*prāṇa* and *apāna* (ii) the closing and opening of eyelids, (iii) state of living (iv) the movements of mind; and (v) the affections.[7]

The *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* systems hold that *ātman* is essentially non-conscious and consciousness becomes manifest in it only by its association with mind, sense-organs and objects of contact.[8] The state of liberation is, therefore, a state of complete non-

1. आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः।
   —*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2.4.5.
2. तच्चैतन्यविशिष्टदेह एवात्मा।
   Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, p. 3.
3. किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवच्चैतन्यमुपजायते।
   Ibid., p. 2.
4. न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति। *Bṛhaspatisūtra* 2.4.12. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 3.
5. *Vātsyāyana* on *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.9.
6. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.10.
7. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 3.2 4.
8. Jayantabhaṭṭa on *Nyāyasūtra*, Benaras, 1934, pt. II, 1.1.9., pp. 4-7.

consciousness. *Vātsyāyana* clearly states that there can be no bliss in the state of liberation.[1]

The Sāṅkhya system

The *Sāṅkhya* system believes in a permanent soul,[2] but all visible conscious activities of knowing, feeling and willing are attributed to the workings of three *guṇas* of matter attached to it.

The conception of *liṅgaśarīra* or subtle body is peculiar to the *Sāṅkhya* system. It is this subtle body which is the substratum of consciousness, which gets awakened by its association with soul. This subtle body is also the vehicle of merit and demerit. It accompanies the soul on its wanderings from one body to another.[3] Conscious life is a bondage of pain which includes pleasure also. Salvation means the existence of soul individually in an isolated condition free from all conscious activities after the dissolution of the subtle body. Thus, according to *Sāṅkhya*, it is the *liṅgaśarīra*, which is bound; the soul remains detached.[4]

The Pūrvamīmāṁsā

The existence of *ātman* as distinguished from body, is implied in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* system. Attainment of heaven by performing actions implies that *ātman* is different from body. In this connection, the arguments given by the *Vedāntist* are acceptable to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* also. But it does not believe in the unity of soul. It attributes the qualities of knowledge, activity and experience to the soul.[5]

The Vedānta school

All systems given above, except the *Cārvāka* system, are dualistic and realistic in nature. *Vedānta*, on the other hand, is monistic in nature. It believes that all reality is reduced

1. Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra*, 1 1.22,
2. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. 17.
3. Ibid., 40-42.
4. Ibid., 62.
5. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, London. 1956, Vol. II, pp. 407-409.

to one in the ultimate analysis. This system is diametrically opposed to *Cārvāka* in as much as *Cārvāka* holds matter to be the only reality whereas *Vedānta* holds spirit to be the only reality. As far as its realisation is concerned, it is the substratum and subject of all knowledge, and therefore, self-evident.[1] *Śaṅkarācārya* in his commentary upon *Brahmasūtra* has explained the oneness of all souls. The reality of self is infinite, the unreality which is to be got rid of is finite.

Mention may also be made of the distinction of empirical self and transcendental self. Empirical self is a creation of illusion. The transcendental self is, on the other hand, free from all miseries. All moral responsibilities lie with the empirical self.[2]

The Jaina view

Neminātha Siddhānta Cakravartī gives the following nine attributes of self. According to *Brahmadeva's* commentary these nine attributes stand in contradiction to one or the other school of thought. We give these nine attributes and explain them according to the commentary of *Brahmadeva* :

(i) It is a conscious entity. Here self is conceived as distinct from matter. This, according to Brahmadeva, refutes the *Cārvāka* view of self.

(ii) It is endowed with apprehension and knowledge. this refutes the *Naiyāyika* view of self.

(iii) It is an intangible entity. By saying this the *Mīmāmsā* school of thought is refuted.

(iv) It is the agent of actions. This quality is by way of refutation of *Sāṅkhya* system.

(v) It is co-extensive with the body which is animated by it. This view refutes the views of *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṁsā* and *Sāṅkhya* systems.

(vi) It is the enjoyer of the fruit of its actions. This goes to refute the momentary theory of the Buddhists.

(vii) It passes through births and deaths. This view goes against the followers of *Sadāśiva* cult, which most probably

1. *Śaṅkara* on *Vedāntasūtra*, Bombay, 1917, 2.3.7.
2. Dasgupta, S., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1932, Vol. I, p. 476.

held the view that the phenomena of transmigration is merely an illusion and that the soul is ever liberated.

(viii) It gets liberation. This goes against the view of *Mimāṁsakas* and *Cārvāka.*

(ix) It has a natural potentiality of upward motion. This quality has been stated by way of refutation of *Māṇḍalika philosophy* [1]

The nine qualities of self given above fairly summarise the Jaina view of self. It may be pointed out that even though the different systems of philosophy have many differences about the nature of self from the point of view of metaphysics, they do not differ regarding the basic moral principles which are the only means of self-realisation. For example the fifth quality, mentioned above, viz. whether the self is atomic in size or all-pervasive or it expands and contracts according to the size of body, does not affect the ethical behaviour and, therefore, need not detain us.

The fourth quality, mentioned above, viz., whether *ātman* is the agent or not is rather significant. Another question of importance is whether *ātman* is endowed with consciousness or not. Last, but not the least, is the question of oneness or otherwise of soul.

The empirical self and the transcendental self

The differences in various schools of thought regarding these problems, are not so important ethically. A clear distinction is to be made between the empirical self and transcendental self.[2] From empirical point of view, the self is the agent of actions and it undergoes such experiences as those of pain and pleasure. The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* school seems to emphasise the empirical nature of self. From transcendental point of view, the self is pure, unalloyed and free from material pollution. The *Sāṅkhya* system seems to emphasise this aspect of self.

Jainism, true to its tradition of non-absolutism, takes both these aspects into consideration together. The empirical

1. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Delhi, 1956, 2.
2. *Samayasāra*, 7.

self is the self with *kārmāṇa śarīra*. We have *adṛṣṭa* in *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* and *kāraṇa śarīra* (casual body) in *Sāṅkhyayoga* corresponding to *kārmāṇaśarīra* of Jainism. In *Vedānta* also, we have a conception of empirical self which, though an illusion, is to be accepted for all practical purposes.

As far as transcendental nature of self is concerned, it is, according to Jaina view, possessed of only one distinguishing quality of consciousness, which distinguishes it from matter.[1] Here Jainism resembles more or less the *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* systems and differs from *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* and *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* who, as already pointed out, do not consider consciousness as the essential quality of self. The transcendental nature of self means its state of pure existence. The self, which is bound, gets emancipated by efforts and shines in its pure intrinsic form.

Different Categories of empirical self

While making this distinction between the empirical and transcendental nature of self, we have seen that it is not possible to classify transcendental self into any categories. But the empirical self is classified into many categories from different points of view. A brief description of these categories of empirical self will be helpful in understanding the Jaina doctrines of ethics, especially the doctrine of non-violence.

Based on intellect (manas)[2]

From the point of view of intellect, the *jīvas* are of two types : (i) Having a mind. *jīvas* of this class are possessed of a faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong. Some of the five-sensed *jīvas* are included in this category e.g. men. (ii) Having no mind. All the *jīvas* having one to four senses as also some of the five-sensed *jīvas* are included in this category.

Based on biology[3]

From the point of view of biology, the *jīvas* are of two

1. ...णिच्चयणयदो दु चेदणा जस्स ।
   Dravyasaṅgraha, 3.
2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 2. 11.
3. *Ibid.*, 2.12,14.

types : (i) mobile and (ii) immobile. The latter include the four elemental-bodied *jīvas*, viz. (a) earth-bodied (*pṛthvīkāyika*), (b) water-bodied (*apkāyika*), (c) fire-bodied (*tejaskāyika*), (d) air-bodied (*vāyukāyika*) and (e) vegetable-bodied (*vanaspatikāyika*).[1] All these immobile *jīvas* have only one sense of touch. These *jīvas* do not explicitly manifest the signs of life. But since they also show the tendency to grow and decay, they are supposed to be possessed of life. The Jaina doctrine of non-violence is, therefore, not confined only to men or animals but embraces these mute, immobile *jīvas* also.

The mobile souls, have two to five senses. The one-sensed (ekendriya) souls have four *prāṇas* (vitalities) viz. touch, power of body, age and respiration.[2] The two-sensed souls have six *prāṇas*, the above four plus the sense of taste and power of speech. The three-sensed souls add to these six, the sense of smell. The four-sensed souls add to the above seven, the sense of sight. All five-sensed souls add to the above eight, the sense of hearing: whereas the rational (*samanaska*) five-sensed souls have one more *prāṇa*, the power of mind.[3]

Thus, though all souls are equal in their transcendental form, they vary in degrees of *prāṇas* from empirical point of view. It is this distinction which makes taking of vegetable life less violent than taking away animal life or human life.

Western View Vs. Indian View

Though it is neither possible nor desirable to deal with Western view of self in detail here, yet some important points may be noted because Western thinkers have also contemplated on the problem of self with the same enthusiasm as Eastern thinkers have done.

The common-place view of man's personality, resembling more or less *Cārvāka* way of thinking, is put by W. James in these words :

> "In its widest possible sense, however, a man's ME is the sum-total of all that he can call his; not only his

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 2.13.
2. *Pūjyapāda* on Ibid., 2.30.
3. Ibid., 2.24.

body and his psychic powers, but his clothes, and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and work, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down; not necessarily in the same degree for every thing, but in much the same way for all".[1]

Obviously, W. James is enumerating the possessions of the self but not the possessor, who is the real self. This tendency of identifying the self with non-self is said to be the result of infatuation in Jainism. In this respect, Mr. Hume observes :

"For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call 'myself', I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 'myself' at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of 'myself', and may truely be said not to exist."[2]

W. James has identified the self with external objects whereas Mr. Hume has the inner ideas of love and hatred etc. identified with the self. This identification of the self either with the external possession (*bāhyaparigraha*) or with inner possession (*āntarikaparigraha*) is natural to man who is to get rid of them through knowledge and self-realisation.

Thus, there is a basic difference between the Eastern approach and Western approach to the problem of self and personality. This is how Zimmer has summarised this : The term 'personality' is derived from the Latin word 'persona' which means the mask that is worn over his face by an actor. Indian philosophy insists upon discriminating between the actor and the mask, which is not the true self, but only a veil that hides it. Western philosophy, on the other hand, has annulled this distinction. The 'self' and the mask of

1. James, William, *Psychology*, New York, 1920. p. 176.
2. Hume, David, *A Treatise of human Nature*, London, 1951, Vol. I, p. 239.

personality have become identical in the West. Indian philosophy, on the other hand, aims at piercing through the layers of manifest personality so as to arrive at the actor of life, who from times immemorial has been assuming various personalities.[1]

This fundamental difference between the East and West makes it difficult to appeciate the ethical conceptions of each other. The West is engaged in developing means for full growth of personality whereas the East is concerned with the inner self, which is hidden behind the visible personality and is far beyond the limits of this short span of our life.

Non-self (ajiva)

The views about the matter can be summarised by classifying them into two categories. The first category of thinkers holds that every outer object is a projection of mind. *Vedānta* amongst orthodox systems and *Yogācāra* sect of Buddhism are of this view. The other group of thinkers holds that perception of mind is an image of the real, outside world. With the exception of the above mentioned two schools, all systems of Indian philosophy belong to this category.

The Cārvāka system

Amongst realists, the *Cārvāka* system holds the first place. They hold that the earth, water, fire and air are real and they are the only reality.[2] They attribute even consciousness to matter [3]

The Sāṅkhya system

Sānkhya system is dualistic. In addition to *Prakṛti*, it believes in *Puruṣa* also. But the conception of *prakṛti* in *Sāṅkhya* is that even such conscious objects as mind or intellect are the outcome of *prakṛti*. This *prakṛti* is subtler than the atoms of *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system. It has three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is called *avyakta* because it is not manifest, *pradhāna* because it is the primary cause of universe. The effects (*vikṛtis*)

1. Zimmer, H., *Philosophies of India*, pp. 236-37.
2. *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, p. 2.
3. चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्यश्चैतन्यमुपजायते । Ibid., p. 7.

of this *prakṛti* are sixteen, the five *jñānendriyas*, five *karmendriyas*, mind and the five elements. The seven *prakṛtivikṛti*, *mahattattva*, *ahaṅkāra* and five *tanmātrās* are also the effect of *prakṛti*.[1] Thus excepting *puruṣa*, which is neither a cause nor an effect, *prakṛti* is the cause of every object in this world. The cause, according to *Sāṅkhya*, is not fundamentally different from effect.[2] This is known as *satkāryavāda*.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system

The *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system believes that effect is basically different from the cause. This is known as *ārambhavāda*.[3] The matter or *prakrti* is not held to be one in *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system. It is composed of atoms (*parmāṇu*). The sixth part of a dust particle which is visible in the rays of sun coming from a ventilation is called a *paramāṇu*. The combination of two such *paramāṇus*, form one *dvyaṇu*, three *dvyaṇus* form one *trasareṇuka* and four *trasareṇukas* form one *catureṇuka*. It is only *trasareṇuka* which can be perceived. It is from *catureṇukas* that the creation proceeds.[4] Thus *Vaiśeṣika* is a pluralistic system which holds that matter has its own independent existence.

The Mimāṁsā system

As far as *Pūrvamimāṁsā* is concerned, many of the thinkers believe in *paramāṇuvāda* but others do not.[5] Even those who believe, differ from *Vaiśeṣikas* regarding its size. They believe that *paramāṇu* can be perceived and the dust particles are visible in the rays of the sun.[6]

1. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 3.
2. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9.
3. Bahaduri, S. *Studies* in *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*, Metaphysics. Poona, 1947, p. 82.
4. Ibid., pp. 76-81.
5. मीमांसकैश्चैव नावश्यमिष्यन्ते परमाणवः ।

   Ślokavârtika, Madras, 1940, p. 348.
6. जालरन्ध्रविसरद्रवितेजो जालभासुरपदार्थविशेषान् ।

   अल्पकानिह पुनः परमाणून् कल्पयन्ति हि कुमारिलशिष्याः ॥

   Mānameyodaya, Madras, 1933, p. 164.

The Vedānta system

Vedānta believes that the cause, or *Brahman*, is real (*sat*) whereas the effect or the world is unreal. This is known as *vivartavāda*.[1]

In the *Brahmasūtra*, it has been clearly brought out that *prakṛti* itself cannot act. How can insentient *prakṛti* change into this universe without the supervision of a sentient God? Thus *Sāṁkhya* view has been contradicted. Neither *Vaiśeṣika* view is upheld as right. How can insentient atoms combine into a systematic universe? Even *adṛṣṭa* which is supposed to govern the atoms, is insentient. The *prakṛti*, therefore, according to *Vedānta* is an effect of *Brahman* and has no independent existence.[2]

The Jaina view

Dr. Radhakrishnan presents the Jaina view with regard to materialism and monism in these words :

"To regard the intelligent subject as the product of five elements is as fruitless from the ethical point of view as to make out that the variety of world is a manifold presentation of the one intelligent principle."[3]

The correctness of this view is upheld by the fact that materialism shows no regard for ethical principles, whereas *Vedānta* thinks monism correct only from philosophical point of view; for all practical purposes, where ethical principles are involved, it accepts the reality of material world as much as any other system.

According to Jainism, therefore, matter is as real as spirit. In this, Jainism agrees with realistic systems. It agrees with *Sāṁkhya* that self (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*) are two different entities. But it does not agree with *Sāṁkhya* regarding the inactivity of *puruṣa* and oneness of *prakṛti*. Matter consists, according to Jainism, of atoms. But the Jaina conception of atoms is different from *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* view. The atoms, according to Jainism, are far more subtler than conceived by *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*.

1. Upādhyāya, Baladeva, *Bhārtīyadarśana*, Benaras, 1948, p, 442.
2. *Śaṅkara* on *Vedāntasūtra*, 2.2.12-18.
3. Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 312.

Six substances (dravyas)

As regards non-self, Jainism holds that there are five non-sentient substances; *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of stay), *ākāśa* (space), *pudgala* (matter) and *kāla* (time). If we add self to it, we get the six *dravyas* (substances) in all.

Starting with matter, every atom of matter is possessed of touch, taste, smell and colour.[1] Matter, composed of these atoms, forms the basis of body, speech, mind and vital airs (*prāṇa*, *apāna* etc.).[2] Worldly enjoyment, pain, life and death are also caused by matter.[3]

As for sound, it is not held to be the quality of *ākāśa* as by the *Nyāyavaiśeṣikas*. Sound is produced by matter, but it is not its quality.

The other forms of non-self : *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* (space) have one substance each.[4] All of them are motionless.[5] The *dharma* and *adharma* occupy limited units of space[6] whereas *ākāśa* occupies unlimited units.[7]

Out of these, *dharma* and *adharma* are the medium of motion and rest, respectively.[8] They are said to be occupying the whole inhabited space of universe (*lokākāśa*).[9] The idea of these two substances is peculiar to Jainism. No other system of philosophy ever conceived of these two. Just as space gives room, time effects change, similarly *dharma* and *adharma* are the medium of motion and rest. Space is infinite, but the universe is finite and it is due to these two substances. Beyond universe (*lokākāśa*) no object can move because of the absence of these two substances. Thus a limit is put on universe by these two substances.

The function of space is to give room to all substances.[10]

1. *Tattavārthasūtra*, 5.23.
2. Ibid., 5.19.
3. Ibid., 5.20.
4. Ibid., 5.5.
5. Ibid., 5,6.
6. Ibid., 5.7.
7. Ibid., 5.9.
8. Ibid , 5.17.
9. Ibid., 5.18.
10. Ibid., 5.18.

Kāla or time is also a substance. The time-substance consists of many *samayas* (the smallest unit of time consisting of the period taken in going of the smallest particle of matter from one *pradeśa* to another *pradeśa*).

Nature of reality

Having discussed the general nature of the six *dravyas* or substances, we are faced with the question of definition of *sat* or reality. These six *dravyas*—the self, the matter, the time, the space, and *dharma* and *adharma*—are characterised by *sat*. What is *sat*? We have, on one hand, *Vedāntins* who define *sat* as unchangeable in all three times. According to this definition transcendental self or *Brahman* is the only reality, everything else being changeable. Buddhism, on the other hand, thinks that there is nothing permanent in this universe as everything, whether self or non-self, is undergoing change every moment. The *Sāṁkhya* philosophy adopts a middle course and holds *puruṣa* to be of permanent nature without change whereas *prakṛti* is held to be permanent with change.

The Jaina view in this respect is based on its general principle of non-absolutism; and reality, according to Jainism, consists of continuity with change.[1] Substance is not only the constant substratum but also its changing modes.[2] The essence of a substance is never annihilated and that is the idea in saying that an object is permanent.[3] Sometimes the unchangeable essence of the substance is taken into consideration (*dravyārthikanaya*) and sometimes its modification (*paryāyārthikanaya*).[4] Both of them are equally real.

The substance (*dravya*) does not change but the modes (*paryāya*) change every moment. Thus, though the substance changes in appearance, it remains the same in essence, just as a piece of gold is permanent with regard to its substratum, even though it may be changing with regard to its modifications like necklace, anklet, ear-rings etc., just as the ocean is permanent with regard to its water but it is ever-changing

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5.29.
2. Ibid., 5.37.
3. Ibid., 5.30.
4. Ibid., 5.31.

with regard to its waves rising within it. Change means disappearance of previous state of modification (*paryāya*) and appearance of a new one with continuity of the same substratum (*dravya*). We cannot, and should not, reject any one of the two—the continuity and the change—because one is impossible without the other.

Jainism reconciled the absolute permanency (*kūṭasthanityatā*) of *Vedānta* with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatā*) of Buddhism, holding that neither the change is sheer illusion nor the permanency underlying the change is unreal. Yamakami Sōgen has interpreted Buddhist view in a way which comes very near to Jainism. Answering the objections of *Śaṅkara* against Buddhists, he says :

> The substratum of everything is eternal and permanent. What changes every moment is merely the phase of a thing, so that it is erroneous to affirm that, according, to Buddhism, the thing of the first moment ceases to exist when the second moment arrives.[1]

We may not go into philosophical discussion of this metaphysical problem of the definition of reality, for we are dealing with the metaphysics only in its relation to ethics. But it may be pointed out that any moral system can be easily based on the Jaina conception of reality.

The contact of the self with the non-self

Before we proceed to deal with the other predicaments of Jainism, it will not be out of place to consider an important problem of philosophy. The self and non-self are the two basic categories but they do not exist exclusive of each other. Had it been so, there would have been no problem of birth and death at all. All living beings are the combination of both the self and the non-self. All problems arise from this union and are solved with their disunion. Self, independent of matter, is as already stated, possessed of four infinite intrinsic qualities (*anantacatuṣṭaya*), and with the separation of the self from the non-self, every problem is solved.

So the question is how self comes into contact with non-self. Self is intangible, whereas matter is tangible. Can there

1. Sōgen, Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, 1912, p. 134.

be a union of the intangible with the tangible? When did this union between the self and matter first occur? These are the questions which should be answered.

The question as to when the union of soul with matter occurred for the first time cannot arise, since this is a beginningless relation.[1] As for the relation of the tangible matter with intangible soul, just as knowledge inspite of its being non-tangible gets obliterated into the influence of wine, similarly self, though intangible, gets his qualities obstructed under the influence of tangible *kārmāṇa* particles. Moreover, the soul, in its state of bondage, is conceived to be tangible.[2]

The union between the body and soul is made possible by the medium of *kārmāṇaśarīra* which, though made up of tangible material, is very subtle.[3]

The cause of misery—the inflow of Kārmic matter and Bondage

The two predicaments, self and non-self, discussed so far, answer mainly such metaphysical curiosity as 'who am I?' and 'what is the nature of the universe?' The remaining five predicaments are mainly the results of thinking on such ethical problems as 'what is the cause of misery?' and 'how misery can be stopped?' The coming chapters will attempt to answer these enquiries. But, hereabelow, we deal with these predicaments in a nut-shell so as to give a bird's eye view of what we propose to discuss later on in some detail.

The Upaniṣadic view

Cārvāka represented a common man's view that either lack of worldly possessions or some mental or physical disability is the cause of misery. This was the first answer that reason afforded to the question. It is, however, in the *Upaniṣads* that the limitations of this answer have been brought out. The real reason of misery lies deeper than it appears to be, at the surface. It is not finitude which can give us happiness; only infinitude can lead us to happiness.[4] The transient world of birth, old

1. *Pañcādhyāyī*, Indore. Vīr Nir-Saṁ 2444, 2.35-36.
2. Ibid.. 2.57.
3. Ibid., 2.60.
4. यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति ।
—*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 7.23.1.

age, and death is full of sufferings. It is this basic assumption of the *Upaniṣads* which brings Indian ethics out of the meshes of blind hedonism.

The Buddhist view

It was felt at the time of Lord *Buddha* that even though the *Upaniṣads* rejected the hedonism of *Cārvāka*, they have their own limitations. They could not, for example, openly challenge the authority of the *Vedas*, which preached performance of sacrifice, involving violence. It seems that the *Upaniṣads* were more concerned with the abstract metaphysical aspect of the whole problem, rather than concrete ethical path of liberation. This accounts for Lord *Buddha's* rejection of abstract metaphysics and emphasis on the moral character. He deeply felt the transient nature of everything in the universe. To him all objects of enjoyment seemed empty shows, unsubstantial and impermanent. He gave the following chain of twelve causes of misery :

(i) *Jarāmaraṇa* (ii) *Jāti* (iii) *Mada* (iv) *Upādāna* (v) *Tṛṣṇā* (vi) *Vedanā* (vii) *Sparśa* (viii) *Saḍāyatana* (ix) *Nāmarūpa* (x) *Vijñāna* (xi) *Saṁskāra* (xii) *Avidyā*.[1]

The Sāṁkhya System

In *Sāṁkhya* nescience or *avidyā* is held to be the root cause of misery. Nescience means absence of distinction between the two categories of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Misery really belongs to *prakṛti* but we wrongly attribute it to self. It is this perversity of knowledge (*viprayaya*) which leads to the following five miseries :

(i) Nescience (*Avidyā*) (ii) Egoism (*Asmitā*) (iii) Attachment (*rāga*) (iv) Hatred (*dveṣa*) (v) Fear of death (*abhiniveśa*).[2]

All these afflictions are only the varieties of *avidyā* in as much *avidyā* pervades them all.[3] This *avidyā*, according to

1. *Visuddhimagga*, Part II, Benaras, 1943, Chapter 17.
2. अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः ।
   — *Yogasūtra* 2.3.
3. सर्व एवामी क्लेशा अविद्याभेदाः कस्मात् सर्वेष्वविद्यैवाभिप्लवते ।
   —*Vyāsa* on *Yogasūtra* 2.4.

Yogasūtra, consists in taking transitory, impure, pain and non-self to be eternal, pure, happiness and self.[1]

The Nyāya system

The immediate cause of misery, according to *Nyāya*, is birth (*janma*). This birth is the result of those activities which are prompted by attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and infatuation (*moha*).[2]

From attachment arise the following five defects which lead to misery :

(i) Love (*kāma*) (ii) Selfishness (*matsara*) (iii) Longing (*spṛhā*) (iv) Hankering (*tṛṣṇā*) (v) Greed (*lobha*).

Aversion also gives birth to the following five defects :

(i) Anger (*krodha*) (ii) Jealousy (*irṣyā*) (iii) Envy (*asūyā*) (iv) Malice (*droha*) (v) Resentment (*amarṣa*).

Infatuation is the cause of the following four defects :

(i) Error (*mithyājñāna*) (ii) Suspicion (*vicikitsā*) (iii) Pride (*māna*) (iv) Negligence (*pramāda*).[3]

These fourteen defects, in short, are the causes of misery. Out of these, infatuation is the worst which breeds attachment and aversion.[4]

The Mīmāṁsā systems

According to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, any infringement of the duties, laid down by the *Vedas* leads to misery.[5] *Vedānta*, on the other hand, allows only *nityanaimittikakarmans* and thinks that even performance of *kāmyakarmans* is a cause of bondage. The performance of *nityanaimittika karman*, however, is necessary for the purification of mind.[6]

1 अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या ।

—*Yogasūtra* 2.5.

2. तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तराभावात् ।

—*Nyāyasūtra*, 4.1 3.

3 *Vātsyāyana on Ibid.*, 4 1.3.

4. तेषां मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः ।

Nyāyasūtra,, 4.1.6.

5. cf. *Mīmāṁsādarśana*, 1.1.2.

6. *Śaṅkara* on *Gītā*, Bombay, 1936, 18.10.

According to *Vedānta*, it is the deceptive nature (*Māyā*) of the universe which has held us in bondage. A mind, purified by *karman* and stabilised by *upāsanā*, gets its veil of ignorance removed by knowledge. So, according to *Vedānta*, the root cause of misery is nescience.

The Jaina view

The cause of misery is dealt with under two heads in Jainism : (i) Inflow of *kārmic* matter (*āśrava*), and (ii) Bondage (*bandha*). We shall deal with both of them.

1. *Inflow of kārmic matter* (*āśrava*)

All activities of body, speech and mind, cause inflow of *kārmic* matter.[1] These activities, if good, cause the inflow of meritorious *karmans* leading to worldly happiness. If, these activities are bad they cause the inflow of demeritorious *karmans* leading to misery.[2] At first sight it would appear as if only bad activities are to be avoided since they lead to misery. But even good activities are to be checked ultimately. These good activities are, of course, preferable to bad activities from practical point of view, but from real point of view are as much bondage to the soul as the good activities. As we would discuss this problem separately in the following chapter, we leave it for present, and proceed to explain which activities are good and which bad.

It may be mentioned here that the force of holding the soul in bondage comes from four basic passions (*kaṣāya*), viz. anger, pride, hypocrisy, and greed.[3] Some subtle activities force inflow of *kārmic* matter (*īryāpatha*) even in the advanced stages of spiritual progress. This is not important from the point of view of morality. It is only *sāmparāyika* inflow, backed by the four passions, which causes the cycle of births and rebirths.

The activities which lead to the *sāmparāyika* inflow of *kārmic* matter are 39 in all.[4]

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.1-2.
2. Ibid., 6.3-4.
3. Ibid., 6.5 and 8.2.
4. *Pūjyapāda* on Ibid., 6.5.

These activities are given below :

I-V. Five activities of five senses.

VI-IX. Four activities of four *kaṣāyas*.

IX-XIV. Five activities arising out of the non-observance of five cardinal moral virtues of non-violence, truth, non-stealing, celibacy and non-possession.

XV. Activities strengthening right belief e.g. worship (*samyaktvakriyā*).

XVI. Activities strengthening wrong belief e.g. superstition (*mithyātvakriyā*),

XVII. Physical activities (*prayogakriyā*)

XVIII. Tendency to neglect the vows which have been taken (*samādānakriyā*).

XIX. Walking carefully to avoid injury to the living beings by one's feet (*īryāpathakriyā*).

XX. Tendency to accuse others in anger (*prādoṣikīkriyā*).

XXI. Tendency to hurt others (*kāyikīkriyā*)

XXII. Having weapon of violence (*adhıkaraṇikīkriyā*).

XXIII. Having means of giving mental pain (*paritāpikīkriyā*).

XXIV. Depriving others of their *prāṇas* (*prāṇātipātikīkriyā*).

XXV. Desire to see a pleasing form (*darśanakriyā*).

XXVI. Touching a pleasant object (*sparśanakriyā*).

XXVII. Searching for new means of enjoyment (*prātyāyikīkriyā*).

XXVIII. Answering call of nature in a place frequented by men, women and animals (*samantāpatanakriyā*).

XXIX. Throwing things on the ground without care (*anābhogakriyā*).

XXX. Doing oneself which should be done by other (*śvahastakriyā*).

XXXI. Admiring what is wrong (*nisargkriyā*)

XXXII. Disclosing sins of o thers (*Vidāraṇakriyā*).

XXXIII. Misinterpreting the injunctions of the scriptures (*ājñāvyāpādikīkriyā*).

XXXIV. Disrespect to the injunctions of the scriptures (*anākāṅkṣakriyā*).

XXXV. Engaging in harmful activities (*prārambhakriyā*).

XXXVI. Attachment to worldly objects (*parigrāhikī-kriyā*).

XXXVII. Deceitfully disturbing one's right faith and knowledge (*māyākriyā*).

XXXVIII. Admiring wrong belief (*mithyādarśanakriyā*).

XXXIX. Not renouncing what should be renounced (*apratyākhyānakriyā*).

This long list of thirty-nine activities is not exhaustive. The basic idea is that any type of activity is the cause of inflow of *kārmic* matter.

Now, to classify these activities into two categories of good and bad, we should know that there are eight types of *karmans* in all, having 148 sub-varieties, Those eight types of *karmans* are[1] :—

(i) Knowledge—obscuring *karmans* (*jñānāvaraṇīya*).
(ii) Connotation-obscuring *karmans* (*darśanāvaraṇīya*).
(iii) Deluding *karmans* (*mohanīya*).
(iv) Destructive *karmans* (*antarāya*).
(v) Feeling-breeding *karmans* (*vedanīya*).
(vi) Family-determining *karmans* (*gotrakarman*).
(vii) Age-determining *karmans* (*āyuṣakarman*).
(viii) Body-determining *karmans* (*nāmakarman*).

Sinful activities:

The inflow of the first two types of *kārmic* matter is caused by the following five moral lapses :

(i) Condemnation of the learned in the scriptures (*pradoṣa*).
(ii) Concealing the knowledge (*ninhava*).
(iii) Envy (*mātsarya*).
(iv) Obstructing the progress of knowledge (*antarāya*).
(v) Denying the truth proclaimed by others (*āsādanā*).
(vi) Refutation of truth purposely (*Upaghāta*).[2]

Coming to deluding *karmans* (*mohanīya*), they are of two types :

(i) Right-belief-deluding (*darśanamohanīya*)
(ii) Right-conduct-deluding (*cāritramohanīya*).

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.5
2. Ibid., 6.11

The right-belief-deluding *karmans* are the result of defaming the liberated persons (*kevali*) or the scripture (*śruta*) or the church (*saṁgha*) or the religion (*dharma*) or gods (*deva*),[1] whereas the right-conduct-deluding *karmans* are the result of intense passionate feelings.[2]

The fourth type of inflow of *kārmic* matter results from disturbing others in their activity of charity (*dāna*), gain (*lābha*), enjoyment of consumable things (*bhoga*), enjoyment of non-consumable things (*upabhoga*) and making use of their power (*vīrya*),[3]

These above four *karmans* are called *ghātik armans* as they tend to obscure the real nature of self. The activities enumerated under these four heads, not only lead to worldly misery but also retard the moral progress of the aspirant.

The aghāti karmans

The remaining four types of *karmans* have good as well as bad aspect. The good activities lead to worldly happiness and bad activities to worldly miseries. But neither of these four *karmans* can retard the moral progress of a person in the absence of the *ghātikarmans*.

Vedanīya

Coming to the feeling-breeding *karmans* (*vedanīyakarmans*), those which lead to miseries are called *asātā* and those which lead to worldly happiness are called *sātā*.

The *asātāvedanīyakarmans* result from the following six activities :

(i) pain (*duḥkha*) (ii) sorrow (*śoka*) (iii) remorse (*tāpa*) (iv) weeping (*ākrandana*) (v) killing (*vadha*) (vi) pathetic moaning (*paridevanā*).[4]

The *sātāvedanīya* result from the following ten good qualitles.[5]

(i) Compassion for living beings (*bhūtānukampā*).

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.14.
2. Ibid., 6.15.
3. Ibid., 8.14.
4. Ibid., 6.12.
5. Ibid., 6.13.

(ii) Compassion for the vowers (*vratyanukampā*).
(iii) Charity (*dāna*).
(iv) Self-control with attachment towards worldly enjoyment (*sarāgasaṁyama*).
(v) Partial control (*saṁyamāsaṁyama*).
(vi) Equanimous submission to the fruition of *karman* (*akāmanirjarā*).
(vii) Austerities not based on right knowledge (*bālatapas*).
(viii) Contemplation (*yoga*).
(ix) Forgiveness (*Kṣamā*).
(x) Contentment (*śauca*).

Gotrakarman

The following cause the inflow of low-family-determining *karmans*[1] :
(i) Speaking ill of other (*paranindā*).
(ii) Self-praise (*ātmapraśaṁsā*).
(iii) Concealing the good qualities of others (*sadguṇācchādana*).
(iv) Proclaiming those good qualities in oneself which one does not possess (*asadguṇodbhedana*).

The inflow of high-family-determining *Karmans* comes from the qualities opposite to those mentioned above, by showing humility towards one's superior (*nīcaiḥvṛtti*) and by not being proud of one's achievements (*anutseka*).[2]

Āyuṣakarmans

The age-determining *karmans* may lead one either to hell or to sub-human life or to human birth or to heaven in the next birth. The inflow of that *kārmic* matter leading to birth in hell results from too much of sinful activity and attachment.[3] Deceitfulness leads to subhuman birth.[4] Less of worldly activity and attachments and humble indisposition leads to human birth.[5] The activities from five to seven, enumerated in the list of *sātāvedanīya* lead to heavenly birth.[6]

1. *Tattvārthas ūtra* 6.24.
2. Ibid., 6.25.
3. Ibid., 6.16.
4. Ibid., 6.17.
5. Ibid., 6.18.
6. Ibid., 6.20.

Nāmakarman

Crookedness of the mind, body and speech (*yogavakratā*) and disintegrity (*visaṁvāda*) of character lead to bad body-determining *karman*,[1] whereas the opposite of them lead to good-body-determining *karman*.[2] Besides, excellent moral character leads to the birth of the soul in a *tīrthaṅkara* body. Such excellent moral character includes the following sixteen virtues :

(i) Purity of right belief (*darśanaviśuddhi*).
(ii) Humbleness (*vinayasampannatā*).
(iii) Faultless observance of the five vows (*śīlavrateṣvanaticāra*).
(iv) Ceaseless pursuit of right knowledge (*abhīkṣṇajñānopayoga*).
(v) Apprehension of mundane miseries (*saṁvega*).
(vi) Renunciation according to one's capacity (*śaktitastyāga*).
(vii) Practising penance according to one's capacity (*śaktitastapas*).
(viii) Service of the saints (*sādhusamādhi*).
(ix) Service of the meritorious (*vaiyāvṛtyakaraṇa*).
(x) Devotion to *Arhants* (*arhadbhakti*).
(xi) Devotion to the *Ācārya* or the head of the orders of saints (*ācāryabhakti*).
(xii) Devotion to the learned saint (*bahuśrutabakti*).
(xiii) Devotion to the scriptures (*pravacanabhakti*).
(xiv) Carefulness in the six essential duties of a saint (*āvaśyakāparihāṇi*).
(xv) Propagation of the path of liberation (*mārgaprabhāvanā*).
(xvi) Affection for one's co-religionist (*pravacanavatsalatā*).[3]

Bondage (bandha)

As already pointed, only that inflow of *kārmic* matter, which is backed by passion, becomes effective. This is called

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.61.
2. Ibid., 6 22.
3. Ibid., 6.26.

bondage.[1] Without passion, the *kārmāṇa* particles may come and go but they do not affect the soul. This position can be compared to the *anāsakti-yoga* of the *Gītā*. To be more elaborate, the causes of bondage are five-fold :

(i) *Wrong-belief* (*mithyādarśana*)

It has five varieties (a) taking only one aspect of truth (*ekānta*) (b) perverse belief (*viparīta*) (c) scepticism (*saṁśaya*) (d) showing equal belief in all religions (*vinaya*) (e) nescience (*ajñāna*).[2]

(ii) *Vowlessness* (*avirati*)

It includes lack of compassion for six classes of embodied soul through lack of control over five senses and mind.[3]

(iii) *Negligence* (*pramāda*)

It includes talks about (a) food (*bhojanakathā*), (b) women (*strīkathā*), (c) politics (*rājyakathā*), (d) scandal (*deśakathā*), lack of control over five senses, four passions, affection and sleep.[4]

(iv) *Passion* (*kaṣāya*)

These include four degrees of intensities of four passions, viz. (a) pride (*māna*), (b) deceitfulness (*māyā*), (c) anger (*krodha*), (d) greed (*lobha*) and nine semi-passions.[5]

(v) *Yoga* (*activities*)

These activities are either mental or vocal or physical.

(A) Mental activities are either from (a) true mind (*satyamana*) (b) false mind (*asatyamana*) or (c) mixed mind (*ubhayamana*) or (d) neither true nor false mind (*anubhayamana*).

(B) Vocal activities are either (a) true or (b) false or (c) both or (d) none.

(C) Physical activities are possible by the seven bodies.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra* 8.2-3.
2. *Pūjyapada*, *on* Ibid.. 8.1.
3. Ibid., 8.1.
4. *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Calcutta, 1929, 8.1. (Hindi Translation, p. 806).
5. *Pūjyapāda on Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.1.

(a) Physical (*audārika*) (b) Physical and *kārmic* (*audārikamiśra*) (c) Fluid (*vaikriyaka*) (d) Fluid with *kārmic* (*vaikrayikamiśra*) (c) *Āhāraka* (f) *Ahāraka* with physical (*āhārakamiśra*) (g) *Kārmic* (*kārmāṇa*).

Thus we have fifteen *yogas* in all.[1]

The Jaina conception of working of the law of *Karman* is based in the psychological theory of habit. We sow an action and reap a habit, we sow a habit and reap a character; we sow a character and reap our fate. Repetition of similar actions makes us habituated and we are forced by habit to repeat them. But, as already shown, this does not deprive us of our freedom.[2] Human efforts have their own part to play in the whole working of this process. The previous action can be altered, amended, aggravated or affected through exertion (*puruṣārtha*). That is why the *ācāryas* have asked us to exert and stop the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter and also to annihilate the previous *karmans*.

It may also be noted that these *karmans* have not only psychical impressions (*saṁskāras*) but also force physical molecules to be attached to the soul. The processes are known as psychic (*bhāva*) and material (*dravya*) inflow.[3] These two aspects of the inflow of *kārmic* matter mutually influence each other. The various psychic modifications attract the *kārmic* matter, and give birth to fresh psychic modifications. In its impure state, the soul, overcome by attachment, aversion and delusion, attracts the *kārmic* matter as magnet attracts needles to itself. This chain of *kārmic* holds the self bound to the miserable worldly existence.

The removal of misery

The Buddhistic view

The third noble truth, *dukkhanirodha*, concerns the means of checking misery. The ethical teachings of Lord *Buddha* are summarised in the following triple jewels[4] (*triratnas*) in

1. Upādhyāya, Baladeva, *Bhārtīyadarśana*, pp. 182-183.
2. *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.1.(Hindi Translation, p. 805).
3. *Supra*, pp. 32-37.
4. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 29-31.

the *Hinayāna* tradition : (i) Conduct (*śīla*), (ii) Meditation (*samādhi*) (iii) contemplation (*prajñā*).

(i) Conduct includes the observance of the following vows : (a) non-violence (b) non-stealing (c) truth (d) celibacy (e) abstinence from intoxication.

These vows are meant for all. The mendicants are asked, in addition, to observe abstinence from (a) evening meals (b) garlands (c) valuable beds (d) music (e) gold and silver.

(ii) Meditation, in Buddhism, has been given a special status.

(iii) Contemplation includes (a) study (*śrutamayī*) (b) rational thinking (*cintāmayī*) (d) affirmed knowledge acquired by meditation (*samādhijanyaniścaya*). These three stage of contemplation are strikingly similar to *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* of *Vedānta* system.

The ethical principles of Buddhism can be described from another view-point also. It is the eight-fold path (*aṣṭāṅgika mārga*) which leads to liberation.[1] These include right attitude (*samyagdṛṣṭi*), determination (*saṁkalpa*), speech (*vāk*), action (*karmānta*), living (*jīva*) effort (*vīryam*).

The Sāṁkhya-yoga

According to *Sāṁkhya*, the discriminating faculty (*viveka-khyāti*), which makes clear distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, leads to liberation.

In *Yoga*, which deals with the ethical aspect of that very system, which is metaphysically represented by *Sāṁkhya* the cardinal moral virtues are said to be five *yamās* which literally resemble the five *vratas* of Jainism. Here the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* of *Yogasūtra* clarifies that truth is subservient to non-violence. A truth, which leads to violence, is said to be virtue in appearance but sin in reality.[2]

1. Ibid., pp. 181-182.
2. "वागुक्ता सा यदि न वंचिता भ्रान्ता वा प्रतिपत्तिवन्ध्या वा भवेदित्येषा सर्वभूतोपकारार्थं प्रवृत्ता न भूतोपघाताय यदि चैवमप्यभिधीयमाना भूतोपघातपरैव स्यान्न सत्यं भवेत् पापमेव भवेत्तेन पुण्याभासेन पुण्यप्रतिरूपकेण कष्टं तमः प्राप्नुयात्तस्मात्परीक्ष्य सर्वभूतहितं सत्यं ब्रूयात्।

—*Vyāsa* on *Yogasūtra*, Allahabad, 1912, 2.30.

In addition to these five *yamas*, we have the following *niyamas* also :

(i) Purity (*śauca*). (ii) Satisfaction (*santoṣa*), (iii) Penance (*tapas*), (iv) Study (*svādhyāya*) and (v) Meditation upon God (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*).[1] In addition to *yama* and *niyama*, the other principles of eight-fold path of yoga (*aṣṭāṅgayoga*) are *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, and *samādhi*, which, respectively, mean mystic posture, control over vital air, withdrawal of senses from outward objects, concentration on one point, continuity of concentration, meditation and complete absorption.[2]

The Nyāyavaiśeṣika view

While dealing with the causes of misery under *Nyāya* system, we have enlisted fourteen moral faults. These faults get a man involved in worldly pursuits (*pravṛtti*), which lead to the circle of births and rebirths. On the renunciation of these moral faults, the worldly pursuits come to a stand-still and the self is released from miseries.

In *Vaiśeṣika* system, the moral duties are classified under two heads : (i) Common duties (ii) Special characteristic duties.

Common duties embrace the following virtues :—(a) Faith (*śraddhā*) (b) Non-violence (*ahiṁsā*) (c) Welfare of all living beings (*prāṇihitasādhana*) (d) Truth (*satya*), (e) Non-stealing (*asteya*), (f) Celibacy (*Brahmacarya*), (g) Purity of heart (*anupadhā*), (h) Absence of anger (*akrodha*), (i) Bathing (*snāna*), (j) Purity of food (*pavitradravyasevana*), (k) Devotion to deity (*devopāsanā*), (l) Fasting (*upavāsa*), (m) Alertness (*apramāda*).[3]

As far as the special duties belonging to particular caste or *āśrama* are concerned, the *Vaiśeṣika* system holds *smṛtis* to be the authority.

All these duties should be performed without any desire for the fruit. This leads to comprehension of reality (*tatt-*

1. *Yogasūtra*, 2.32.
2. Ibid. 2.29.
3. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, Benaras, 1924, p. 640.

vajñāna), which is the means of liberation.[1] Thus desireless performance of the moral duties is the indirect means whereas the real knowledge is the direct means of liberation.[2]

The mīmāṁsā view

According to *pūrvamīmāṁsā*, *karmans* lead to bondage as well as liberation. There are two theories about the performance of *karman*. According to *Kumārilabhaṭṭa*, actions can be performed only when one is sure about their yielding the desired fruit (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*) whereas, according to *Prabhākara*, the knowledge that such and such action is prescribed by the *Vedas* (*kāryatājñāna*) is enough for engaging one in that duty. Thus, according to *Kumārilabhaṭṭa*, an action is always motivated by a desire whereas according to *Prahhākara* desire is not necessary. The theory of *Prabhākara* comes nearer to the *niṣkāmakarmayoga* of the *Gītā*.[3]

The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, in any case, lays it down very clearly that the actions prescribed by the *Vedas* should be performed, but actions which have been prohibited (*niṣiddha*) by the *vedas* should be avoided. The actions prescribed by the *Vedas* are, again, of two kinds : (i) Wishfulfilling actions (*kāmyakarma*), which include those actions which are to be performed with certain desire in view e.g. *svargakāmo yajeta*. (ii) Daily and occasional (*niytyanaimittika karman*), which include such actions as *sandhyā* and *śrāddha* which are to be performed without any particular motive.[4]

Coming so *Vedānta*, the *Śaṅkara* school believes that knowledge is the only means of liberation. This principle has been subsequently elaborated by two followers of *Saṅkara*, *Vācaspati Miśra* and *Sureśvarācārya* who wrote *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa* commentaries, respectively, on the *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* of *Vedānta*. The main difference between the two can be summarised thus :

1. ...तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ।

   —*Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, 1.1.4.

2. तत्त्वज्ञानकर्मणोर्मोक्षं प्रति तत्त्वज्ञानस्य साक्षाज्जनकता कर्मणस्तु परम्परये-त्याशयः ।

   —*Kirṇāvalībhāskara*, Benaras, 1920, p. 21.

3. Upādhyāya, Baladeva, *Bhāratīyadarśana*, p. 394.
4. Ibid,. pp. 394-395.

Vācaspati Miśra thinks that even after hearing (*śravaṇa*) of such *mahāvākya* as 'that thou art' (*tattvamasi*) one needs contemplation (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) also.[1] According to *Sureśvarācārya*, the sentence 'that thou art' is capable of imparting direct knowledge of *Brahman*.[2] This is the main difference between *Bhāmatīprasthāna* and *Vivaraṇaprasthāna*. In both the cases, however, action is subservient to knowledge.

Naiṣkarmyasiddhi has classified the objects attainable by actions into four : 1. *utpādya*, 2. *āpya*, 3. *saṁskārya*, 4. *vikārya*. Since *ātman* is neither of these, therefore, it cannot be realised by action.[3]

The Jaina view

The Jaina view regarding the removal of misery is classified under two heads : (1) Checking of the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter (*saṁvara*) and (2) Annihilation of the *kārmic* matter already accumulated (*nirjarā*).

1. *Checking of the inflow of fresh kārmic matter* (*saṁvara*)

The inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter can be checked best by not allowing those causes to work which effect the inflow. The means for this check are as follows :

(i) Three-fold self-discipline (*trigupti*)
(ii) Five-fold path of vigilance (*pañca-samiti*)
(iii) Ten categorical qualities (*daśa-lakṣaṇa-dharma*)
(iv) Twelve-fold reflections on the nature of the universe (*dvādaśānuprakṣā*).
(v) Equanimous fortitude of twenty-two hardships (*dvāviṁśati-pariṣahajaya*).

1. तस्मान्निर्विचिकित्सशाब्द-ज्ञान-सन्ततिरूपासना कर्मसहकारिण्यविद्या-च्छेदहेतुः ।

—*Miśra, Vācaspati*, on *Vedāntasūtra* Bombay, 1917, p. 55.

2. सकृत्प्रवृत्त्या मृद्नाति क्रियाकारकरूपभृत् ।
अज्ञानमागमज्ञानं सांगत्यं नास्त्यतोऽनयोः ॥

—*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, Poona, 1925, 1.67.

3. उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं च क्रियाफलम् ।
नैवं मुक्तिर्यतस्तस्मात् कर्म तस्या न साधनम् ॥

—Ibid., 1.53.

(vi) Five types of conduct (*pañcacāritra*).[1]

I. Three-fold self-discipline means withdrawal of the mind, body and speech from the mundane activities.[2]

II. Five-fold vigilance means carefulness in walking, talking, eating, in handling the objects and in evacuating bowls.[3]

III. The ten categorical qualities are : (a) forgiveness, (b) humility, (c) straightforwardness, (d) contentment, (e) truthfulness, (f) self-control, (g) penance, (h) renunciation, (i) detachment, (j) chastity.[4]

IV. The twelve reflections are : Contemplations about—

(i) transitoriness, (ii) helplessness, (iii) mundane existence, (iv) loveliness, (v) distinctness, (vi) impurity, (vii) inflow of *kārmic* matter, (viii) checking of *kārmic* matter, (ix) annihilation of *kārmic* matter, (x) universe, (xi) rarity of right path and (xii) nature of right path.[5]

V. The twenty two hardships to be endured are :

(a) hunger, (b) thirst, (c) cold, (d) heat, (e) mosquitoes (f) nakedness, (g) disgust, (h) women, (i) too much of walking, (j) posture, (k) sleeping, (l) abuse, (m) beating, (n) begging, (o) failure to attain an object, (p) disease, (q) contact with thorns, (r) dirt, (s) respect or disrespect, (t) conceited knowledge (u) lack of knowledge (v) slackness of belief.[6]

VI. The five types of conduct are :

(a) equanimity (b) recovery of equanimity if one falls from it, (c) purity and completeness in non-violence, (d) freedom from passions except in some subtle form, (e) ideal state of complete freedom from passion.[7]

Here we have just given a list of moral virtues that check the inflow of *kārmic* matter. We propose to discuss them in detail while dealing with the conduct of the house-holder anp

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.2.
2. *Pūjyapāda on* Ibid., 9.4.
3. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.5.
4. Ibid., 9.6.
5. Ibid., 9.7.
6. Ibid., 9.9.
7. Ibid., 9.18.

a monk, separately. It may, however, be pointed out that the list of moral virtues given above mentions ascetic and spiritual virtues mainly. As already pointed out this is due to the fact that Jaina thinkers do not mix up the science of spiritualism (*adhyātmaśāstra*) with sociology (*samājaśāstra*) as some of the Hindu scriptures like *Manusmṛti* have done.

Shedding of the accumulated kārmic matter (nirjarā)

Merely checking of the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter does not remove miseries unless the *kārmic* matter already accumulated is also shed away. This, the Jainism believes, can be done by austerities.[1] These austerities are in addition to what has been prescribed above under *saṁvara*. Austerities are external and internal. The external austerities include (i) fasting (ii) eating less than one's fill (iii) taking a secret vow to accept the food only if certain conditions, about which no one knows, are fulfilled, (iv) renouncing delicacies, (v) sitting and sleeping in lonely place and (vi) mortifying the body with mental equanimity.[2] The internal austerities include : (i) expiation (ii) reverence (iii) service (iv) study (v) detachment and (vi) renunciation.[3] All these austerities are propounded mainly with the monk's life in view and we shall take them one by one at proper places.

To sum up, it is through the activities of mind, body and speech, tinged with passion, that the *kārmic* matter gets an inflow into the realm of soul. It is, therefore, obvious that when the self is absorbed in its own intrinsic, pure consciousness, shutting out the impure states of desire, aversion and delusion, the inflow of *kārmic* matter does not take place. It is an ideal stage. The aspirant, if he has to act at all, should be very much alert against sinful tendencies in his daily routine.

As regards shedding of the previously accumulated *karmans*, Jainism prescribes performance of penance. This is based on the psychological law of habit. An old habit can be broken only by acting against it forcibly and purposely. Our

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.3.
2. Ibid., 9.19.
3. Ibid., 9.20.

attachments are deep-rooted and can be uprooted only by hard austerities It should not be thought that these austerities have any super-natural power of pleasing some gods who can forgive us for our previous acts of omission and commission. It is a simple question of resoluteness of will-power. Repeated blows of voluntary infliction break the old habits and efface those impressions (*saṁskāras*), which lead to further birth.

The state of liberation

The Upaniṣadic view

Except for *Cārvāka*, who does not believe in existence after death, all other systems of Indian philosophy have conceived of a liberated soul, which after having exhausted all *karmans* attains perfection. The *Upaniṣads* were the first to conceive of such a state. A soul in such a state, according to the *Upaniṣads* is indescribable. This is how *Yājñavalkya* attempts an answer to the question of the nature of a liberated soul :

> Just as a lump of salt put in water loses its identity and cannot be taken out separately, but in whatever portion of water we taste, we find the salt; so, *Maitreyī*, does this great reality, infinite and limitless, consisting only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences), becomes identical with them and there is no phenomenal knowledge.[1]

The Buddhist view

Nirvāṇa, the name for liberation in Buddhist philosophy, means 'extinction'. It implies extinction of the five, viz. forms (*rūpa*), names (*saṁjñā*) the old impressions (*saṁskāra*), the analytical knowledge (*vijñāna*) and the feeling of pain and pleasures (*vedanā*). That *nirvāṇa* is the state of highest bliss is proved by many passages of Buddhist scriptures.[2] Lord *Buddha*, however, was more concerned with the ethical problem of the removal of misery rather than indulging in such sub-

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2.4.12.
2. निब्बानं परमानि सुखानि—
Pali-English Dictionary, p. 364.

tleties of metaphysical problems as the nature of the liberated soul.[1]

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga view

From what has already been said about the nature of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* according to *Sāṁkhya*, it can easily be concluded that in the state of liberation, when the self stands separated from *prakṛti*, there can be no happiness.[2] Happiness and misery are the workings of the *guṇas*. The liberated soul, having gone beyond these *guṇas*, shines forth in pure consciousness.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view

According to *Nyāya*, liberation is not a state of bliss but a state of perfect qualitilessness where the self remains in its mere existence. It is a state of complete freedom from pain.[3] This state is compared to a deep dreamless sleep.[4] *Nyāya* holds that since it is the state of complete freedom from pain, the scriptures speak of this state of happiness. In fact, liberation cannot be a state of happiness 'for happiness is always tainted with pain'. There is no consciousness in a a liberated soul. Therefore, the self remains in a passive state of its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge and will.

The Mimāṁsā view

The *pūrvamimāṁsā* did not originally conceive of liberation but of heaven only. The heavenly state is not free from misery but one where all desires are fulfilled. The later authors

1. Dasgupta, Surendranath, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 108-109.
2. नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिर्निर्धर्मत्वात् ।
   —*Sāṁkhyasūtra*, 5.74.
3. तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः ।
   Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.22.
4. सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभावादपवर्गः ।
   Ibid., 4.1.63.

have dealt with liberation also. They hold that release means freedom from pain where the self exists in its pure essence.[1]

The Vedānta view

In *Vedānta*, liberation means removal of duality and merger of self with *Brahman*. In this state, the self shines forth in its intrinsic existence, intelligence and bliss (*sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*). Here everything, having name and form, vanishes as illusory.

The Jaina view

Liberation, according to *Tattvārthasūtra*, is a state free from all *karmans* due to absence of causes of bondage and shedding of the *karmans*.[2] The four *ghātins* (*destructive karmans*) are the main concern of the aspirant, because the other four *aghātin karmans* do not stand in the way of liberation.[3] One gets freedom from these *karmans* gradually as he ascends the fourteen stages of spiritual development.[4] At the end of the twelfth stage, all the *ghātin karmans* are destroyed and the aspirant gets perfect knowledge, perception, potency and bliss. This conception of liberation comes nearer to that of *Vedānta*, the only difference being that the self, according to Jainism, does not lose its identity in the emancipated state.

After the liberation, the self, which has a natural upward motion, goes right upto the end of the universe (*lokākāśa*)[5] beyond which it cannot proceed due to the absence of *dharmāstikāya*, the medium of motion.[6]

Conclusion

To conclude, the following points may be noted regarding our discussion in this chapter :

(1) In the first place, even though, the different systems of Indian philosophy disagree about such problems as the

1. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 422-423.
2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 10.2.
3. Ibid., 10.1.
4. Infra, Chapter VIII.
5. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 10.5.
6. Ibid., 10.8.

nature of self or the position of a liberated soul, yet as far as the practical side of morality is concerned, they seldom differ.

(2) Secondly in Jainism we find a combination of both types of systems of morality, those which emphasise on knowledge and those which emphasise on conduct and faith.

(3) The brief sketch of the fundamentals of Jainism—*āsrava, bandha, saṁvara* and *nirjarā*—in this chapter gives an answer to the question why most of the ethical principles of Jainism are negative in character. Any action prolongs rather than cuts short the mundane existence of the soul. If the actions are good, they lead to birth in favourable circumstances; if they are bad, they lead to birth in unfavourable circumstances. But since the ultimate aim is to get rid of the circle of birth and rebirth, all actions are in reality a source of misery. We shall elaborate this point in the following chapter.

(4) The Jaina *ācāryas* have a tendency to go on enumerating the varieties and subvarieties of a single fact. We shall have more occasions to meet with this tendency during the course of our discussion. This has made the discussion of problems more concrete and objective.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTION OF MORALITY

Limitations of virtuous Life

We have spoken of some moral virtues in the foregoing chapter. These virtues lead to happiness and are to be preferred to vices which lead to misery. But is that the end of morality ? We have already noted that worldly happiness is not the ultimate end of morality. Emancipation from mundane existence, which is the ultimate end of life, cannot be attained by mere observance of virtue.[1] An inner awakening followed by withdrawal from all activities of life, whether good or bad, is necessary for that. It is a state beyond vice and virtue. One may become worse or better by vicious or virtuous activities, but not perfect.

Practical path (vyavahāramārga)

This, however, does not mean total obliteration between good and bad. Perfection is a far cry for an ordinary man who has to discharge the normal duties of life. He has to choose between good and bad at every step. For him is prescribed a code of morality which may be called as practical path (*vyavahāramārga*). Here a clear distinction between good and bad is made. This path is a means and not an end in itself. It ultimately yields place to the supra-moral plane of life where one gets rid of normal duties of life.

What is necessary is a considered balance between the two, the supra-moral plane of life and the practical code of morality.[2] The practical code of morality serves no good if it does not lead to the higher supra-moral plane of life. Transcendental code of morality, on the other hand, should be no excuse for licentiousness. As long as one becomes perfect

1. *Pravacanasāra*, 3.56.
2. *Samayasārakalaśa*, Delhi, 1959, 267.

and passes beyond his mundane consciousness completely, he does require a clear distinction between good and bad. The complete conception of morality, therefore, includes both, the practical as well as the transcendental morality, which are inter-related with each other.

With this background we proceed to examine this problem, first according to Jainism and then according to other systems of Indian Philosophy.

Vice and Virtue

The result of virtues are birth as *tīrthaṅkara*, *gaṇadhara*, sage, universal monarch, *Baladeva*, *Vāsudeva*, god and *vidyādharas* and supernatural powers. The result of vices are pain, birth amongst subhumans and bad men, old age, death, disease, misery and poverty etc.[1] It is the motive behind an action which is taken into account and not merely the outer action.[2] We have given a list of actions which lead to worldly happiness (*sātāvedanīya*) as well as those which lead to misery (*asātāvedanīya*).[3] It may be mentioned that both types of these acts are actuated by attachment; in the case of the former it is mild, in the case of the later it is intense. In *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, therefore, vice has been defined as intense passion whereas virtue has been defined as mild passion.[4] Attachment, however, is present in both the cases.

Transcendental morality (niścayamārga) :

The ultimate aim is to uproot even the subtlest form of passions. Therefore the relative life of vice and virtue is to be abandoned in favour of a life of pure consciousness (*śuddhopayoga*). The activities of soul can be classified under three heads : (i) The auspicious activities (*śubhopayoga*), (ii) The inauspicious activities (*aśubhopayoga*), (iii) The pure activities (*śuddhopayoga*). In *śuddhopayoga* the self remains absorbed in its own nature of consciousness. In *śubhopayoga* as well as *aśubhopayoga*, the self becomes extrovert and con-

1. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Vol. 1, p. 105.
2. न पापबन्धो बाह्यनिमित्तमात्रादेव भवति ।
   —*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.11.
3. *Supra*, pp. 59-60
4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 90.

centrates on non-self. Thus from the point of view of *śuddhopayoga*, *śubhopayoga* and *aśubhopayoga* are bracketed together under the common name of *aśuddhopayoga*.

From transcendental point of view, therefore, it is said that ultimately the distinction of good and bad cannot be held.[1] Vice and virtue, bind the soul by effecting the inflow of foreign *kārmic* matter. All the eight types of *karmans* are *pudgala* (non-self) and yield a fruit which is miserable in the ultimate analysis.[2] Both of them cause bondage.[3] Therefore, both types of *Karmans* are to be condemned equally. Just as a skilful elephant does not get attached either to an ugly or to a beautiful she-elephant, meant for his capture, similarly a wise man does not get attached either to good or to bad actions, because both cause bondage.[4] Those who have a yearning for good actions, wander in this world in delusion.[5] How an action, leading to bondage, can be called good ?[6]

A person should transcend the duality of good and bad actions. "The meritorious action leads to wealth, wealth to pride, pride to infatuation and infatuation to sin; let, therefore, be no good actions for us"[7] It is said that even good

1. ततः परमार्थतः शुभाशुभोपयोगयोः पृथक्त्वव्यवस्था नावतिष्ठते ।
   —*Amṛtacandra* on *Pravacanasāra*, Bombay, 1935, 1.72.
   Also न खलु परमार्थत. पुण्यपापद्वैतमवतिष्ठते ।
   —Ibid , 1.77.
   Also *Samayasāra*, 145.
2. *Samayasāra*, 45.
3. *Pañcāstikāya*, 147.
4. *Amṛtacandra* on *Samayasāra*, 148-149.
   Also कर्म सर्वमपि सर्वविदो यद्बन्धसाधनमुशन्त्यविशेषात् ।
   तेन सर्वमपि तत्प्रतिषिद्धं ज्ञानमेव विहितं शिवहेतु ॥
   —*Samayasārakalaśa*, 103
5. *Pravacanasāra*, 1.77
   Also *Paramātmaprakāśa*, Bombay, 1937, 2.53. 55.
6. कह तं होदि सुसीलं जं संसारं पवेसेदि ?
   —*Samayasāra*, 145.
7. पुण्णेण होइ विहवो विहवेण मओ मएण मइ-मोहो ।
   मइ—मोहेण य पावं ता पुण्णं अम्ह मा होउ ॥
   —*Paramātmaprakāśa*, 2.60

actions lead to hell in future.[1] Rare is a wise man who considers even a virtue to be a vice.[2] A man should not be thus satisfied by anything less than self-realisation.

With this ultimate aim of transcendental morality in view, we are asked to be moral in the practical sense of the term till the achievement of that aim. Vice and virtue are chains of iron and gold, respectively, and as such are equally bad.[3] But is it not better to wait in the shade rather than in the hot sun ?[4] It is from his point of view that good actions are approved.[5] If the ultimate aim is not lost sight of, good actions are also indirectly helpful in the achievement of liberation.[6]

To conclude, though good and bad actions are equated from transcendental view-point, yet from practical point of view good actions are to be preferred to bad action for the following reasons:

1. For a man, engaged in worldly affairs, it is not possible to remain absorbed in pure consciousness.[7] So when he turns to activities under compulsion it is wiser to indulge in *śubhopayoga* which leads to happiness rather than in *aśubhopayoga*, which leads to misery[8]. Worldly happiness and misery, both dwindle into insignificance before the ecstacies of blissfulness of self-consciousness, but given a choice between the two, happiness is naturally preferable to misery.[9]

1. तेन निदानबद्धपुण्येन भवान्तरे भोगान् लब्ध्वा पश्चान्नरकादिकं गच्छन्ति ।
   —*Brahmadeva* on *Paramātmaprakāśa*, Bombay, 1937, 2.58.
2. जो पुण्णु वि पाउ वि भणइ सो बुह को वि हवेइ ।
   —*Yogasāra*, 71.
3. *Samayasāra*, 146.
4. *Iṣṭopadeśa*, 3.
5. जोण्हाणं णिरवेक्खं सागारणगार चरियजुत्ताणं ।
   अणुकंपयोवयारं कुव्वदु लेवो जदि वि अप्पो ।।
   —*Pravacanasāra*, 3.51.
6. *Bhāvasaṁgraha*, Bombay, Vik. Sam. 1978, 610-618.
7. गृहव्यापारयुक्तस्य मुख्यत्वेनेह दुर्घटम् ।
   निर्विकल्पचिदानन्दं निजात्मचिन्तनं परम् ।
   —Ibid., 607.
8. Ibid., 611, 612.
9. *Iṣṭopadeśa*, 3.

2. Secondly, good activities are governed by self-denial and negation of passions. Liberality, for example, implies greedlessness and is a sort of penance.[1]

3. Man is a social animal. He wants to preserve and promote the interest of the society in which he lives. Thus good acts which benefit the society are preferable to bad ones which cause its disintegration. It is from this point of view that the *Jaina ācāryas* have asked their adherents to follow those general customs of the society which are not contrary to spiritual teachings[2].

Thus we see that even though a man with right attitude will not attach much importance to the performance of good actions from the point of transcendental morality, yet at the same time while he is acting as a practical man, he will be a moral man in the ordinary sense of the word. The higher an aspirant ascends, the greater his devotion to *śuddhopayoga.* But in the interim period he tries his best to avoid *aśubhopayoga* and to devote to *śubhopayoga.*

Non-Jaina Systems

The Upaniṣadic View

Jainism shares this attitude with other systems of Indian philosophy. The chief interest of the Vedic seers lies in this world rather than the other world. They do not sing of the emptiness of this world and the futility of worldly pleasures. But by passage of time, mankind became introvert. In the later portions of the *Ṛgveda* itself, a recluse is described roaming fearlessly from one forest to another, remaining detached from the villages and fearing none[3]. It is, however, in the *Upaniṣads* that we find a clear distinction betwean the mundane good (*preyas*) and transcendental good (*śreyas*). In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, the old sage *Yājñavalkya* gave up all his worldly possessions in favour of higher spiritual life.

1. *Bhāvasaṁgraha*, 616, 617.
2. सर्व एव हि जैनानां प्रमाणं लौकिको विधिः ।
   यत्र सम्यक्त्वहानिर्न यत्र न व्रतदूषणम् ॥
   —*Yaśastilakacampu*, Bombay, 1901, 8.34.
3. *Ṛgveda*, 10.146.1.

When he was distributing his wealth amongst his wives, one of them, *Maitreyi*, pondering over the temporary nature of worldly possessions, refused her share of it with these words : 'What are these to me, if I am not thereby to gain life eternal'[1].

This anti-hedonistic tendency is brought out more clearly in the story of *Yama* and *Naciketas* in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. *Yama* tempted the youthful imagination of *Naciketas* and placed all human and divine pleasures at his disposal. There is a colourful description of the damsels and long life that were promised to him. Chariots ringing with divine music were offered.[2] But none of these could budge him from his keen desire of knowledge of the self because he knew that all worldly pleasures would wither away by to-morrow.[3]

Thus when it was established that *Naciketas* was really a deserving candidate for spiritual knowledge, *Yama* began his discourse with a clear distinction between the good (*śreyas*) and the pleasurable (*preyas*). He made it clear that both of these were diametrically opposed to each other and lead a person to diverse ends.[4] The path of good has the pre-requisite of freedom from the allurement of environment.

Modern scholars have also emphasised the supra-moral nature of the ethical teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. Dr. Radhakrishnan, while discussing the ethics of the *Upaniṣads*, remarked, "Duty is a means to the end of the highest perfection. Nothing can be satisfying short of this highest condition. Morality is valuable only as leading to it."[5] Deussen has also very clearly pointed out this. He observes that when "the knowledge of the *Ātman* has been gained, every action and, therefore, every moral action also has been deprived of meaning".[6]

Buddhist View

According to Buddhism it is meditation, which is beyond

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2.4.2.
2. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, 1.1.25.
3. Ibid., 1.1.26.
4. Ibid., 1.2.1.
5. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 208.
6. Deussen, Paul, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, Edinburgh, 1919, p. 362.

good or bad, which leads to Arhat-ship. From the point of view of meditation all acts, whether good or bad, are impure.[1]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System

The *Naiyāyikas* hold that 'so long as we act we are under the sway of attachment and aversion and cannot attain the highest good.'[2] According to the *Vaiśeṣika* system also the ceremonial piety can lead simply to worldly prosperity whereas spiritual insight (*tattvajñāna*) leads to liberation.[3] Whether it is *dharma* or *adharma*, both lead to embodied existence.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga System

In *Sāṁkhya*, the heaven which is the result of *sāttvika* activities, is considered undesirable in comparison to liberation.[4] Unselfish activities are, no doubt, the indirect cause of liberation.[5]

In the *Yoga* system our actions are classified under four heads : (1) The black or wicked deeds, as speaking ill of others; (2) The white or virtuous deeds, as wisdom; (3) The white and black or mixed deeds, as performance of sacrifice, which involves violence also; (4) The neither-white-nor-black or supra-moral deeds, as meditation of the self.[6] It is only this last-mentioned type of action which leads to liberation.

The Mīmāṁsā system

Even in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, which is the strongest votary of action, it is held that liberation, which lies in absolute cessation of the body, comes only when not only the virtuous (*dharma*) but vicious (*adharma*) actions also are exhausted.[7]

1. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 419.
2. Ibid., p. 162.
3. *Candrakānta* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Allahabad, 1924, 1.1.2.
4. *Sāṁkhyasūtra*. 3.52-53.
5. *Vijñānabhikṣu* on *Sāṁkhyadarśana*, Calcutta, 1936, 1.82, 85.
6. *Vyāsa* on *Yogasūtra*, 4.7.
7. आत्यन्तिकस्तु देहोच्छेदो निश्शेषधर्माधर्मपरिक्षयनिबन्धनो मोक्ष इति युक्तम् ।

   —*Prakaraṇapañcikā*, Benaras, 1961, p. 341.

In *Vedānta*, *Śaṅkarācārya* makes it clear while commenting on the *Upaniṣads* that since self is neither āpya (to be attained) nor *utpādya* (to be generated) nor *vikārya* (to be modified) nor *saṁskārya* (to be refined), it cannot be realised by *karmans*.[1] Wherever *Śaṅkara* finds a plea for action in the *Upaniṣads* he interprets it as an injunction for those who are still at a lower plane of existence and who cannot follow the path of renunciation.[2]

It is this common attitude of all systems of Indian philosophy towards ethics which makes it basically different from Western ethics. This is why Mckenzie remarks : '···it can be at least maintained with full assurance that Hindu ethical thought and practice have rested on pre-suppositions of a different kind from those on which the ethical thought and practice of the West have rested.[3]

Christian View

Mckenzie is right to some extent. But we cannot say that such ideas are absolutely lacking in Christian ethics. The Bible says, "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him."[4] Asked by a young man as to what he should do to inherit eternal life, Jesus Christ said, "Go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in heaven."[5] Jesus teaches us complete non-possession (*aparigraha*) when he says, '···So likewise, whosoever he be of you that foresaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple.'[6] Dr. Radhakrishnan has rightly remarked, "The only ethics that Jesus can preach is a negative one, to enable man to free himself from the world and fit himself for the Kingdom."[7] He further adds that 'the eschatological teaching of Jesus that the end of the world

1. *Śaṅkara* on *Īśopaniṣad*, Gorakhapura, Vik. Saṁ 1994, 1.
2. Cf. Ibid., 2.
3. Mckenzie, John, *Hindu Ethics*, p. 205.
4. I John, 2.15.
5. Mark, 10.21.
6. Luke, 14.33.
7. Radhakrishnan, S., *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, London, p. 69.

was at hand reveals an attitude of world and life negation so far as He did not assume that the Kingdom of God would be realised in this natural world but expected its sudden and startling inauguration by supernatural power."[1]

Conclusion

Thus we see that—

(1) The lofty ideal of social service is also motivated by subtle self-interests. We indulge in good activities either for name and fame here or for heavenly happiness hereafter. Even the so-called desireless actions (*niṣkāmakarmans*) can be at the best rated as action motivated by the noblest desire of alleviating the miseries of others or by the higher desires of following the teachings of the scriptures and performing the duty for the sake of duty. But can it lead to liberation without self-realisation? Perhaps not, for both—to dive deep into the realm of the self and to indulge in worldly activities—cannot go together.

(2) Good activities are to be deemed as a means and not as an end in itself. Even the subtlest form of passion in the form of ego is to be swept away. The moral virtues should be observed with the ultimate end in view without a tinge of egoism.

(3) The transcendental morality is not an excuse for moral slackness. The enlightened rise above the ordinary duties of life in the awareness of a higher purpose of life. The ordinary man should fulfil his duties with a detached view.

1. Radhakrishnan, S., *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 68.

CHAPTER IV

THE PATH OF THREE JEWELS

We have seen that some systems of Indian philosophy like *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* hold knowledge (*tatvajñāna*) to be the means of liberation, Other systems like *Mīmāṁsā* hold *karman* or right action to be superior to any other thing. The followers of *bhakti*-cult hold devotion and faith to be the only way to liberation.

The position of Jainism here also, as elsewhere, is reconciliatory.[1] In fact, right faith, right knowledge and right conduct cannot exist exclusively of each other. It is true that right conduct is the direct means of liberation,[2] but right conduct with right faith and right knowledge only can lead to liberation.[3]

From real point of view right attitude, right knowledge and right conduct can be summarised in one word 'self-absorption'.[4] From practical point of view right faith means faith in seven predicaments of Jainism,[5] whereas right knowledge consists in a knowledge thereof.[6] Right conduct is the conduct based on detachment.[7]

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 28 2.
2. चारित्रमन्ते गृह्यते मोक्षप्राप्तेः साक्षात्कारणमिति ज्ञापनार्थम् ।

    —*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.18.
3. अतः सम्यग्दर्शनं सम्यग्ज्ञानं सम्यक्चारित्रमित्येतत्त्रितय समुदित मोक्षस्य साक्षान्मार्गो वेदितव्यः ।

    —Ibid, 1.1.
4. आदा खु मज्झणाणं आदा मे दंसणं चरित्तं च ।

    —*Samayasāra*, 277.
5. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.2.
6. येन येन प्रकारेण जीवादयः पदार्था व्यवस्थितास्तेन तेनावगमः सम्यग्ज्ञानम् ।

    —*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.1.
7. रायादी परिहरणं चरणं ।

    —*Samayasāra*, 155.

The necessity of combining the three is brought out in many passages. Just as a person knowing a man to be king, and having faith in him, follows him for money, similarly a person knowing the real path and having faith therein should follow it for liberation.[1] Conduct without faith and knowledge is as futile as faith and knowledge without conduct.

Right faith (samyagdarśana)

The meaning of samyagdarśana

Samyagdarśana, which has been rendered as 'right attitude', 'right faith', or 'right conviction', indicates complete saturation of mind with a principle or idea. From real point of view, *samyagdarśana* means a sense of feeling—realisation of self.[2] From practical point of view, *samyagdarśana* means a firm belief in the fundamental principles of Jainism. The *vyavahāra-samyagdarśana* may be said to be the means of *niścaya samyagdarśana*. Different *ācāryas* have expressed the same idea in different words. We give below some of the representative descriptions of the nature of *samyagdarśana* :

(1) The Uttarādhyayana defines *samyaktva* as belief in the nine categories.[3] In his *Darśanapāhuḍa, Kundakunda* also defines *samyagdarśana* as a firm belief in the six substances and nine categories.[4] In *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, he expresses the same idea in different words by defining *samyagdarśana* as belief in the *dharma* devoid of violence, in faultless deity and in the way of life, prescribed by the omniscients.[5] In *Niyamasāra, samyagdarśana* is explained as a belief in liberated souls, Jaina scriptures and Jaina principles.[6] In *Mūlācāra*, the *samyagdarśana* is defined as belief in nine categories.[7]

(2) *Svāmikārtikeya* added belief in non-absolutism as a condition for *samyagdarśana*.[8] He held that the nature of nine

1. *Samayasāra*, 17-18.
2. *Darśanapāhuda*, Delhi, 1943, 20.
3. *Uttarādhyayana*, 28.14,15.
4. *Darśanapāhuḍa*, Delhi, 1943, 19.
5. *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, Delhi, 1943, 90.
6. *Niyamasāra*, Lucknow. 1931, 5.
7. *Mūlācāra*, 5.6.
8. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 311, 312.

categories cannot be rightly ascertained without the help of *Pramāṇa* and *naya*.

(3) *Umāsvāti*, who is followed by *Amṛtacandrācārya* and *Nemicandra Siddhāntacakravartī*, defines *samyagadarśana* as belief in the seven predicaments of Jainism.[1]

(4) *Samantabhadra* defines *samyagdarśana* as a belief in true deities, true scriptures and true teachers as against the three follies of belief in pseudo-deva, pseudo-belief and pseudo-teacher. *Samantabhadra* also speaks of the eight essentials of right faith and the necessity of freedom from eight types of pride for a right believer.[2]

(5) *Vasunandī* in his *Śrāvakācāra* says that, in addition to belief in the seven predicaments, *samyagdarśana* includes belief in liberated soul and Jaina scriptures.[3] Here *Vasunandī* follows *Niyamasāra* of *Kundakunda*.

Transgressions and blemishes of samyagdarśana

The *Tattvārthasūtra* speaks of following five transgressions of *samyagdarśana* :

(i) *Śaṅkā* (doubt)
(ii) *Ākāṅkṣā* (desire)
(iii) *Vicikitsā* (repulsion)
(iv) *Anyadṛṣṭipraśaṁsā* (admiration of followers of other creeds)
(v) *Anyadṛṣṭisaṁstava* (praise of followers of other creeds).[4]

The fourth transgression differs from the fifth in as much as the former means secretly thinking admiringly of wrong believers, whereas the latter means announcing the praise of wrong believers loudly.[5]

Banārasī Dāsa in his *Nāṭakasamayasāra* has given a different list of transgressions of right faith :

(i) Fear of public censure.
(ii) Attachment towards worldly pleasures.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.2.
2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, Delhi, 1955, 4.
3. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 6.
4. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.40. Also *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.18.
5. *Cāritrasāra*, Shri Mahaviraji, Vīra Nir. Sam. 2488, p. 7.

(iii) Thinking of attainment of worldly pleasures in the next birth.
(iv) Praise of false scriptures.
(v) Service of wrong believers.[1]

Eight essentials of samyagdarśana

An aspirant should be firm in his belief. Any doubt or scepticism hampers moral progress. The firmness of his belief is indicated by the following eight qualities which are essential characteristics of *samyagdarśana*. All these characteristics together make the right faith complete and effective.

1. *Niśśankita* (Absence of doubt about scriptures). The right believer, because of this quality, is free from the seven fears of (1) this world (2) another world (3) death (4) pain (5) accident, (6) absence of protector and (7) absence of forts, etc.[2] This shows a state of complete fearlessness, which is obviously necessary for a moral life.

2. *Niḥkāṅkṣita* (having no desire for the worldly pleasures). It comes from the firm belief that worldly enjoyments are impermanent, fraught with miseries, root of sins and evils.[3] A right believer, therefore, has a detached view of life. According to *Amṛtacandrācārya*, he has non-absolutistic attitude and avoids one-sided view.[4]

3. *Nirvicikitsā* (absence of doubt about the attainments of spiritual path). A right believer should not have any repulsion from the impurity of the body of a person possessed of three jewels.[5]

4. *Amūḍhadṛṣṭi* (no confusion about the ideal). A right believer does not follow the wrong path even if it may sometimes lead to seemingly favourable results. He disassociates himself from those persons who follow the wrong path.[6] This is not out of any hatred for them but because of the possible

1. *Nāṭakasamayasāra*, Bombay, Vik. Saṁ. 1986, 13 38.
2. *Mūlācāra*, 2.52, 53.
3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 12.
4. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, Agas, Vik Sam. 2022, 23.
5. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 13.
6. Ibid., 14.

dangers of deviating from right path by their association.[1] He should not recognise violence as right under any fear of greed.[2] He should avoid pseudo-guru, pseudo-deva, pseudo-scripture pseudo-conduct and common false conceptions [3]

5. *Upabṛhaṇa* (Augmenting the spiritual qualites). The right believer should perpetually endeavour to increase his spiritual qualities.[4] Another name for this characteristic is *Upagūhana*, consisting in concealing one's own merit and demerits of others.[5]

6. *Sthirīkaraṇa* (Re-establishing those who deviate from truth). Any time any one may be tempted by passions to follow the wrong path. It is the duty of the aspirant to re-establish himself and others also on the right path by reminding him of its glory.[6]

7. *Vātsalya* (Sense of brotherhoods towards the followers of the right path). It includes respect for spiritual principles and for those who follow them.[7] One must be devoted to meritorious persons, show respect to them and speak nobly.[8]

8. *Prabhāvanā* (preaching the importance of truth). One should try to propagate the truth to others also by means of charity, austerity, devotion, profound learning and by such means as are suited to the time and place.[9]

It would be observed here that the first five characteristics pertain to the individual life of the aspirant whereas the last three pertain to the social aspect of religion. A true aspirant is not satisfied with his progress only but tries his best to help others also in self-realisation.

1. माध्यस्थ्यभावं विपरीतवृत्तौ ।
—*Sāmāyikapāṭha*, Delhi, 1966, 1.
2. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 418.
3. *Puruṣārthasiddhupāya*, 26.
4. Ibid., 27.
5. Ibid., 27.
Also *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 419.
6. Ibid.. 28.
7. *Puruṣārthsiddhyupāya*, 29.
8. Ibid., 421.
9. Ibid., 30.
Also *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 18; *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 422.

Kundakunda on the eight essentials

Kundakunda in his *Samayasāra* explains the above eight characteristics from a different point of view. *Niśśaṅkita* according to his interpretation, means freedom from fear of seven types.[1] *Niṣkāṅkṣita* means having no yearning for the fruits of one's actions.[2] *Nirvicikitsā* stands for non-abhorrence towards the natural qualities of objects.[3] *Amūḍhadṛṣṭi* means that one should have no confusion about the nature of things.[4] *Upabṛhaṇa* means covering the pseudo-characteristics of self by devotion to *Siddhas*.[5] *Sthirīkaraṇa* means re-establishing one-self on the right path.[6] *Vātsalya* is love for three jewels and monks.[7] *Prabhāvanā* means devoting oneself to the self-knowledge.[8]

The means of attaining samyaktva :

Some people attain *samyaktva* through intuition (*nisarga*) others by a study of scriptures (*adhigama*).[9] The persons having right faith can be classified into ten categories according to the means they adopt for the attainment of *samyaktva* :

1. *Nisarga*—Those who have an inborn spontaneous inclination towards righteousness.

2. *Upadeśa*—Those who learn truth from somebody by instruction.

3. *Ājñā*—Those who, being free from love and hate, follow the path of righteousness by command.

4. *Sūtra*—Those who obtain righteousness by the study of *sūtras*.

5. *Bīja*—Those who comprehend the truth just by

1. *Samayasāra*, 228.
2. Ibid., 230.
3. Ibid., 231.
4. Ibid., 232
5. Ibid., 233.
6. Ibid., 234.
7. Ibid , 235.
8. Ibid., 236.
9. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.3.

having a suggestion about it, just as a drop of oil expands on the surface of the oil.

6. *Abhigama*—Those who comprehend the truth by the study of the eleven *Aṅgas*, the *Prakīraṇas* and the *Diṣṭivāda*.

7. *Vistāra*—Those who understand the truth by undergoing the full course of study by means of all *pramāṇas* and *nayas*.

8. *Kriyā*—Those who believe in performing all the duties prescribed by the scriptures under right knowledge, faith and conduct.

9. *Saṁkṣepa*—Those who understand the truth by a brief exposition only though ignorant of other systems of philosophy.

10. *Dharma*—Those who believe in the law, or the words of the Jinas.[1]

The classification shows that human disposition differs from person to person but if the aim is correct we should make an allowance for the different methods of attainment of truth in accordance with one's own nature.

Moral corollaries of right faith :

It is clear from the above description that right faith implies such moral qualities as fearlessness, detachment, firmness, absence of scepticism, alertness, selflessness, sincerity of purpose, single-minded devotion, and propagation of truth. Besides, *Pūjyapāda* gives the following four essential virtues of a right believer :

(i) Calmness (*praśama*), (ii) detachment (*saṁvega*), (iii) kindness (*anukampā*) and (iv) self-realisation (*āstikya*).[2]

Somadeva says that 'just as virility of a man, which cannot be perceived with the senses, can be ascertained from his relations with women, or the generation of children, or his fortitude in danger, or the execution of his designs, similarly the existence of the jewel of right faith, although

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 28.26-27. Also *Dharmasaṁgraha*, Palitana, 1905, 2.23 (p. 144).
2. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.2.

extremely subtle owing to its being a condition of soul, may be inferred from the qualities of *praśama*, *saṁvega*, *anukampā* and *āstikya*.[1]

In the first place, an excited person, who becomes the victim of his own ill-considered actions, and is overcome by such negative ideas as that of rage, hatred and jealousy, cannot focus his energies with a single minded devotion to the purpose of liberation. The calmness comes from the realisation of the true aim of life.

Secondly, a true aspirant of liberation is not only detached from all worldy pleasures but is also afraid of them because these allurements can take him away from the right path. This is called *saṁvega* and comes from the realisation of the fact that happiness comes from within and not from without.

Thirdly, right believer is not a bigoted, hard-hearted and bitter man but he has respect for all, willing to let others lead a happy life, and has tendency of proving helpful in the miseries of others.

Fourthly he understands the equality of all. He has friendship for all (*maitrī*) but feels special bondage of kinship for those who are spiritually advanced (*pramoda*). Those who are away from truth, he tries to improve their lot (*karuṇā*). But if they do not listen to him, he does not develop any hatred for them; he rather becomes indifferent to them (*mādhyasthya*.)[2]

Beside these four primary moral qualities, a right believer is asked to renounce eight types of pride of (i) the position of relatives on the maternal side (*jātimada*), (ii) the position of relatives on the paternal side (*kulamada*), (iii) beauty (*rūpamada*), (iv) wealth (*vibhūtimada*), (v) scholarship (*dhīmada*), (vi) strength (*śaktimada*), (vii) austerities (*tapomada*) and (viii) honour (*arcanāmada*).[3] The following five vices vitiate his right faith : (i) pride of knowledge, (ii) dullness of intellect, (iii) harsh speech, (iv) cruelty and (v) idleness.[4]

1. Handiqui, K. K., *Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, Śolapura, 1949, p. 255.
2. *Sāmāyikapāṭha*, 1.
3. *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, Bombay, 1919, 2.87.
4. *Nāṭakasamayasāra*, 13 37.

On the other hand, the five qualities that adorn his right faith are as follows : (i) The eagerness to propagate right faith (ii) knowledge of right and wrong (iii) Steadfastness, (iv) happiness at the attainment of right attitude, (v) dexterity in thinking over metaphysical problems.[1] The Acārāṅga Sūtra brings out the moral significance of right faith with great emphasis when it says, "He who has right faith commits no sin."[2]

Position of faith in Indian Culture

Faith marks the start of the journey towards the ultimate goal. It indicates the first glimpses of truth. Faith has been praised as a great moral virtue and necessary for all spiritual progress by all.

The Ṛgveda praises faith (*śraddhā*).[3] The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* asks us to be faithful.[4] The *Gītā* says that only the faithful attains knowledge.[5] We find a further development of this idea of faith in the *Bhaktisūtra* of *Nārada* and *Śāṇḍilya* which are solely based on the idea of faith and devotion. In *Vedānta*, *Rāmānujācārya* held that salvation is not possible by knowledge, as held by *Śankara*, but by *bhakti.*[6]

Thus we find that the importance of faith has been impressed throughout the history of Indian culture.

Some points on Samyagdarśana

In the above description of the nature, characteristics, types and means of right faith, the following points are discernible :

(1) Right faith is not something dogmatic. The way in which a man may fall and regain the right attitude[7] proves that it is a dynamic quality and not mere conversion from

1. *Nāṭakasamayasāra*, 13.31.
2. सम्मत्तदंसी न करेइ पावं—

   —*Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1.3.2.1.
3. *Rgveda*, 10.151.1-5.
4. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 6.12.3.
5. श्रद्धावांल्लभते ज्ञानम् ।

   —*Gītā*, 4.39.
6. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 703.
7. Cf. infra chapter VIII.

one faith to another faith in the missionary sense of the term.

(2) In Jainism, as in other religions of India, only acceptance of a code of principles is necessary but we need not accept the over-all supremacy of a particular person. There can be no Mohammedan without accepting Mohammad as the messenger of God and no Christian without accepting Christ as the son of God. No person is assigned such superhuman position by Jainism. The *Tīrthaṅkaras* were as human as we are; only they conquered their passions which we can also do and attain the same status which they did.

(3) Jainism realises the direct comprehension of truth as a landmark in the life of an aspirant. But it is only the beginning of the journey, not the end. Belief does affect our conduct but old habits do not break instantaneously. Right faith must lead to right conduct. Our conviction must compell us to act accordingly. Hence right faith, from which the ethics begins, can lead to perfection only when followed by right conduct.

(4) Mere conduct and knowledge are impotent without right faith. It means that all moral virtues should be deeply rooted in the spiritual realisation. Without right faith, the moral virtues remain merely means of attaining selfish motives like name and fame. Right faith implies that duty is to be performed not for some petty immediate gain but for the attainment of the highest goal of perfection. This saves the aspirant from being entrapped in the allurements of worldly pleasures which he may easily come across as a result of his good activities.

(5) To some extent, the position of a right believer may be compared to that of a *niṣkāma karmayogī* of the *Gītā*. He has no desire, no attachment, still he engages himself in activities under the influence of previous *karmans*. These activities are not always good. But the inner detachment of the right believer weakens the force of *karmans* remarkably.

We shall have more occasion to deal with the character of a *samyagdarśī* while dealing with the stages of spiritual development (*guṇasthāna*). Suffice it to say for the present, that right faith means an inner conversion and not merely verbal acceptance of certain truths. The truth of truths is the self. Therefore from real point of view, *samyagdarśana* means

realisation of the self. The description of *samyagdarśana* from practical point of view is to be interpreted in the light of this *niścayasamyagdarśana*. Now we turn to the second jewel of right knowledge with special reference to its ethical value.

Right knowledge

The *Uttarādhyayana* clearly says that without knowledge, there is no virtuous conduct.[1] In the history of mankind the word 'knowledge' has been considered to be very sacred. In Jainism, a utilitarian view of knowledge has been taken. Knowledge is a means to something higher, which is emancipation. Knowledge should not only be right epistemologically but should be backed by right faith as to be spiritually useful.

Right faith and right knowledge

Though right faith and right knowledge emerge simultaneously on the removal of *mithyātva* as heat and light simultaneously rise from sun on the removal of clouds,[2] yet the two are to be distinguished from each other. Right faith is the result of removal of vision-deluding *karmans* (*darśanamohanīya*) whereas right knowledge is the result of removal of knowlenge-obscuring *karmans* (*jñānāvaraṇī*). For liberation, right attitude should be free from all blemishes, whereas it is not necessary to know more than the bare fundamental truths of spirituality. We have a story of *Śivabhūti* in *Bhāvapāhuḍa*, who attained liberation even though he had little knowledge of scriptures.[3] On the other hand, not an iota of scepticism can be tolerated with regard to right attitude. What is comparable to *avidyā* of other systems, is *darśanamohanīya* in Jainism. Ignorance or *ajñāna*, in the ordinary sense of absence of mundane knowledge, is not a great hindrance in the realisation of truth.

While discussing the stages of spiritual development in

1. नाणेण विणा न हुंति चरणगुणा—
—*Uttarādhyayana*, 28.30.

Also पढमं णाणं तओ दया—
—*Daśavaikālikasūtra*, 4.10.

2. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.1.
3. *Bhāvapāhuḍa*, 53.

a subsequent chapter, we shall see that as the aspirant ascends upwards, he has to fight against vision-deluding (*darśana-mohanīya*) *karmans* and conduct-deluding (*cāritramohanīya*) *karmnas*, whereas the *jñānāvaraṇī karmans* continue to the last till he attains the highest stage of omniscience. As far as moral progress is concerned, only the knowledge of basic principles of spiritualism is essential. Therefore, the knowledge-obscuring *karmans* are not considered detrimental (*ghātins*) for moral progress.

What is right knowledge ?

To know the jar as a jar does not make the knowledge right. A right knowledge is that in which a clear distinction is made between the self and the non-self.[1] The real knowledge is the knowledge of the self. The word *jñānī* may be used in three different contexts :

1. A man possessed of knowledge is called *jñānī*. From this point of view all are *jñānīs*.

2. A man possessed of right faith is called *jñānī*. All overcome by wrong belief are *ajñānīs* from this point of view, even though their knowledge may be epistemologically right.

3. A man having perfect knowledge is called *jñānī*. All souls in bondage are *ajñānīs* from this point of view.[2]

It is only the second type of *jñānī*, whose knowledge leads him to liberation.[3] Right knowledge is that which leads one towards his goal. The knowledge of the scriptures is valuable only if it leads to detachment and self-realisation.[4] Right knowledge should help in the realisation of truth and in controlling the mind and purifying the self.

1. ...स्वपरान्तरं जानाति यः स जानाति ।

—*Iṣṭopadeśa*, 33.

2. *Jayacanda* on *Samayasāra*, Delhi, 1959, 177-178.

3. सम्मत्तरयणभट्टा जाणंता बहुविहाइं सत्थाइं ।
आराहणाविरहिया भमंति तत्थेव तत्थेव ॥

—*Darśanapāhuḍa*, 4.

4. एवं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं वियाणित्ता ।
जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुक्खपरिमोक्खं ॥

—*Pañcāstikāya*, 103.

The special position of right knowledge according to Jñānasāra

Jñānasāra lays greater emphasis on knowledge. There seems to be an influence of *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* and *Vedānta* on the author of the book. He defines *avidyā* or ignorance, after the fashion of *Patañjali*, as miscomprehending non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure and non-self as self[1]. Obviously, *Jñānasāra* includes *mithyādarśana* and *mithyājñāna*, both in *avidyā*. "If the knowledge, capable of cutting the Gordian knot, exists what is the use of strange *tantras* and *yantras*? "If the sight itself is dispeller of darkness why use the lamps?"[2] The book continues to speak in poetic tones, "The wise declare knowledge to be a nectar, which does not arise from ocean, a tonic, without being a medicine, a glory which does not depend on others."[3] Knowledge of scriptures is to be distinguished from inner knowledge. A man, intoxicated with penance and scriptural knowledge etc. even though devoted to religious rites, gets attached; whereas a man possessed of the inner knowledge, even though not devoted to religious rites, does not get attached.[4] The wise cuts, with the sickle of know ledge, the creeper of the poison of desire, which yields the fruits of drying up of the mouth, attachment and helplessness.[5] Knowledge makes a man fearless.[6] It is the real penance (*tapas*) because it burns (*tāpanāt*) the *karmans*.[7]

All this praise which *Jñānasāra* showers on knowledge is justified in case of the broader sense of the term, which it attributes to it.

Right knowledge Vs. wrong knowledge :

All knowledge of a wrong believer is wrong because it does not lead to liberation. Even otherwise, if a man does

1. *Jñānasāra*, Bhavanagar, Vik. Sam. 1969, *Vidhyaṣṭaka*, 1. (For other *Aṣṭakas* also see *Jñanāsāra*) cf. *Yogasūtra*, 2.5.
2. *Jñānāṣṭaka*, 6.
3. Ibid., 8.
4. *Nirlepāṣṭaka*, 5.
5. *Nihspṛhāṣṭaka*, 3.
6. Cf. *Nirbhayāṣṭaka*.
7. ज्ञानमेव बुधाः प्राहुः कर्मणां तपनात्तपः ।

   —*Tapoṣṭaka*, 1.

not know even the substratum of all knowledge, how can his knowledge be right? The truth is that one who knows one, knows all and who knows all, knows one.[1] Knowledge to be right should be relative. This implies non-absolutism which is another name for right faith. Absence of bookish knowledge or wrong perception arising out of the weakness of senses is not real ignorance.

Limitations of knowledge

Some of the systems of Indian Philosophy hold that knowledge alone can lead to liberation. *Vidyānandī* has refuted this view in the beginning of his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*. His arguments can be summarised thus : A man, even after acquisition of knowledge remains embodied for some time. This is also accepted by *Sāṅkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Vedānta* as necessary for the enjoyment of residual *karmans* Now the question is this that a person who has acquired right knowledge will not be reborn; then how does it become possible for him to exhaust all his residual *karmans* before leaving his body?[2] The soul must put some special efforts for it. This effort in the form of meditation is a form of conduct, which annihilates the residual *karmans* by the process of *nirjarā*.[3] Therefore, right knowledge combined with right conduct brings emancipation.

The position of right knowledge in Indian culture

Knowledge occupies a very significant position in the history of Indian philosophy. By the term 'knowledge', two psychological phenomena are indicated : (1) Knowledge of the external objects, which may be called 'mundane knowledge', (2) Knowledge of the self, which directly comes through self-realisation.[4] This is the latter type of knowledge, called *tattvajñāna*, which according to *Vedānta*, *Nyāya* and *Sāṅkhya* systems of philosophy, directly leads to liberation.

In Jainism, which is mainly an ethical system, know-

1. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1. .4.1. SBE, Vol. XXII, p. 34.
2. *Vidyānandī* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Bombay, 1918, 1.1. (verses 50-51).
3. Ibid 1 1. (verses 52)
4. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 1.1.5.

ledge occupies only a subservient place to conduct. It believes that knowledge is a power which can be rightly utilised only by a man possessed of right attitude (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). Even the mundane knowledge, in Jainism, is held to be leading towards liberation provided that it is utilised for developing a detached view of life. Since Jainism is a realistic system, it does not look upon mundane knowledge as false, as is the case with *Vedānta* system which holds this world and knowledge thereof to be illusory.

Coming to the *Brāhmaṇical* attitude, we find prayers for knowledge and intelligence at many places.[1] Knowledge occupies such an important position in the *Upaniṣads* that they are called *jñānakāṇḍa* (portions dealing with knowledge) of the Veda. *Īśopaniṣad* says that through knowledge one gets immortality.[2] The *Gītā* says that there is nothing purer than knowledge.[3] According to *Sāṅkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Vedānta*, knowledge is the only means of liberation.

Some points on right knowledge

From the above discussion it may be concluded that :

(1) Jainism places ethics above metaphysics and epistemology. To believe that 'to know the jar even as a jar' is wrong if the knowledge is not accompanied by right faith, is a clear indication of the above fact. The motto is not 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge' but 'knowledge for the sake of liberation.'

(2) Jainism and other systems of Indian philosophy make a distinction between verbal knowledge and knowledge acquired through direct spiritual experience. The former, even though much in quantity, cannot save whereas a little of the latter can lead us to liberation.

(3) Knowledge without faith and conduct is impotent, Knowledge without faith is a mere pedantic gymnasticism whereas knowledge without conduct is a futile burden on the head. It is the union of the three that brings real bliss to the soul.

1. *Śukla Yajurveda*, Bombay, 1929, 32.15.
2. विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ।
   —*Īśopaniṣad*, 11.
3. *Gītā*, 4.38.

Right Conduct

Right faith precedes right conduct.[1] No conduct or knowledge without right faith can be said to be right.[2]

Transcendental conduct

From transcendental point of view, right conduct consists in self-absorption. We have spoken of this conception in the foregoing chapter. From this point of view conduct has only one variety viz., self-absorption. Conduct is *dharma*, *dharma* is equanimity (*sāmya*), and equanimity means that condition of *ātman* which is free from delusion and agitation.[3]

Conduct from practial point of view

It is only in the background of this transcendental conception of conduct that all religious conduct is to be justified.[4] Persons are purified by the purification of mind, all austerities are mere torturing of body without that.[5] A person who is inwardly detached, is detached in the real sense of the term; he who is detached only outwardly does not get emancipation. Right conduct is something spontaneous, it is not forced. The vows, the three-fold path of self-discipline and the five-fold path of vigilance are the constituents of practical conduct.[6] Without conduct all knowledge is futile.[7]

1. तत्र सम्यक्त्वस्यादौ वचनं तत्पूर्वकत्वाच्चारित्रस्य ।

—*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 2.3.

2. यत्पुनर्द्रव्यचारित्रं श्रुतं ज्ञान विनापि दृक् ।
न तज्ज्ञानं न चारित्रमस्ति चेत्कर्मबन्धकृत् ॥

—*Pañcādhyāyi*, 2 771.

3. चारित्तं खलु धम्मो, धम्मो जो सो समो त्तिणिद्दिट्ठो ।
मोहक्खोहविहीणो परिणामो अप्पणो हु समो ॥

—*Pravacanasāra*, 1.7.

Also *Pañcādhyāyi*, 2 764.

4. *Amṛtacandra* on *Samayasāra*, 307

5. मनःशुद्ध्यैव शुद्धिः स्याद्देहिनां नात्र संशयः ।
वृथा तद्व्यतिरेकेण कायस्यैव कदर्थनम् ॥

—*Jñānārṇava*, Bombay, 1907, 22.14.

6. *Bṛhaddravyasaṁgraha*, Bombay, Vīr. Nir. Saṁ. 2433, 45.

7. *Ārādhanāsāra*, Bombay, Vik. Saṁ. 1973, 54.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have observed that according to Jainism the main cause of bondage is perversity of attitude. The right faith, therefore, occupies the most important position.

At the same time, right conduct is no less important. The soul has to exert itself in order to check the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter and also to annihilate the previously accumulated *kārmic* matter. This is, as given in the second chapter, called *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*.

Now we proceed to deal with the rules of conduct, which form the main part of Jaina ethics. As attainment of right conduct is a gradual process, the aspirant may not be able to achieve the highest ideals of conduct at the first stage. He, therefore, can observe only partial self-control at the stage of householder, whereas at the advanced stage of monkhood he becomes capable of observing the rules of conduct more comprehensively and completely. So we have two sets of rules of conduct : one for the householder, another for the monk. We shall deal with both of them in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER V

THE CONDUCT OF A HOUSEHOLDER

Who is a householder ?

The Jaina word for a householder, *śrāvaka*, covers all those persons who have attained right faith but have not adopted monkhood. These persons either observe the vows partially (*aṇuvrata*) or do not observe them (*aviratasamygdṛṣṭi*). But pure right faith is the necessary condition for a *śrāvaka*. This purity of right faith comes from its eight essentials[1] and from freedom from eight prides[2] and three follies.[3]

Having conquered the vision-deluding *karmans* (*darśana-mohanīya*), the *śrāvaka* continues to struggle against another enemy, the character-obstructing (*cāritramohanīya*) *karmans*. He adopts the twelve vows prescribed for a laity and then proceeds to limit his desires till he is able to take the absolute vows (*mahāvrata*) and adopt the life of a monk. This is generally a gradual process. At the higher stage of spiritual development a *śrāvaka* is called *Naiṣṭhika* who renounces the worldly life and takes to a life that resembles the life of a monk (*śramaṇabhūtapratimā*). Thus *śrāvakācāra* includes not only the conduct of a *gṛhastha* but also the conduct of one who is known as *vānaprastha* in *Hindu-dharma-śāstras*.

The position of a householder:

Jaina ethics is primarily ascetic. The life of a householder is meant to be a short stay, only for those who are still incapable of enduring the hardships of the life of a monk. The morality of a householder, therefore, occupies a secondary place to the morality of a monk. We, therefore, find that the older books like *Ācārāṅga* of the *Śvetāmbaras* or *Mūlācāra* of the *Digambaras*, deal primarily with the life of a monk.

1. Supra, pp. 86-87.
2. Supra, pp. 90.
3. Supra, p. 85.

In Brāhmaṇism, the position is just the reverse. The older books of Brāhmaṇism conceive primarily of a householder's life. It is only in the later books that the institution of ascetics came to its own and occupied that prominent place which it does to-day. The *Manusmṛti* represents the Brāhmaṇical thinking on the whole when it says that just as all rivers find shelter in ocean, similarly all *āśramas* find shelter in *gṛhasthāśrama*.[1]

The position of an aviratasamyagdṛṣṭi :

The first stage of a Jaina householder begins with right attitude. This right attitude should be perfect in respect of eight essential limbs. Just as a *mantra*, short of even a single letter, does not remove the pain of poison similarly right attitude, devoid of any of the essentials, does not pierce the line of births.[2] Even a pariah, having right faith is like god and is like the lustre of a live charcoal covered by the ashes.[3] Right faith acts like a pilot in the path of liberation.[4] A householder with right faith is better than a monk without it.[5]

Even if a person does not observe the vows, but if he is blessed with right faith, he is not reborn in hell or as animal, bird, eunuch or woman or in a low family, and does not suffer from deformity, or short life or poverty.[6] Those who are purified by right faith become lords of splendour, energy, wisdom, prowess, fame, wealth, victory, and greatness and are born in great families and are very prosperous.[7]

Jainism emphasises both, an inner detachment and renunciation of the worldly objects. The latter is the result of former and has no spiritual significance without it. Right attitude signifies inner detachment. It may not be possible for a man of right faith to renounce the worldly objects instantaneously, but once he has developed inner detachment

1. *Manusmṛti*, 6.90.
2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 21.
3. Ibid. 28.
4. Ibid., 31.
5. Ibid., 33.
6. Ibid., 35.
7. Ibid., 36.

the *karmans* cannot hold him in bondage for long. It is said that he attains liberation within a maximum time-limit of an *ardhapudgalaparāvarta*. He performs actions but they have so little influence on him that the *karmans*, it is said, do not bind him. This position can be compared to the *niṣkāma karmayoga* of the *Gītā*. The person with an inner detachment performs actions, but is not attached to their fruits or results.

But the aspirant is not satisfied with anything short of liberation, which requires not only inner detachment but a complete renunciation of worldly activities. As his right faith gains ground, he proceeds towards monkhood by adopting small vows which are less strict than the great vows of a monk.

The vows of a householder :

According to *Upāsakadaśāṅga* as well as *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, the householder should observe the following twelve vows :

(1) Five partial vows. (2) Three *guṇavratas* (3) Four purificatory *śikṣāvratas*.[1] According to *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra* the eight essentials of a *śrāvaka* are the five small vows and renunciation of wine, meat and honey.[2] The five small vows include partial observance of the five moral principles of non-violence, truth, non-stealing, celibacy and non-possession. These vows are supplemented by the *guṇavratas* which discipline the external movements and the *śikṣāvratas* which emphasise inner purity of heart.

The five vows and Caturyāmadharma:

The number 'five' seems to have some special significance for ancient Indian thinkers. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* gives the following five qualities as constituents of the life of a good man.

(1) Penance (*tapas*) (2) Liberality (*dāna*) (3) Simple dealing (*ārjavam*) (4) Non-violence (*ahiṁsā*) (5) Truthfulness

1. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, Rajakota, 1961, 1.11 (pp. 201-244)
Also *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 51.
2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 66.

(*satyavacana*).[1] The last two of these qualities are the same as the first two vows of Jainism. The third of these may be interpreted as non-stealing.[2] Thus these moral qualities of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* very much resemble the Jaina vows.

Baudhāyana gives the following list of cardinal moral virtues :

1. Abstinence from injuring the living beings.
2. Truthfulness.
3. Abstention from appropriating the property of others.
4. Continence.
5. Liberality[3]

This description has replaced penance of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* by continence, thus bringing these moral virtues still nearer to Jaina vows. The fifth vow of liberality, which was a cardinal virtue of Brāhmanism was a misfit in the Jaina view of morality. It was, therefore, replaced by non-possession. This was, however, done only at the time of the last *Tīrthankara*, *Mahāvīra*. *Pārśvanātha* the *Tīrthaṅkara* prior to him, conceived, only of four vows (*caturyāmas*).[4]

The five vows (*pañcaśīla*), which are binding on a Buddhist laity, include the vow of abstinence from intoxicants as the fifth vow. The Jaina view of non-possession is more comprehensive than this. Thus we see that the first four of these vows are unanimously accepted by Brāhmaṇism, Buddhism and Jainism. The fifth vow was, however, modified by each religion according to its own requirements.[5] Later on, the Brāhmaṇical tradition also adopted the same vows as those of Jainism when *Yogasūtra* of *Patañjali* replaced the original vow of liberality by the ascetic vow of non-possession.[6]

The reason why *Mahāvīra* replaced the four *Yamas* of

1. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 3.17.4.
   Also *Taittarīyopaniṣad*. 1.9.
2. *Ācārāṅga* mentions three vows also. SBE, Vol. XXII, p. 63.
3. *Baudhāyana*, 2.10.18. quoted from SBE, Vol. XXII, Introduction, p. XXIII.
4. *Sthānāṅga*, 4.1.266.
5. *SBE, Vol. XXII, Introduction*, p. XXIV.
6. *Yogasūtra*, 2.30.

Pārśvanātha by five vows is given as follows in the *Uttarādhyayana*. The followers of *Pārśvanātha* were simple and wise whereas the followers of *Mahāvīra* were prevaricating and slow of understanding.[1] So *Mahāvīra* had to make it clear to his followers that celibacy and non-possession were equally important and, therefore, he split one vow into two. From yet another reference to nakedness of the followers of *Mahāvīra* in contrast to the wearing of clothes by the followers of *Pārśvanātha*[2] it may be inferred that perhaps *Mahāvīra* was more strict on the observance of absolute vow of non-possession. This is, however, a tradition of the *Śvetāmbara* sect. *Kundakunda* of the *Digambara* sect, has clearly prohibited use of clothes for all monks.[3] It may also be pointed out that in the Brāhmaṇical tradition, these vows for mendicants were nowhere prescribed for a householder till perhaps *Yogasūtra* first of all thought of having small vows (*aṇuvratas*) for the householder. Originally, the life of a householder, according to Brāhmaṇism, was guided by such social virtues as sacrifice, study and liberality rather than by the ascetic virtues. The life of a householder according to *śramaṇa* tradition is, however, only a preparation for monkhood and, therefore, he was expected from the very beginning to practise the same virtues on a smaller scale which a monk was ex- pected to follow with perfection.

Thus it is a long journey from the list of five cardinal moral virtues given by *Chāndogyopaniṣad* to the five *Yamas* of *Yogasūtra*. We see that the ascetic tradition of Jainism influenced the Brāhmaṇical tradition also, which replaced the social virtue of liberality by the ascetic virtue of non-possession. The emphasis on non-possession may be considered to be a contribution of *Mahāvīra* to the Jaina tradition itself.

Originally, the Brāhmaṇical tradition, again, did not favour the idea of renouncing the world in the prime of youth. It was only after the duties of worldly life were fulfilled that a person could adopt monkhood to lead a retired life in the

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 23.26-27.
2. Cf. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXIII.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 1.30.

forest, devoted to meditation. The *śramaṇa* tradition influenced the Brāhmaṇical tradition in this respect also. The old division of āśramas continued; but the new idea of renouncing the world, the very day one attains detachment, was also introduced.[1]

The vow of non-violence : its background

The Vedic people seem to have been more inclined towards worldly engagements than spiritual attainments. They glorified the institution of war as means of destroying enemies.[2] This glorification of war is repeated in the later Brāhmaṇical literature also.[3] At the time of *Mahāvīra*, animals were mercilessly killed in sacrifices.

But this does not mean that Brāhmaṇical literature has no mention of non-violence. *Āśādhara* tells us that the animal sacrifice was started by *Vasu* by misinterpreting such sentences as '*ajairyaṣṭavyam*'.[4] The *Manusmṛti* praises avoidance of meat-eating.[5] The famous sentence that non-violence is the supreme duty (*ahiṁsā paramo dharmaḥ*) occurs in the *Mahābhārata* itself. The *Mahābhārata* declares that the sum-total of duties is contained in the maxim : "Thou shalt not do to others what is disagreeable to thyself."

Thus two distinct currents can be seen from the very beginning of Indian culture. *Manusmṛti* has beautifully summarised the position by saying that human nature is inclined towards meat-eating but a check on this natural inclination yields immensely favourable results.[6] There is great truth in the saying that life lives on life.[7] Still justice demands that we should not inflict misery on others, if we do not want others to inflict misery on us. Between these two facts, the inevitability of violence on one hand and the demand of our inner-

1. *Jābālopaniṣad*, 4.
2. *Ṛgveda*, 1.166.10.
3. *Gītā*, 2.37.
4. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.84.
5. *Manusmṛti*, 5.45-55.
6. Ibid., 5.56.
7. जीवो जीवस्य जीवनम् ।
—*Śrimadbhāgavatapurāṇa*, Gorakhapura, Vik. Saṁ. 2010, 1.14.46.

most heart of being non-injurious to others, we are to fix our duty of non-violence.

Non-violence in Jainism :

Thought is the father of action. We commit violence in thought (*bhāvahiṁsā*) before we commit it in action *dravya-hiṁsā*). It is the former, violence in thought, which is real violence (*niścayahiṁsā*). Therefore, merely taking away of life does not constitute complete definition of violence. Violence has been defined as injury to one's vitalities out of negligence (*pramāda*). Negligence means, in short, the passionate ideas of attachment and aversion. These ideas have been classified under fifteen heads.[1] Entertaining such ideas is violence, whereas absention from such ideas is non-violence.[2]

Violence in thought

Bhāvahimsā, violence in thought, has predominated in the discussion of *ahiṁsā* by Jaina thinkers. Even before *Umāsvāti* defined *hiṁsā*, *Ācārya Kundakunda* had declared that whether one was killed or not, a negligent person certainly committed violence.[3] A vigilant person, on the other hand, who acted with care, did not suffer bondage by mere (material) injury. The commentator *Amṛtacandrācārya* says that the inner violence is the impure state of self, whereas the injury to vitalities is the external manifestation of violence.[4] He is clear about it that the material vitalities of others are sometimes injured and sometimes not; a person gets the bondage of *karmans* because of defilement of his abstract vitalities (*bhāvaprāṇa*) by attachment.[5] *Jayasenācārya* made the sense clearer by means of a metaphor. "Just as a person desirous of killing others by a burning iron bar burns his ownself first, similarly an ignorant person first afflicts his own pure-self by getting influenced by the ideas of infatuation etc., which are like the burning iron bar; there is no rigid rule

1. Supra, p. 62.
2. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 44.
3. *Pravacanasāra*, 3.17.; also *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 45.
4. *Amṛtacandra* on *Pravacanasāra*, 3.17.
5. Ibid., 2.57.

for the affliction of others."[1] The *Daśavaikālikasūtra* declares that to one who walks, stands, sits, sleeps, eats and speaks with vigilence, no sin accrues.[2] *Kundakundācārya* also says that a *śramaṇa* who is negligent is said to be violent with regard to all the six *kāyas* but if he behaves vigilantly, he remains unattached, just like lotus in water.[3] This is how absolute non-violence is made possible.

Coming to the commentaries of *Tattvārthasūtra, Sarvārthasiddhi* of *Pūjyapāda* repeats the same thing and says that a negligent soul afflicts the self by self and it is not important whether others are killed or not.[4]

Akalaṅkadeva in his *Rājavārtika* defines *pramatta* as a person who loses all sense of discrimination under the influence of passions.[5]

The objection that if a person cannot be held responsible for happiness and miseries of others, how could he be held responsible for any act of violence, has been answered on the basis of predominance of *bhāvahiṁsā*. True that a person is not responsible for the miseries of another person[6], yet he cannot escape responsibility of defiling his pure nature by entertaining the ideas of attachment and aversion, which is the real sin.

Violence in action (Dravyahiṁsā) :

Non-violence in thought should be translated into action also. To say that if internal mind is undefiled external purity of actions is unnecessary, would be denying the unbreakable relation between thought and action. Non-violence is not merely an abstract idea but also a concrete way of life. What has been said about the importance of *bhāvahiṁsā* and *niścayhiṁsā* does not mean negligence in outward behaviour.

1. *Jayasena, on Pravacanasāra* 2.57.
2. *Daśavaikālika*, 4.8
3. *Pravacanasāra*, 3.18.
4. स्वयमेवात्मनात्मानं हिनस्त्यात्मा प्रमादवान् ।
   पूर्वं प्राण्यन्तराणान्तु पश्चात्स्याद्वा न वा वधः ॥
   —Quoted by *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.10.
5. *Akalaṅka* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Calcutta, 7.13.1.
6. *Samayasāra*, 266.

"The wheel of different view-points (*nayacakra*) is extremely sharp-edged and difficult to ward off; when it is used by misguided intellect it cuts off one's own head quickly."[1] Hence avoidance of external violence is as necessary as the aviodance of feelings of attachment or aversion.

From practical point of view, any kind of injury to any of the ten vitalities of a living being is violence. These ten vitalities are five senses : three powers of mind, speech and body; age and respiration.[2] Violence thus includes not only killing or physical injury but also curtailing the freedom of thought and speech of others. None should be forced to do anything against his wish. Thus it would be wrong to restrict non-violence only to the limited field of non-injury to living beings; it should also be extended to the higher plane of independence of thought and speech, which is the very basis of democracy and free society.

Amṛtacandra has shown the importance of the intention of the agent. He has pointed out that, on account of intensity or mildness of passions, trifling violence may yield serious results and grievous violence may yield trifling results.[3] Thus the same violent action may yield different results on account of variation in the intensity of passion.[4] Sometimes violence leads to benefits of non-violence and non-violence to the harms of violence.[5]

Non-absolutism and non-violence

When we extend non-violence from respect for life to respect for thought, we are automatically led to non-absolutism. That is why non-absolutism is held as important as non-violence by Jaina thinkers. All statements or points of view are relative and, therefore, every one of them has a grain of truth. Every object has complex nature and unity can be found in diversity. Given two contradictory statements, it is not necessary to reject one of them, for the

1. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 59.
2. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Surat, 1930, 7.8.
3. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 52.
4. Ibid., 53.
5. Ibid., 57.

contradiction may be superficial and not real. A wider outlook is necessary to avoid quarrels which lead not only to mental conflicts but to so much of bloodshed in the name of religion and ideologies. It is a matter of daily experience that contradictory attributes can be assigned to the same object from different points of view. The same tree which is said to be movable from the point of view of branches, is said to be immovable from the point of view of root and trunk. We do not like to listen to the view-points of others on account of our prides and prejudices. But a non-violent person, who is free from attachment and aversion, will dispassionately look at every problem and would be able to arrive at the truth by reconciling different points of view by putting them in their proper perspective. In fact, most of the so-called ideological conflicts are motivated by selfish interest. Non-violence teaches us to be master of our passions and accept objective views on all problems.

Types of violence

From real point of view violence is only of one type; but from practical point of view it can be classified into many varieties. Jaina thinkers have classified violence into 108 varieties so that the aspirant can detect even the minutest form of violence.[1] The violence is three-fold in as much as it can be (1) committed by the person himself (*kṛta*) or (2) got committed by others (*kārita*) or (3) got committed by others by giving consent (*anumodanā*). This three-fold violence becomes nine-fold as it can be committed by either of the three agencies of mind, speech and body. This nine-fold violence becomes twentyseven-fold as it has three stages : (1) thinking of violent action (*saṁrambha*), (2) making preparation for violence (*Samāraṁbha*) and (3) actual committal (*ārambha*). This twentyseven-fold violence becomes one hundred and eight-fold as it could be inspired by either of the four passions. This classification shows that *Jaināčāryas* took a comprehensive view of non-violence.

Avoidance of violence in all its varieties is possible only

1. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, Bombay, Vik. Saṁ. 1979, 6.12-13.

for a monk who observes absolute non-violence. We shall deal with the absolute non-violence in the following chapter while dealing with the conduct of a monk. Herebelow we deal with the vow of non-violence as it is observed by a householder.

Limitations of the small vow of non-violence[1]

The conception of the vow of non-violence for householder is based on two considerations : (1) The householder has certain responsibilities towards his family of earning livelihood and procuring necessities of life for them. (2) He has to safeguard himself and his country against enemies.

For the first requirement, the householder has to adopt a certain profession. He should be careful to choose a profession which involves the least violence. The violence that he commits under compulsion of professional circumstances is called *Udyamīhiṁsā*; and it can be avoided only at the higher stage of spiritual progress in the eighth *pratimā*. Unintentional violence is also involved in such daily routine of a householder, as cooking etc. It is not possible to abondon such violence in the initial stages.[2] This is known as *āraṁbhahiṁsā* and is abondoned only in the eighth *pratimā*.

As regards the second requirement of self-defence, the house-holder takes a defensive attitude in wars. He is never offensive, but he can take part in defensive wars. When compelled by circumstances, he accepts the challenge of war as a necessary evil (*virodhihiṁsā*).

It is only the fourth type of *hiṁsā*, called intentional violence (*saṁkalpihiṁsā*), which can be and should be absolutely avoided by a householder.[3] *Saṁkalpihimsā* includes violence for the sake of fun or violence performed under intense passion. Avoidance of this type of violence interferes neither with his duty of earning his livelihood nor with discharging his responsibilities of self-protection as a self-respecting citizen of his country.

This, however, does not mean that other three types of

1. *Muni Nathamala, Ahiṁsā-tattva-darsana*, Curu, 1960, pp. 85-86.
2. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 6.6-7.
3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 53.

violence that the householder commits under compulsion are not to be abondoned ultimately. As the aspirant ascends the steps of spiritual progress, he minimises all types of violence in his conduct. In the meantime, he has a constant feeling of self-condemnation (*nindana, garhaṇa*) for the violence that he commits.[1]

Eight mūlaguṇas :

Amṛtacandra has considered the renunciation of wine, meat, honey and five types of *Udumbara* fruits as necessary for a householder, who wants to observe the vow of non-violence.[2] These are called basic qualities or *mūlaguṇas* of a householder. The earlier writers like *Samantabhadra* included the five *aṇuvratas* also in the *mūlaguṇas*. *Samantabhadra* had five *aṇuvratas* and abstinence from wine, meat and honey as the eight *mūlaguṇas*.[3] *Ācārya Somadeva* introduced altogether a different tradition by ıeplacing five *aṇuvratas* by abstinence from five *Udumbaras*.[4] This must be considered as concession, since observance of five *aṇuvratas* is much more difficult than avoidance of five *Udumbaras*. *Amṛtacandrasūri* followed *Somadeva* in this respect.

The number of these basic qualities has not remained constant. *Ācārya Amitagati* added to the eight basic qualities given by *Amṛtacandra*, the avoidance of eating at night.[5] *Vasunandī* added, the avoidance of gambling, hunting, prostitution, adultery and stealing.[6] *Paṇḍita Āśādhara* gives another list of these basic qualities in which he has added devotion to the adorable five, viz. *Arihanta, Siddha, Ācārya, Upādhyāya* and *Sādhu* ; use of only that water which is strained through a cloth and a compassionate attitude towards the sentient beings.[7]

It may be observed from these different lists of basic qualities of a householder that non-violence predominates in

1. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 6.8.
2. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 61.
3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 66.
4. *Handiqui, K. K., Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 262.
5. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 5.1.
6. *Vasunandīśrāvakā āra*, 59.
7. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 2.18.

every list. These lists also show that *Jaina Ācāryas* were particular about non-violence not only towards fellow human beings but towards small insects and animals also.

Dietic prohibition :

Food is the basic necessity of life. The necessary violence involved in the preparation of food is unavoidable for a house-holder and is considered as *ārambhī hiṁsā*. But violence for food should be restricted within certain limits. Meat, for example, which is obtained by merciless killing of innocent animals, is not allowed for eating in any case. Vegetables and animals are endowed with life alike but it will be wrong to argue that just as we take vegetable life for food, we can also kill animals for food. To use a simile of *Āśādhara*, though both mother and wife are possessed of womanhood, yet only wife is used for gratification of sex and not mother.[1] Killing of a five-sensed animal causes hardening of heart and involves much more callousness than is required for preparing food out of vegetables. Not that violence to vegetable life is not a sin but that is lesser of the two evils, and perhaps an unavoidable one, for a householder.

Wine is another item which should be avoided by a house-holder. Wine stupefies the mind; the man whose mind is stupefied forgets righteousness ; and he who forgets righteousness, commits violence.[2] Moreover, a man who takes wine necessarily commits violence because he destroys many creatures which are generated in liquor. Pride, fear, hatred, ridicule, disgust, grief, passion for sex and anger are concomitants of wine.[3]

Besides wine and honey, five *Udumbaras* are also prohibited for food purposes. Even though the living beings in these five fruits may not be present on account of their being dry, their use involves violence in as much as it indicates strong attachment for them.[4] Butter, even though not included in the above list of eight *mūlaguṇas*, should also be avoided as

1. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 2.10.
2. *Puruṣārthasidhyupāya*, 62.
3. Ibid., 64.
4. Ibid., 73.

germs are believed to be taking birth in it. Butter together with honey, wine and meat, is known as *mahāvikṛti*, as all of these have excessive fermentations.[1]

Āśādhara has included the following *abhakṣya* under eight *mūlaguṇas* (1) Abstinence from wine includes abstinence from rice-gruel that has fermented pickles and curds kept for more than two days. (2) Abstinence from meat includes abstinence from water or other liquids contained in leather, as afoetida in contact with leather and tainted food. (3) Abstinence from honey includes abstinence from honey as collyrium and flowers like *mahuā*. (4) Abstinence from *udumbara* includes abstinence from pods as *rājamāṣa*, aubergines and unknown fruits. (5) Abstinence from taking food at night includes avoidance of food in the first and last *muhūrtas* of the day and avoidance of taking of ghee or mango even as a medicine at night.[2]

Transgressions of the vow of non-violence :

When the householder takes a vow of non-violence, he has to know the acts which defile his vow, so that he can avoid them. The scope of non-violence is so wide that the traditional five *aticāras* (transgressions) of the vow can be hardly said to be comprehensive. Any intentional violation of the rule of non-violence is a defilement of the vow. A householder in initial stages may not be able to avoid violence of the immobile life but he should avoid violence of mobile life.[3]

The traditional *aticāras* of non-violence are :

(1) tying up living beings tightly (2) beating them (3) mutilating them (4) overloading them (5) withholding their food and drink.[4]

All these five *aticāras* are condemnable if done under the pressure of passions. But a householder may adopt them for correcting a child or a servant.[5] Similarly, food may be

1. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 71.
2. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 3.11-15.
3. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 75.
4. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.45.
5. *Gaṇin Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Surat, 1930, 7.20.

denied to a patient suffering from fever for his physical good.[1]

Some misconceptions about non-violence:

There are certain misconceptions about non-violence. Some hold that there is no violence in taking the flesh of those animals who have met natural death. It is not true, because in the flesh of a dead body, *nigoda* creatures of same genus are constantly being generated which are killed even by touching of that flesh.[2] Similar argument is advanced against taking of honey which has itself dropped down from the honeycomb.[3] It is due to this existence of *nigodas* in the carcass of an animal that the plea for saving many lives of small creatures by taking away the life of one animal of huge size, is refuted.[4]

Even violent animals should not be killed either with an intention of saving the possible destruction of other animals by them or to save them from the possibility of incurring the great sin of violence.[5] The only way of removing one away from sin is to teach him to control his passions and not to destroy him. Even mercy-killing is a form of violence.[6] The animal, which is suffering, is a victim of his own past *karmans*, and his suffering cannot be cut short by killing him.

Violence in the name of religion:

Violence is not to be justified for the sake of so-called religious rituals. Non-violence, compassion and love is the core of every religion and yet in many of the great religions of the world we find that violence is prescribed in the name of religion itself. Jainism has vehemently opposed all such violence.

It is argued that *dharma* is difficult to comprehend; and, therefore, even though violence is otherwise bad, when sanc-

1. *Ganin Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.20.
2. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 66-68.
3. Ibid., 70.
4. Ibid., 82.
5. Ibid., 83-84.
6. Ibid., 85.

tioned by religion, violence is no sin.[1] Everything can be offered to gods including flesh of animals, as religion flourishes through gods.[2] But this argument should not be used for violence.

Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya refers to some other strange beliefs. One of these beliefs is that if a person is killed when he is in a state of happiness, that state will continue in future life also.[3] Another belief is that if a person engrossed in deep meditation is killed he gets liberation.[4] The third group called *kharapaṭikās* believed that liberation automatically comes at the dissolution of body.[5] All violence under such misconceptions is condemned.

Under no pretext, therefore, can violence be justified. The implication of the precept of non-violence in Jainism is manifold. It is against all cruelty towards animals. It is against wars even though it gives us the right of self-defence. It guarantees freedom of thought, speech and action to all alike and it asks us to shun violence in the name of religion. This force of non-violence became a powerful weapon, recognised by all, under the dynamic personality of *Gandhiji*. Non-violence means victory over one's baser instincts, the unbridled expression of which is sometimes wrongly eulogised as bravery.

The vow of truthfulness

The word '*satyam*' conveys much wider meaning than the English word 'truth'. In Brāhmaṇism it indicates not only the ethical principle of truthfulness but also the metaphysical reality.[6] The following points may be noted as regards the conception of *satyam* in Jainism; (1) *Satyam* refers to an ethical principle rather than to abstract metaphysical entity as *Brahman*; (2) Mere statement of fact is not truth unless it is

1. *Purusārthasiddhyupāya*, 79.
2. Ibid., 80.
3. Ibid., 86.
4. Ibid., 87.
5. Ibid., 88.
6. सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।

—*Taittarīyopaniṣad*, 2.1.1.

Here the word '*satyam*' is used in its abstract metaphysical sense.

motivated by beneficial intentions;[1] (3) Truth is subservient to non-violence.

Classification of truth

Truth and untruth are classified, sometimes according to their causes, sometimes according to their nature, and sometimes according to their intensity.

Amṛtacandra has given four types of falsehood :[2]

(1) Denial of the existence of a thing with reference to its position, time and nature.

(2) Asserting the existence of a non-existent thing with reference to its position, time and nature.

(3) Representing a thing as something else.

(4) The fourth type of falsehood includes (a) Reprehensible speech (*garhita*) (b) Sinful speech (*sāvadya*) (c) Hurtful speech (*apriya*).

(a) A reprehensible speech includes back-bitting, joke, harsh, unbecoming, non-sensical and anti-canonical speech. (b) Sinful speech includes speech which prompts piercing, cutting, beating, ploughing, trading and stealing.[3] (c) Hurtful speech causes unpleasantness, fear, pain, enmity, grief, quarrel or anguish in the mind of another person.[4] The sinful speech includes what may be called the professional lie which is allowed for a householder.[5] Speech causing ploughing or trading may not be considered as a lie at all ; but it has been called so because these professions involve violence.

Another classification, based on the mixture of truth and falsehood, is given by *Somadeva*[6] : (1) *satyasatya*—wholly true, (2) *asatyasatya* —intermixture of truth and falsehood, the latter being predominant, (3) *satyāsatya*—intermixture of truth with falsehood, the former being predominant,

1. Cf. यद्भूतहितमत्यन्तमेतत्सत्यं मतं मम ।
 —*Mahābhārata*, 12.329.13.
2. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 91-96.
3. Ibid., 97.
4. Ibid., 97.
5. Ibid. 101.
6. *Handiqui, K. K., Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 265.

(4) *asatyāsatya*—wholly false. Amongst *Digambaras*, *Āśādhara* also follows *Somadeva's* classification.[1]

Conception of truth :

In speech one should aim at moderation rather than exaggeration, esteem rather than denigration, at distinction rather than vulgarity of expression.[2] Even truth if it is harmful to others should be avoided.[3] Language should be balanced and expressive of the sacred truths.[4]

All untruth necessarily involves violence for it is caused by negligence, which is the back-bone of violence.[5] It is, therefore, unthoughtful speech, anger, greed, fear and cutting of jokes which should be avoided to protect the vow of truthfulness.

Transgressions of the vow of truthfulness

The five *aticāras* of the vow of truthfulness according to *Upāsakadaśāṅga* are as follows :

(1) Sudden calumniating (*sahasābhyākhyāna*)

(2) Disclosing others' secrets (*raho'bhyākhyāna*)

(3) Divulging the confidence of one's wife (*svadāramantra-bheda*).

(4) False advice (*Mṛṣopadeśa*)

(5) Writing false statements (*kūṭalekhakaraṇa*).[6]

The *Digambara* tradition has the following *aticāras* :

(1) False preaching (*mithyopadeśadāna*)

(2) Divulging one's secret (*raho'bhyākhyāna*)

(3) Forgery (*Kūṭalekhakriyā*)

(4) Breach of trust (*nyāsāpahāra*)

(5) Disclosing one's secret purpose (*sākāramantrabheda*).[7]

1. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.40-43.
2. *Handiqui, K. K.*, *Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 266.
3. सत्यं विमोक्तव्यं परपीडारम्भतापभयजनकम् ।

   —*Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 6.47.
4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 234-4.
5. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 99.
6. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.46.
7. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 184. Also *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.45. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 7.4.

Besides, mention may be made of *Samantabhadra*,[1] who considers *paiśunya* (calumny) and *parivāda* (reproach), and of *Somadeva*[2] who considers *mudhāsākṣipadokti* (false evidence), as the transgressions of the vow of truthfulness.

Now we deal with these *aticāras* in some details.

(1) *Mithyopadeśadāna* : According to *Cāmuṇḍarāya*, it means such advice as is detrimental to the attainment of liberation or heaven.[3] *Āśādhara* explains it as speaking such words as may cause suffering to others or show the methods of winning in a dispute by dishonesty.[4]

(2) *Rahobhyākhyāna* : In *Digambara* tradition it means divulging secret actions of men and women.[5] *Siddhasena Gaṇin* seems to interpret this *aticāra* in the sense of *svadāramantra-bheda* of *Upāsakadaśāṅga*.[6]

(3) *Kūṭalekhakriyā* : It means alleging in writing what was not in fact said or done by someone.[7] *Siddhasena Gaṇin* connects it with false writing of symbols on birch bark.[8]

(4) *Nyāsāpahāra* : It means dishonesty with regard to the deposits of a person. If a person deposited Rs. 500 with another man but forgot the exact amount, the second may then deceive him by saying that he had deposited only Rs. 400 with him[9]. Then this would be *aticāra* called *nyāsāpahāra*.

(5) *Sākāramantrabheda* : It means divulging the intention of a person as inferred from his facial expressions.[10]

Praise of truthfulness :

The *Jaina* scriptures praise truthfulness as a great virtue. A liar suffers in this life and the next. A truthful man, on the other hand, enjoys great security.[11] A truthful man should neither exaggerate, nor find fault with others, nor use indecent speech, and should use noble, beneficial and balanced speech.

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 56.
2. *Upāsakādhyayana*, 381.
3. *Cāritrasāra*, Shri Mahaviraji, VNS 2488, p. 9.
4. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.45.
5. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.26.
6. *Gaṇin*, *Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.21 (p. 105).
7. *Cāritrasāra*, p. 19.
8. *Gaṇin*, *Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.21.
9. *Ibid*., 7.21.
10. *Ibid*., 7.21.
11. *Yogaśāstra*, 2.53-64

He should have equanimity of mind, be noble and kind and should not extol himself.[1]

The position of truth in Brāhmanism

Truth held a prominent place in Brāhmaṇism from the *Ṛgvedic* times. In the *Ṛgveda, ṛta* which is another name for truth, is considered to be the chief divine quality.[2] In *Śatapatha*, truthfulness is identified with *dharma*.[3] The *Upaniṣads* declare in unequivocal terms that truth alone conquers and not falsehood.[4]

The vow of non-stealing

The vow of non-stealing, which means abstention from taking a thing which is not given, is very comprehensive and includes avoidance of dishonesty in all walks of life. Like other vices, even stealing is connected with violence by *Amitagati*. Wealth is, as if it were, external vital force of a man, and whosoever takes that away commits violence.[5] Moreover, *pramattayoga* which is the backbone of violence, is also present in the act of stealing.[6]

Dvādaśānuprekṣā summarises the scope of this vow in these words : one should not buy a valuable article at low price, nor sell it at low price, nor appropriate something that has been forgotten, nor take the property of others through anger or greed.[7] Similarly, *Āśādhara* forbids taking a thing whose ownership is doubtful.[8] He also says that valuables like a buried hoard should be considered as the property of the state.[9] *Samantabhadra* holds that what is unoffered, placed, dropped or forgotten by others, should neither be taken nor

1. *Handiqui, K. K., Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 266.
2. *Ṛgveda*, 10.190.1.
3. यो वै स धर्मः सत्यं वै तत् ।

   —*Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, Kashi, VS 1994, 14.4.2.26.
4. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 3.1 6.
5. *Purṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 103.
6. Ibid., 104.
7. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 335.
8. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.49.
9. Ibid., 4.48.

be given to somebody.[1] One may take possession of property of one's kinsman after his death ; but during his life his permission should be sought.[2]

The transgressions of the vow of non-stealing

All authors, except *Somadeva*, agree with regard to the following five transgressions of the vow of non-stealing :

(1) Abetment of theft (*stenaprayoga*) (2) Receiving stolen property (*tadāhṛtādāna*) (3) Violating state rules (*viruddharājyātikrama*) (4) Use of false weights and measures (*hīnādhikamānonmāna*) (5) Adulteration (*pratirūpaka vyavahāra*).[3]

(1) *Stenaprayoga* : According to *Pūjyapāda*, it means direct or indirect instigation of theft.[4] *Siddhasena Gaṇin* has a different interpretation. According to him this transgression means helping thieves with money.[5]

(2) *Tadāhṛtādāna* : According to *Pūjyapada*, it means obtaining something stolen by a thief, without having employed or prompted him.[6] According to *Siddhasena Gaṇin*, it means obtaining goods which are proceeds of a robbery for nothing or at low price.[7]

(3) *Viruddharājyātikrama* : According to *Pūjyapāda* it means all illicit business.[8] According to *Siddhasena Gaṇin*, it means unlawful acquisition of property in another country which is engaged in hostilities with one's own country since even grass or wood acquired under such circumstances must be regarded as stolen.[9]

(4) *Hīnādhikamānonmāna* : According to *Cāmuṇḍarāya*, it means trading in which more is taken from oneself and less

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 57.
   Also *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 211; *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.48.
2. *Handiqui, K. K., Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 265.
3. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.47. Also *Tattvārthasūtra* 7.22; *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 58; *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 7.5; *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 185; and *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 1 47.
4. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.27.
5. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.22.
6. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.27.
7. *Ganin, Siddhasena*, on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.27.
8. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.27.
9. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.22.

given to others when weighing or measuring.[1] *Siddhasena Gaṇin* includes charging abnormal interest on the lent money under this transgression.[2]

(5) *Pratirūpaka Vyavahāra* : According to *Cāmuṇḍarāya*, it means fraudulent trading in fictitious or alloyed gold and similar commodities.[3] According to *Siddhasena*, it means alloying of gold, silver, brass, copper, oil, ghee, milk or curds with materials that resemble them in colour, weight and other properties.[4]

It is clear from the foregoing account of the *aticāras* of the vow of non-stealing that the vow is very comprehensive and forbids almost all such acts of direct or indirect theft as are punishable under modern law.

Vow of brahmacarya (celibacy) :

The vow of *brahmacarya*, which literally means 'treading into the soul', stands for abstinence from sexual intercourse. In wider sense, any action which leads to extroversion goes against this vow. The importance of *brahmacarya* has been emphasised since Vedic times.[5]

In Jainism, which lays more emphasis on ascetic qualities than Brāhmaṇism, *brahmacarya* occupies a much more important place. In Brāhmaṇism, the position is quite different because marriage is considered to be a social obligation. This is not so in Jainism where total avoidance of sex is highly extolled. All these traditions, however, agree in prohibiting the sexual intercourse beyond one's duly married wife (*svadāra*).

Samantabhadra has, therefore, included in this vow renunciation of contact with another man's wife and remaining contented with one's own wife.[6] *Somadeva* has advised to consider all women except one's wife, as mother, sister, or daughter. According to him the ten concomitants of sexual desire are : wine, meat, gambling, music including songs and dance, bodily decoration, intoxication, libertines and aimless wanderings.[7]

1. *Cāritrasāra*, pp. 10-11.
2. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.22.
3. *Cāritrasāra*, p. 11.
4. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena on Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.22.
5. *Atharvaveda*, 11.5.
6. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 59.
7. *Handiqui, K. K., Taśastilaka and Indian Culture*, pp. 266-267.

The five transgressions of this vow are as follows[1] :

(1) *Itvarāparigṛhītāgamana* : The word '*itvarā*' has been explained as harlot or a kept woman,[2] *Āśādhara* calls this transgression by the name of *itvarikāgamana*, explaining '*itvarā*' not merely as harlot but as any woman leading a disorderly life [3]

(2) *Aparigṛhītāgamana* : The word '*aparigṛhīta*' has been explained as 'harlot', 'widow' or 'ownerless'. Both in the first and the second cases transgression of original vow of *svadāra-santoṣa* is involved.[4]

(3) *Anaṅgakrīḍā* : It includes use of artificial phalli, caressing the sexual organs to influence desire.[5] Obviously, this goes againt the common standards of chastity and should be avoided.

(4) *Kāmabhogatīvrābhilāṣa* : Literally, it means an excessive desire for sexual intercourse. It means that sexual passions even in relation to ones's own wife should not cross a limit. *Siddhasena Gaṇin* includes the use of artificial means for excessive sexual enjoyments under this transgression.[6]

(5) *Paravivāhakaraṇa* : Here the word '*para*' excludes one's own children which a householder has to get married not only as social obligation but also as a duty of saving them from going astray.[7] A householder, however, should not indulge in unnecessarily arranging marriages of others which may only indicate his excessive interest in sexual indulgence.

The vow of non-possession

Aparigraha has been explained as '*mūrchhā*' or the hallucination of possessions.[8] *Amitagati* says that every violence is committed for *parigraha*;[9] therefore, a householder should constantly try to limit his activities for possessions.

1. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.48
2. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.23.
3. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.58.
4. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7 23.
5. Ibid., 7 23.
6. Ibid., 7.23.
7. Ibid., 7.23.
8. *Daśavaikālika*, 6 20, Also *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7 16.
9. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 6.75.

Parigraha is the result of *mohakarma*, which is the main obstacle to self-realisation. *Moha* has two sides : (i) attachment and (ii) aversion. The former of these manifests itself as *parigraha* whereas the latter as *hiṁsā*. Therefore, on its subjective side *parigraha* represents one side of *moha*, whereas *hiṁsā* represents another side. *Aparigraha*, therefore, is as important as non-violence.

Aparigraha is neither only non-attachment nor only non-possession; it is both.[1] It stands, in its inner meaning, for non-attachment. To be particular, inner *parigraha* includes *mithyādarśana*, four *kaṣāyas* and nine *nokaṣāyas*[2] These are, as it were, symbols of attachment and should be avoided for the perfection of this vow.

The external *parigraha* is classified under ten heads :

(1) *kṣetra* (land) (2) *vāstu* (house) (3) *hiraṇya* (coins etc. of gold) (4) *suvarṇa* (gold) (5) *dhana* (livestock etc.) (6) *dāsī* (maid servants) (7) *dāsa* (men servants) (8) *kupya* (jewels etc.) (9) *śayyāsana* (bed), (10) other luxury items.[3]

Transgressions of the vow of non-possession

The five transgressions of the vow of non-possession are :[4]

(1) *Kṣetra-vāstu-pramāṇātikramana* : This means adding a field or a house to the existing one in order to save himself from breaking the vow under which he must have fixed the number.[5] Though the number of the fields or houses does not exceed the fixed limit yet the spirit of the vow is violated.

(2) *Hiraṇyasuvarṇapramāṇātikramaṇa* : This means giving some newly acquired precious articles to one's acquaintance with the understanding that he will return the same to him after the expiry of the time for which he may have taken the vow.

(3) *Dhanadhānyapramāṇātikramaṇa* : This means keeping

1. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 113.
2. Ibid., 116.
3. *Cāritrasāra*, p. 12.
4. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.49. Also *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.24. for explanations of these *aticāras*.
5. Cf. *Hemacandra* on *Yogaśāstra*, Bhavanagar, 1926, 3.96 (p. 195).

extra grains etc. at some place to bring it to one's house when the commodity that already exists is exhausted.

(4) *Dvipadacatuṣpadapramāṇātikramaṇa* : This means so arranging that even though the animals do not actually give birth to the younger ones during the period of vow, they become pregnant and give birth to the younger ones after the expiry of the period of the vow.

(5) *Kupyadhātupramāṇātikramaṇa* : This means welding ornaments to keep their number within the limit of the vow. Similarly, other objects may be acquired and joined with the already existing ones so as to keep the number unchanged and yet actually exceed the limit.

These *aticāras* of *aparigraha* point to the weakness of human nature, which is often self-deceptive. A man may declare to the world that he is greedless and yet may satisfy his desire for acquiring new objects under one or the other pretext. *Samantabhadra* has given a different list of the *aticāras* of this vow[1] :

(1) *Ativāhana* : Compelling the beasts of burden to cover more distance than they can easily do, out of greed.

(2) *Atisaṁgraha* : Hoarding of grains out of greed to sell them at higher price at a later date.

(3) *Ativismaya* : To be extremely sad at a loss incurred in some transaction.

(4) *Atilobha* : To desire for a higher price when a reasonable price has already been offered for an article.

(5) *Atibhāra-Vāhana* : Overloading the animal out of greed.

This means that a householder is expected to be a contented type of man. He should not sacrifice either his own spiritual well-being or the social well-being of others at the alter of uncontrolled greed. Hoarding and profiteering which are impediments to spiritual progress are also obstacles in establishing economic justice in the society, and retard social progress.

The supplementary vows of a householder

The following seven supplementary vows protect the

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 62.

above five *aṇuvratas*. These supplementary vows, collectively known as *śīlavratas*, include three *guṇavratas* and four *śikṣāvratas*. The *guṇavratas* according to *Tattvārthasūtra* are :
1. *Digvrata*, 2. *Deśāvakāśika*, 3. *Ānarthadaṇḍavrata* [1]

The *Śvetāmbara* tradition replaces *deśāvakāśikavrata* by *bhogopabhoga*,[2] a practice which is followed by *Kundakunda*, *Kārtikeya*, *Samantabhadra* and *Āśādhara* also.

The four *śikṣāvratas* according to *Tattvārthasūtra* are :
1. *Sāmāyika*, 2. *Proṣadhopavāsa*, 3. *Bhogopabhoga* and 4. *Ātithisaṁvibhāga*.[3]

As *Śvetāmbara* tradition includes *bhogopabhoga* in *guṇavratas*, it replaces this *vrata* by *deśāvakāśika*[4] which, as shown above, is a *guṇavrata* according to *Tattvārthasūtra*. *Samantabhadra*, *Āśādhara* and *Kārtikeya* follow the *Śvetāmbara* tradition here also.

Kundakunda replaces *bhogopabhoga* by *sallekhana*. *Vasunandī* divides this *vrata* into two : *bhogavirati* and *paribhogavirati*, the other two being *dāna* and *sallekhana*.

It would be observed here that there is much difference of opinion regarding the list of *guṇavratas* and *śikṣāvratas* and there is also some controversy as to the nature of these two categories which is clear from the fact that *bhogopabhoga* is a *guṇavrata* according to one tradition and *śikṣāvrata* according to another. It may, however, be pointed out that there is no fundamental difference amongst *ācāryas*, and they perhaps classify these *vratas* differently only due to their personal likings and not on a matter of principle.

According to *Samantabhadra*, the *guṇavratas* increase the capacity of observing the five vows with greater determination and purity.[5] In fact, by the observance of *guṇavratas*, the *aṇuvratas* attain the status of *mahāvratas* for a limited period with reference to the place falling outside the limits set by the aspirant.[6]

The *śikṣāvratas*, as the name shows, are helpful in

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.16.
2. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.11. (pp. 216-226).
3. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.16.
4. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.11 (p. 227).
5. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 67.
6. Ibid., 70.

educating the aspirant for the higher life of complete renunciation.[1]

Guṇavratas

Digvrata and deśāvakāśikavrata

There seems to be no material difference between these two *vratas*. The idea of both of these *vratas* is to restrict the movements of a householder in order to avoid violence to the maximum extent and also to minimise his greed. For this purpose *Deśāvakāśikavrata* sets narrower limits but for a shorter time than *digvrata*.

Transgressions of digvrata

The five *aticāras* of the *digvrata* are[2] :

1. *Urdhvadikpramāṇātikramaṇa* : It includes climbing on trees or ascending a mountain outside the limit one has set for himself.

2. *Adhodikpramāṇātikramaṇa* : It includes descending into a well or the underground-store-house outside the limit.

3. *Tiryagdikpramāṇātikramaṇa* : It may mean travelling in any direction outside the limit. Entering a cave outside the limit is also given as an example of this *aticāra*.

4. *Kṣetra-vṛddhi* : This means extending the limits for freedom of movement.

5. *Smṛtyantardhāna* : It means transgressing the limits through forgetfulness.

Deśāvakāśikavrata :

In the opinion of *Svāmikārtikeya*,[3] *deśāvakāśikavrata* limits the extent of territory of movement as well as the objects of senses, whereas according to *Samantabhadra*[4], *Deśāvakāśikavrata* is connected with the limitation of the territory of movement only. *Vasunandi* has offered a different explanation. He says

1. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.1.
2. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.50. Also *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.25.
3. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 367.
4. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 92-93.

that under this vow one should renounce going to such places where the *aṇuvratas* are impossible or difficult to observe.[1]

Transgression of deśāvakāśikavrata :[2]

As already pointed out, the *deśāvakāśikavrata* sets limits narrower than set under the *digvratas*, but for a shorter time. It has, therefore, different types of transgressions. Obviously, as the duration of *vrata* is short, there is little possibility of forgetting the exact limit. The idea behind the transgression of *deśāvakāśikavrata* is that the *vratī* should have no direct or indirect connection with the territory falling outside the limits.

1. *Ānayana-prayoga* : This means asking somebody to bring something from outside the limits The idea is that one should not ask others to move in that area where he himself does not move under the vow.[3]

2. *Preṣya-prayoga* : This means ordering one's servant to do some work outside the limits. Under first transgression the work is got done by request whereas under the second transgression it is got done by orders to a servant.[4]

3. *Śabdānupāta* : This means making some sound and giving hints to those who are outside the limits to do certain jobs.[5]

4. *Rūpānupāta* : Here some signs and gestures are used instead of sounds for the same purpose as in the previous case.[6]

5. *Pudgalaprakṣepa* : Here some article may be thrown for the same purpose.[7]

Anarthadaṇḍaviramaṇavrata:

This is included in *guṇavratas* by all *Jaina ācāryas*. As the name of the vow shows, it means abstaining from such

1. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 215.
2. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.54.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.31.
4. Ibid., 7.31.
5. Ibid., 7.31.
6. Ibid., 7.31.
7. Ibid., 7.31.

harmful activities as will do no good to the agent.[1] *Samantabhadra* has pointed out that such activities are to be avoided even within the limits set under *digvrata* and *deśāvakāśikavrata*.[2]

Five forms of anarthadaṇḍavrata :

Pūjyapāda has mentioned the following five forms of *Anarthadaṇḍa* : 1. Evil thinking (*apadhyāna*), 2. Advice to commit sin (*pāpopadeśa*), 3. Non-vigilant action (*pramādācarita*), 4. Giving of weapons of violence (*hiṁsādāna*), 5. Wrong-reading (*aśubhaśruti*).[3]

1. *Apadhyāna* : This involves (1) finding faults with others (2) wishing loss to others, (3) seeing wives of others with a lusty eye, (4) taking interest in other's dispute.[4] *Amṛtacandra* adds thoughts about hunting, victory, defeat, war, adultery and theft to these.[5] In short, all *ārthadhyāna* and *raudradhyāna* is a form of *apadhyāna*.

2. *Pāpopadeśa* : It means giving instructions to a fellow man in sinful professions. *Samantabhadra* includes in it : (1) advising to buy cheap slaves to sell them dearer elsewhere (*kleśavāṇijya*), (2) to advise the same thing for beasts (*tiryagvāṇijya*), (3) to tell about the animals to hunters, or trappers (*badhikopadeśa*), (4) to advise about such activities as involve violence (*ārambhakopadeśa*).[6]

Here it may be noted that though, *Upāsakadaśāṅga* did not prohibit agriculture, yet in *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra* it is held to be a profession which involves violence; and, therefore, advising a man to cultivate the land is also prohibited under this vow.[7]

3. *Pramādācarita or Pramādacaryā* : *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* gives the following under *Pramādācarita* : (i) digging of land (ii) crushing stones, (iii) sprinkling water on lawns, (iv) burning fire, (v) plucking leaves, fruits or flowers and (vi) blowing wind.[8] *Āśādhara* adds to these, obstructing the wind, irrigat-

1. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 343.
2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 74.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.21.
4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 344 Also *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 78.
5. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 141.
6. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 76.
7. Ibid., 77.
8. *Śubhacandra* on *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 346.

ing a field, and unnecessary travelling under *pramādācarita*.[1] *Hemacandra* has also included recreations like going to see a dance or drama, or playing with dice, or watching cock-fights or sleeping for the whole night even when one is neither ill nor tired on account of journey.[2]

4. *Hiṁsādāna* : *pūjyapāda* has explained it as supplying of poison, thorns, weapons, fire, rope, whips, staffs, and other such objects as may lead to violence.[3] *Svāmikārtikeya* thinks that keeping of such violent animals as cats, and doing business in such materials as irons and lac come under this head.[4] *Hemacandra* has pointed out that objects like carts, ploughs, etc. could be given only to one's son or other relatives as a sort of help.[5]

5. *Duḥśruti* : It means listening to or reciting such stories which excite passion.[6] *Kārtikeya* has given the example of reading *Kāmaśāstra* under this heading.[7] *Āśādhara* has given examples of each type of literature which may be included under this heading. *Kāmasūtra* is given as an example of sex literature, *ṭaṭaka* of violence, *vārtānīti* of *parigraha*, *vīra-kathā* of *sāhasa*, *Brahmādvaita* of *mithyātva*, *vaśīkaraṇatantra* of *rāga*, and text exalting the position of *Brāhmaṇa* as example of literature which incites pride (*mada*).[8]

The transgressions of anarthadaṇḍavrata

The five transgressions which defile the vow of *anartha-daṇḍavrata* according to *Tattvārthasūtra* are as follows[9] :

(i) *kandarpa*—licentious speech, (ii) *kautkucya*—obscene speech, (iii) *maukharya*—prattling senselessly, (iv) *asamīkṣyā-dhikaraṇa*—acting without thought, (v) *Upabhogādhikya*—excess in enjoyments.

Somadeva also includes giving instructions for the follow-

1. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.10-11.
2. *Yogaśāstra*, 3.78-80.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.21.
4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 347.
5. *Hemacandra* on *Yogaśāstra*, 3.77 (p. 173).
6. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 145.
7. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 348.
8. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.9. (p. 171)
9. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.27; Also *Upāsakādhyayana*, 1.52.

ing five as transgression of this vow[1] :

1. Deceit (*vañcanāpravartana*), 2. Harmful activity (*ārambhapravartana*), 3. Violence (*hiṁsāpravartana*), 4. Overloading of animals (*bhārādhikya*), 5. Inflicting the animals excessively (*atikleśa*).

Now we proceed to discuss the transgressions of *anarthadaṇḍaviramaṇa* as shown by *Tattvārthasūtra* :

1. *Kandarpa* : It is associated with concupiscence.[2] According to *Cāmuṇḍarāya kandarpa* is the result of *cāritramoha*.[3]

2. *Kautkucya* : It means vulgar speech.[4] The idea is that a *śrāvaka* should be modest and should not be outspoken.

3. *Maukharya* : It means non-sensical and purposeless talking.[5]

The above three transgressions exhort a *śrāvaka* to use speech sparingly and carefully.

4. *Upabhogādhikya* : This refers to unnecessary accumulation of articles and avoidance of excessive use of ornaments etc.[6]

5. *Asamīkṣyādhikaraṇa* : This includes destroying life without any self-interest.[7]

Bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata

All *Śvetāmbara*, and even amongst *Digambaras Kundakunda*, *Samantabhadra*, and *Āśādhara*, include *bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata* in *guṇavratas*. The tradition of *Tattvārthasūtra*, however, places it in *śikṣāvratas*.

The word *upabhoga* indicates those objects which can be used only once, for example, food, drink, garland. etc. The word *paribhoga* means objects which can be used repeatedly as cover, ornaments, bed, seat, house, etc.[8] Thus this vow

1. *Handique, K.K.* : *Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 269.
2. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.27.
3. *Cāritrasāra*, pp. 17-18.
4. Ibid., p. 18.
5. Ibid, p. 18.
6. *Gaṇin. Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.27.
7. Ibid., 7.27.
8. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.21.
   Amitagatiśrāvakācāra 6.93. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta* 5.14.

means putting limit to the use of objects of *upabhoga* and *paribhoga* in order to minimise attachment to them.

According to *Ratnakaraṇḍa-śrāvakācāra*, a thing may be renounced for the whole life, in which case it is called *yama* or for a limited period, in which case it is called *niyama*.[1] It seems that as *yama*, or a vow taken for the whole life, it is taken to be *guṇavrata*; and as *niyama*, it is taken to be a *śikṣāvrata*. That is, perhaps, the reason why there are two traditions about this vow as shown above. Things which should be renounced for the whole life include[2] meat and honey which cause misery to those living beings who are possessed of more than one sense, (2) intoxicants like wine, opium etc., (3) such objects which cause injury to *anantakāyajīva* or infinite living being, possessed of one sense, like ginger, raddish, carrot, butter, etc. (4) unsuitable means of conveyance or unsuitable ornaments, (5) the use of bizarre dresses.

The main idea is that such objects as are unnecessary and cause hurdle in the spiritual development should be renounced for the whole life as this causes no difficulty for the aspirant even from worldly point of view. Objects, the renunciation of which, even though desirable, may create difficulty for a householder, may be renounced for a limited period only. Amongst such things are included food, conveyance, couch, betel-leaf, clothes, ornaments, music, singing, etc.[3]

Svāmikārtikeya has pointed out that the householder should renounce those things which he possesses or is likely to possess.[4] Where is the use of renouncing a thing which one is not likely to possess ? *Amṛtacandra* says that even such things as are not generally prohibited should be renounced for a limited period under this vow.[5] The idea of all these *ācāryas* is that giving up objects of *bhoga* and *upabhoga* should not

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 87. Also *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.14.
2. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.15-17.
3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 88-89.
4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 351.
5. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 164.

be a mere formality but should cut at the very root of attachment.

Transgressions of bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata

The transgressions of this vow according to *Tattvārtha-sūtra* are limited to restriction on food. They are eating of (1) articles having life, (2) articles mixed with other articles having life, (3) articles in contact with those having life, (4) articles not fully cooked, (5) articles conserved by fermentation.[1]

The *Śvetāmbara* tradition replaces the third and fifth *aticāras* of this list by mentioning the consuming of uncooked food and hollow-vegetable products, respectively, as *aticāra* of this *vrata*. According to *Somadeva*, taking of prohibited food (*niṣiddhāhāra*) and such food, the preparation of which has not been supervised personally (*avikṣitāhāra*), are the first and fifth *aticāras* of this vow; the fourth is the same as that mentioned in the *Tattvārthasūtra*; and the second and third, though different in name, are substantially the same.

Samantabhadra has made a substantial contribution in enhancing the scope of the *aticāra* of this vow. In keeping with the wider spirit of the vow, he enumerates the following *aticāras*[2] :

(i) Lack of indifference to the poison of sensual pleasures (*viṣayaviṣato'nupekṣā*).

(ii) Remembering past pleasures (*anusmṛti*).

(iii) Indulging in pleasures after enjoying them (*atilaulya*).

(iv) Acute craving for pleasures in future (*atitṛṣā*).

(v) Excessive indulgence (*atyanubhāva*).

Now we take each *aticāra* individually :

1. *Sacittāhāra* : The word *Sacitta* means body of those who have one sense, as *pṛthvikāya* or *apkāya* or vegetables.[3] *Siddhasenagaṇin* says that *anantakāyas* are to be avoided.[4] Vegetables etc. should be taken only when they have been rendered as *acitta* by cooking, etc.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.30; Also *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.51; *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, 520.
2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 90.
3. *Yogaśāstra*, 3.98 (p. 196).
4. *Gaṇin*, *Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.30.

2. *Sacittasambandhāhāra* : Any thing *acitta* associated with something *sacitta*, should also be avoided.[1]

3. *Sacittasamiśrāhāra* : As the name itself shows it means taking of food a part of which is *Sacitta*.[2]

4. *Abhiṣava* : *Cāmuṇḍarāya* cites the sour gruels as an example of this kind of food.[3] *Āśādhara* prohibits taking of such liquids as milk or rice-gruel in large quantities.[4]

5. *Duṣpakvoṣadhi* : Every grain should be fully cooked so as to ensure that it is not *sacitta*.[5]

The essence of these *aticāras* is that least harm is done to the living beings for the sake of food and our sense of taste is kept under control. *Amṛtacandra* has said that renunciation of *bhogopabhoga* leads to the avoidance of *hiṁsā*.[6] It is but natural that in Jainism, where householder's life is nothing but a stepping-stone to monk's life, self-denial to the utmost possible should have been recommended from the very beginning.

Śikṣāvratas

Sāmāyikavrata

Except *Vasunandin*, all other *ācāryas* accept *sāmāyika* to be a *śikṣāvrata*. Literally, *sāmāyika* means the practice of becoming one (*ekatvagamana*) with the *ātman*.[7] In other words, it means practising equanimous state of mind. *Samantabhadra* has said that a householder, while performing *sāmāyika*, is like a monk on whom clothes have been put by others.[8]

Svāmikārtikeya mentions place, time and posture for *sāmāyika*.[9] The place for *sāmāyika* should be free from disturbances such as noise, crowd, mosquitoes and insects.[10] The

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.35.
2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.35.
3. *Cāritrasāra* p. 25.
4. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.20.
5. *Cāritrasāra*, p. 25.
6. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 166.
7. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.21.
8. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 102, Also *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 357.
9. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 352.
10. Ibid., 353.

sāmāyika could be performed thrice a day[1] or at least twice a day.[2] In fact, it may be performed as many times as possible.[3] The day of fasting is specially suited for *sāmāyika*.[4] The duration should be gradually increased as one gets prac tised to it. As for postures, any sitting or standing posture which is convenient is good for *sāmāyika*.[5] Adopting humble and surrendering gestures, the aspirant should either repeat some devotional hymn or should get absorbed in self-meditation.[6] He should show forbearance under adverse circumstances and should keep his body, mind and speech steadfast.[7]

Transgressions of sāmāyikavratas

The five transgressions of *sāmāyikavrata* are ;

1. Misconduct of speech (*vāgduṣpraṇ-dhāna*)
2. Misconduct of body (*kāyaduṣpraṇidhāna*)
3. Misconduct of mind (*manoduṣpraṇidhāna*)
4. Lack of interest in *sāmāyika* (*anādara*)
5. Forgetfulness in due observance of *sāmāyika* (*smṛtyan-upasthāna*).[8]

1. *Vāgduṣpraṇidhāna* : It means hasty recitation of text without understanding its meaning.[9]

2. *Kāyaduṣpraṇidhāna* : This means that parts of body should be kept steady.[10]

3. *Mānoduṣpraṇidhāna* : Anger, avarice, deceit, pride, envy and other such feelings, if entertained at the time of *sāmāyika*, constitute this *aticāra*.[11] *Cāmuṇḍarāya* says that absent-mindedness at the time of *sāmāyika* constitutes this *aticāra*.[12]

1. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣa*, 354.
2. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 149.
3. Ibid., 149, Also *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, 5.29.
4. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 100-101.
5. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 355.
6. Ibid., 355-356.
7. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 103.
8. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.28. Also *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.53.
9. *Gaṇin*, *Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.28. Also *Cāritrasāra*, p. 20.
10. Ibid., 7.28. Also Ibid., p. 20.
11. *Gaṇin*, *Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.28.
12. *Cāritrasāra*, p. 20.

4. *Anādara* : It is explained as lack of zeal in the performance of *sāmāyika*.[1]

5. *Smṛtyanupasthāna*: This means forgetfulness in *sāmāyika*; one may forget whether he has performed it or not. This type of forgetfulness is condemned for a man who wants to attain liberation.[2]

Proṣadhopavāsavrata :

Almost every religion prescribes some type of control over food. Fast is considered to be a means of self-purification. *Gāndhiji* used fast as a self-purificatory measure in modern times, even to remove social evils as untouchability.

With the Jainas, whether a householder or a monk, fast is a common practice. Under *proṣadhopavāsavrata*, a Jaina householder is expected to fast on *aṣṭamī*, *caturdaśī* and *pūrṇimā*.[3]

Fasting includes not only abstinence from food, but also avoidance of bath, perfumes, physical adornment, use of ornaments and sinful activities and observance of *brahmacarya*.[4] *Pūjyapāda* has laid emphasis on abstinence from the pleasures of senses, so much so that even sounds which give pleasure to ear are to be avoided.[5]

Āśādhara,[6] *Vasunandin*,[7] *Amṛtacandra*[8] and others have prescribed the procedure for fasting. Though having some differences in details, it is almost the same in its moral contents. Meditation, study of the scriptures, worship of Jina, saluting and feeding the *sādhus*, vigilance in conduct, and thinking of *anuprekṣās* are some of the duties of the aspirant while fasting.[9] He should sleep on a mat on ground and should avoid sinful activities.[10]

1. *Cāritrasāra*, p. 20.
2. *Gaṇin*, *Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.28.
3. Ibid., 7.16.
4. *Umāsvāti* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.16.
   Also *Kartikeyānuprekṣā* 358; *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 107-108; *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 6. 89.
5. *Pujyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.21.
6. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5. 36-38.
7. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*. 280-289.
8. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 152-157.
9. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.36-38.
10. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 153-154.

Transgression of proṣadhopavāsavrata

Tattvārthasūtra gives the following five *aticāras* of *proṣadhopavāsavrata* :

1. *Apratyavekṣitāpramārjitotsarga* : This means that bodily discharge should not be thrown on a spot which is not well-examined and swept.[1]

2. *Apratyavekṣitāpramārjitādānanikṣepa* : Similar care should be taken while picking up or laying down any object like sticks, etc.[2] *Pūjyapāda* includes careful handling of objects used for *Jinapūjā* or in obeisance to the *guru*.[3]

3. *Apratyavekṣitāpramārjita-saṁstara* : The same care should be taken in handling one's bed, which should be made of *kuśā* or blanket.[4]

4. *Anādara* : It means lack of zeal in performing the necessary duties.[5] What is desirable is withdrawing oneself from food and worldly enjoyments, not only outwardly but inwardly also.

5. *Smṛtyanupasthāna* : This *aticāra* corresponds to the last *aticāra* of *sāmāyika*. It means forgetfulness about the observance of *proṣadhopavāsa*.[6] It also means lack of concentration of mind in observing the fast.[7]

Atithisaṁvibhāgavrata

Samantabhadra extends the scope of this *vrata*, by calling it *Vaiyyāvṛtya*, which means any physical service including removal of ailments or massaging of feet of the monk.[8]

Kārtikeya defines *atithisaṁvibhāgavrata* as offering of four kinds of gifts to the three kinds of recipients in conformity with the nine-fold process.[9] *Tattvārthasūtra* mentions the

1. *Pujyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.34.
2. *Ganin, Siddhasena* on Ibid., 7.29.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on Ibid., 7.34.
4. *Ganin, Siddhasena* on Ibid., 7.34.
5. Ibid., 7.28-29
6. Ibid., 7.28-29
7. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.40.
8. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 112.
9. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 360-361.

following four factors to be considered in *dāna*[1]:

(i) The manner of giving (*dānavidhi*).

(ii) The object which is given (*dātavya*).

(iii) The giver (*dātṛ*).

(iv) The recipient (*pātra*).

Vasunandin adds the result of giving *dāna* as the fifth factor to this list.[2]

The three kinds of recipients are[3] :

(a) The best recipient, which means a Jaina ascetic.

(b) The second best recipient, which means an aspirant, who is ascending the ladder of the *Pratimā*.

(c) The least satisfactory recipient, which means a man with right faith but not observing the vows.

The recipients of gift are classified into three other categories of *kupātra*, *apātra*, *karuṇāpātra*. A man who observes the moral laws but is devoid of *samyagdarśana* is called *kupātra*.[4] In this connection, we have already discussed the importance of *samyagdarśana*. Worse is *apātra*, who has neither *samyagdarśana* nor moral virtues.[5] Children, old and destitute persons are considered to be *karuṇāpātras*.[6]

As for the giver. he must be possessed of the following seven virtues[7] :

(1) Faith (*śraddhā*) regarding the result of almsgiving·

(2) Devotion (*bhakti*) towards the virtues of the recipient.

(3) Pleasure (*tuṣṭi*) in giving

(4) Knowledge (*vijñāna*) of the propriety of gifts for different types of recipients.

(5) Unattachment (*alaulya*) towards worldly rewards.

(6) Forbearance (*kṣamā*) even in the face of instigation.

(7) Enthusiasm (*śakti*) for almsgiving even if one is not so rich.

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.39.
2. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 220.
3. Ibid., 221-222. Also *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 171; *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 10.4; *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*. 5.44.
4. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 10.34-35, Also *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 223.
5. Ibid., 10.36-38.
6. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 235.
7. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 9.3-10. Also *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra* 224; *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.47.

The *Tattvārthabhāṣya* gives a slightly different list [1]

(1) Absence of ill-will (*Anasūyā*) towards the recipients.

(2) Absence of defection (*aviṣāda*) in giving.

(3) Absence of condescension (*aparibhāvitā*) towards the recipient.

(4) Joy (*prītiyoga*) in giving.

(5) Purity of mind (*kuśalābhisandhitā*)

(6) No desire for worldly result (*dṛṣṭa-phalānapekṣitā*).

(7) Straightforwardness (*nirupādhitva*)

(8) Freedom from desire of rebirth in heaven, etc. (*anidānatva*).

As for things worthy of gifts, the following four kinds of gifts have been recognised : food, medicine, books and fearlessness.[2] *Cāmuṇḍarāya* adds to these the place of shelter.[3] All these things should be conducive to observance of austerities and study and should be such as do not bring about attachment or aversion.[4]

The method of giving is as important as the giver, gifts and the recipient. The following nine modes have been recommended[5] :

1. Reception (*pratigraha*) to the monk with the words '*namo'stu*'.
2. Offering a high seat (*uccāsana*) to the monk.
3. Washing of feet (*pādodaka*).
4. Adoration (*arcanā*) of the monk.
5. Salutation (*praṇāma*) to the monk.

6-8. The giver should be possessed of purity of mind (*manaḥśuddhi*), speech (*vacanaśuddhi*) and body (*kāyaśuddhi*).

9. The food to be offered should also be pure (*āhāraśuddhi*).

Transgressions of Atithisaṁvibhāgavrata

Regarding the five *aticāras* of *atithisaṁvibhāgavrata*, the *Śvetāmbara* and *Digambara* traditions agree, except that the third of these *aticāras* is called *anādara* by *Samantabhadra*.

1. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.34.
2. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra* 233-238 Also *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 362.
3. *Cāritrasāra*, p. 27.
4. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, : 70.
5. *Śubhacandra* on *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 360-361.

1. *Sacittanikṣepa* : As a monk cannot accept the food which is associated with something sentient, the giver commits a transgression if he places food on a green leaf.[1] *Siddhasena* says that one may purposely do so because then the food would not be accepted by the *Sādhu* and the householder will be ben efitted.[2]

2. *Sacittāpidhāna* : Covering of food with a sentient thing, like leaf, constitutes this *aticāra* [3]

3. *Kālātikrama* : This means offering of food at inappropriate time. The *Śvetāmbara* tradition ascribes intention of avoiding almsgiving by asking a *Sādhu* to accept food at such time when he is not allowed to take food.[4]

4. *Paravyapadeśa* : *Pūjyapāda* explains this as offering alms of others as if they were one's own [5] *Siddhasena* says that it means telling the monk that the objects of alms do not belong to him and that the monk should ask somebody else for the same.[6]

5. *Mātsarya* : It means lack of respect for the monk.[7] *Siddhasena* thinks that anger shown to soliciting monk, or envy at some rich neighbour who offers rich alms, constitutes this *aticāra.*[8]

Sallekhanāvrata

Samantabhadra,[9] *Vasunandin,*[10] and *Āśādhara*[11] give a detailed description of this ritual of voluntary death.

The nature of *Sallekhanā* is such that one is likely to confuse it with suicide. The Jaina *ācāryas* have, therefore, tried to distinguish it from suicide. *Pūjyapāda* says that *rāga,*

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.36.
2. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.31.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.36.
4. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.31.
5. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.36.
6. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.31.
7. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.36.
8. *Gaṇin, Siddhasena* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.31.
9. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra,* 122-129.
10. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra,* 271-272.
11. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta,* 8.1-110.

which underlies suicide, is absent in *sallekhanā*.[1] *Sallekhanā*, therefore, is justified if the body becomes incapable of observance of *vratas*. Similarly, *Āśādhara* defends *sallekhanā* for the protection of *dharma*.[2] He says that what a man does at the last moment is very important.[3] *Hemacandra* says that *sallekhanā* is a sort of *udyāpana*, as it were, for the *śrāvaka-dharma*.[4]

In view of what has been said above, *sallekhanā* has been recommended when someone is confronted with calamity, famine, senility, disease, and when the sustenance of spiritual practices is endangered.[5] *Sallekhanā* can also be practised at a time when the natural death is known to be at hand.[6] It is better to die a voluntary death with self-control than try to save the body in vain, when it ceases to respond to medical treatment.[7]

The idea underlying *sallekhanā* is not mere flagellation of the body but denial of passions also.[8] Voluntary death is not so difficult as upholding self-control, when the vital forces leave the body.[9] If the mind is not pure at the last moment, the life-long self-control, study, austerity, worship and charity become futile, just as a king, well-versed in weapons, is no good if he faints in the battle-field.[10]

It is repeated by every *ācārya* that renunciation of attachment and aversion is a necessary corollary of *sallekhanā*. Thus *Samantabhadra* says that one performing *sallekhanā* should put aside all affection and enmity, should ask for forgiveness to all and should himself forgive all. He should make an honest confession of his misdeeds, *kṛta*, *kārita* or *anumata*.

1. न सल्लेखनां प्रतिपन्नस्य रागादय. सन्ति ततो नात्मवधदोष: ।
   —*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.22 Also *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8 8
2. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.7.
3. Ibid., 8 28.
4. श्रावक: किल सकलस्य श्रावकधर्मस्योद्यापनार्थमिवान्ते संयमं प्रतिपद्यते ।
   —*Hemacandra* on *Yogaśāstra*, 3.149 (p. 272b).
5. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 122.
6. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta* 8.20. Also *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 6.98.
7. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8 7.
8. Ibid., 8.22.
9. Ibid., 8.24
10. *Handiqui, K.K., Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 287.

He should abandon all dissatisfaction, sorrow, fear and turpitude. Then he should renounce, in the first stage, intake of solid food and then of fatty liquids and acid in liquids, respectively.[1]

Vasunandin does not think it necessary to assume *mahāvratas*[2] while performing *sallekhanā*, whereas *Āśādhara* and *Samantabhadra* think it obligatory and recommend nudity not only for men but even for women at this last moment of life.[3]

Transgressions of Sallekhnāvrata

Tattvārthasūtra gives the following five transgressions of *sallekhanāvratas* :[4]

1. Desire to live (*jīvitāśaṁsā*)
2. Desire to die (*maraṇāśamsā*)
3. Remembrance of friends (*mitrānurāga*)
4. Revival of past pleasure (*sukhānubandha*)
5. Expectation of future prosperity (*nidāna*)

Samantabhadra replaces the fourth *aticāra* by 'fear'.[5] *Upāsakadaśāṅga* gives the following five *aticāras*[6] :

1. Longing for this world (*ihalokāśaṁsā*)
2. Longing for the next world (*paralokāśaṁsā*)
3. Longing for life (*jīvitāśāṁsā*)
4. Longing for death (*maraṇāśaṁsā*)
5. Longing for sensual pleasures (*kāmabhogāśaṁsā*).

We explain below the *aticāras* of *sallekhanāvrata* :

1. *Jīvitāśaṁsā* : *Pūjyapāda* explains it as reluctance to leave this body.[7] *Āśādhara*[8] thinks that the desire to listen to one's own praise from those who surround the dying man constitutes this *aticāra*.

1. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 127-128.
2. Cf. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 271-272
3. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*. 8 35-38.
4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.32; Also *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 195; *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 7.15 and *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.45.
5. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 129.
6. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*. 1.57.
7. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.37.
8. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.45.

2. *Maraṇāśaṁsā* : *Pūjyapāda* explains it as desire for quick death.[1]

3. *Mitrānurāga* : This includes remembering one's friends, games of childhood, merry festivities etc.[2] The *Śvetāmbaras* do not recognize this *aticāra.*

4. *Sukhānubandha* : This means recollection of past comforts and pleasures.[3]

5. *Nidāna* : One should not desire sensual satisfaction in the next life as a reward for performance of *sallekhanā.*[4]

The Pratimās

Kundakunda,[5] *Kārtikeya,*[6] *Samantabhadra*[7] and *Vasunandin*[8] refer to *Pratimās* whereas *Umāsvāti* and *Amṛtacandra* do not. All *Digambara ācāryas,* except *Svāmī Kārtikeya,* speak of twelve *pratimās;*[9] and *Upāsakadaśāṅga*[10] speaks of eleven *pratimās. Svāmī Kārtikeya,* in fact, thinks *samyagadarśana* and avoidance of gross faults as two separate *pratimās* whereas other *ācāryas* combine these two into one, viz. *darśanapratimā. Somadeva,* here as elsewhere, has a way of his own. In the first place, he changes the order of the *pratimās* and then replaces *rātribhuktivirati* by *divāmaithunavirati* (*divābrahma*).[11]

1. *Darśanapratimā*

In the first stage of spiritual development, the *Śrāvaka* is required to give up the use of meat, wine, etc. According to *Vasunandin,* in this *pratimā* the *śrāvaka* should abandon the use of five *udumbara* fruits, and should also refrain from gambling, meat, wine, honey, hunting, prostitution, adultery, and stealing.[12] He also thinks it proper that the *śrāvaka,* even in this first stage, should renounce eating at night.

1. *Pūjyapāda* on, *Tattvārthasūtra,* 7.37.
2. *Cāritrasāra,* p. 50.
3. Ibid., p. 50.
4. Ibid., p. 50.
5. *Caritrapāhuḍa,* 22.
6. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā,* 305-306.
7. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra,* 137-147.
8. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra,* 4.
9. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā,* 305-306.
10. *Upāsakadaśāṅga,* 1.71.
11. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra, prastāvanā,* p. 50.
12. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra,* 59.

The *Mūlaguṇas* are also attached to *darśanapratimā*; and *Somadeva* calls this *pratimā* as *mūlavrata*. *Samantabhadra* and *jinasena* include five small vows in *mūlaguṇas* whereas *Somadeva* does not. *Vasunandin* follows the middle path by saying that a *Śrāvaka* should renounce seven *vyasanas* in this *pratimā*,[1] as these seven *vyasanas* indirectly include four out of five sins, viz. violence, falsehood, stealing and unchastity.

2. *Vratapratimā* :

Samantabhadra [2] and other *Digambarācāryas* think that in this stage, a *śrāvaka* should observe the twelve *vratas* mentioned in this chapter.

3-4. *Sāmāyika and Proṣadhapratimā* :

It may be noted that *sāmāyika* and *proṣadhopavāsa* are enjoined as separate *pratimās*, whereas they are included in the second *pratima* also. *Āśādhara* tries to explain this position by saying that *sāmāyika* and *proṣadhopavāsa* as *śikṣāvrata* are meant for safeguarding the five *aṇuvratas* and, therefore, occupy only a subservient position, whereas in *pratimās* they assume the position of an independent *vrata*.[3] *Vasunandin* had perhaps this duplication in his mind when he excluded *sāmāyika* and *proṣadhopavāsa* from the list of *śikṣāvratas* and represented them as *pratimās* only. *Kundakunda* and *Kārtikeya*, on the other hand, have preferred to enumerate them, both as *pratimās* and *śikṣāvratas*, perhaps to show their importance for spiritual progress. We have already dealt with *Sāmāyika* and *proṣadhopavāsa* while dealing with *śikṣāvratas*.

5. *Sacittatyāga pratimā*

This *pratimā* consists in abandoning the use of animate articles like roots, fruits, seeds, etc. without getting them sterilized by boiling etc.[4] The *Śrāvaka* in this *pratimā* is required not to feed others by such objects as he himself has renounced.[5]

1. *Vasunandi-śrāvakācāra*, 57.
2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 138.
3. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.6.
4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 379.
5. Ibid., 380.

6. *Rātribhuktivirati pratimā*

Kundakunda,[1] *Kārtikeya*,[2] and *Samantabhadra*[3] take this *pratimā* to mean abstinence from taking of food at night. *Amitagati*,[4] *Vasunandin*[5] and *Somadeva*[6] represent the other school and call this *pratimā* by the name of *divāmaithunavirati* i.e. abstinence from sexual intercourse during day. *Āśādhara* is here influenced by Hindu conception of *brahmacarya* and says that a *śrāvaka* in this *pratimā* renounces all intercourse except during *ṛtu* for the sake of progeny[7] The first school distinguishes abstinence from taking food in the night in the first *pratimā* from this *pratimā*, in as much as here the *śrāvaka* is required not to offer food to others also at night.[8]

7. *Brahmacarya pratimā*

It implies absolute continence. It covers not only intercourse but all types of contacts with women. It also includes avoidance of decorating one's body.[9]

8. *Ārambhatyāga pratimā*

It signifies the renunciation of all worldly occupations as service, cultivation and business. The aspirant under this *pratimā* should neither ask others to do such jobs nor give his consent for doing such jobs.[10]

9. *Parigrahatyāga pratimā*

It means abandonment of all kinds of *parigraha*, except limited clothes.[11] *Parigraha* here includes external possession as well as inner faults, perverted attitude, sex, humour, passion, attachment and aversion.[11]

1. *Cāritrapāhuḍa*, 22.
2. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 382.
3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, 142,
4. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, 7.72.
5. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 296.
6. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, *prastāvana*, p. 50.
7. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.14.
8. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 382.
9. *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.27; Also *Kartikeyānuprekṣa*, 385.
10. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 299.
11. *Śubhacandra* on *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* 386.

10. *Anumatityāgapratimā*

Under *anumatityāga*, a *śrāvaka* should also withdraw himself from all worldly affairs and should leave everything worldly to fate.[1] *Śvetāmbaras* call it '*presyatyāga*' *pratimā* and its description includes both *parigrahatyāga* and *anumatityāga*.

11. *Uddiṣṭatyāga*

Under this *pratimā*, the *Śrāvaka* does not take any food specially prepared for him.[2] *Vasunandī* mentions two divisions of this *pratimā*,[3] which are called '*kṣullaka*' and '*ailaka*'.[4]

This difference between '*kṣullaka*' and '*ailaka*' is mainly in their dress. The *kṣullaka* has an upper garment also whereas the *ailaka* has only a loin cloth. The former applies instruments for cutting his hair, keeps a broom in place of *picchī*, takes his meals once a day either in the palm of his hands or in some pot in a sitting posture, and observes fast on every *parvan* day. The latter pulls out his hair (this act is called *luñcana*) and takes his meals in the palm of his hands.[5]

Conclusion

Thus we see that in Jainism the conduct of a householder occupies a subserviant position to that of a monk. In fact, the life of a householder is just a stepping-stone to the life of a monk.

We find that *Jaina ācāryas* have covered almost every quality of good and honest citizens while giving the details of transgressions of different vows. The minuteness with which they describe these *aticāras* show their close familiarity with the working of human mind, which generally inclines towards evil under some excuse or the other.

1. भवियब्व भावंतो अणुमण विरओ हवे सो दु ।
   —Ibid., 388.
2. Ibid., 390.
3. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 301.
4. For the history of this division, see introduction to *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, pp. 60-64.
5. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, 302, 303, 311.

It may also be pointed out that the descriptions of the conduct of a householder by different *ācāryas* differ in detail, but the fundamental spirit behind these rules has remained unchanged through ages.

Chapter VI

THE CONDUCT OF A JAINA MONK

Position of an ascetic in Jainism

Jainism is an ascetic religion from the very beginning whereas the institution of *saṁnyāsa* is most probably of later origin in Brāhmaṇism. The *gṛhastha* stage occupies the place of pride in Brāhmaṇism,[1] whereas in Jainism *gṛhastha* stage is only a means to the higher goal of monkhood. Later on, in Hinduism also, the division of life (*āśrama*) into four stages accorded a proper place to asceticism.

It may also be pointed out that Jainism has retained its ascetic character till modern times. Brāhmaṇism, on the other hand, has been influenced by such ascetic religions as Jainism and Buddhism. The Hinduism of the *Purāṇas* shows greater inclination for *saṁnyāsa* than that of the *Vedas*. In *Śāntiparva* of the *Mahābhārata*, we find this conflict of the older Vedic religion of activity with the newer *Hindu* religion of renunciation.[2]

It is due to this, that in *Jaina* tradition even a *śrāvaka* is taught *yatidharma* prior to *śrāvaka dharma*, so that he is attracted by the life of a monk rather than remain attached to householder's life.[3] It is in contradiction to Hinduism where the study of *Vedas*, which are books of action (*karmakāṇḍa*), precedes the study of *Vedānta*, or *Jñānakāṇḍa*. There is every reason to believe that the ascetic tendency of later systems of *Hindu* philosophy is due to the influence of Buddhism and Jainism.

The conduct of a Jaina Monk

The whole moral code for a *Jaina* monk should be viewed from a particular angle. Here the aspirant has decided to

1. *Manusmṛti*, 3.77-78.
2. Cf. *Saṁkṣipta Mahābhārata*, (ed.) C.V. Vaidya, Bombay, 1921, pp. 408-412.
3. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Bhavanagar, 1933, Vol. II, *Gāthā* 1139.

devote himself absolutely to spiritualism. Even though depending on society for such bare necessities of life as food, he is above all social obligations. His goal is transcendental morality which is beyond good or bad in the ordinary sense of the words. His life is predominated by *niścayanaya* or real point of view rather than by *vyavahāranaya* or practical point of view. In order to attain perfection, he has to avoid even smallest defects in his conduct even though this may make his living odd and inconvenient from a worldly point of view.

The institution of *Jaina* monkhood has been traced to pre-Vedic periods.[1] The description of *Ṛṣabhadeva* in the *Bhāgavata* very much resembles the description of *Jaina* monk.[2] Even though there has been some modification in the moral code of a *Jaina* monk, which will be noted at places in this chapter, it may be pointed out that the mode of living of a *Jaina* monk has essentially remained unchanged for all these ages. The study of the conduct of a *Jaina* monk, therefore, forms a unique chapter of Indian civilisation because here we can see the continuity of a great tradition for a considerably long period i.e. from pre-vedic age down to modern times.

Qualifications for initiation into monkhood

Originally, Jainism revolted against casteism. *Harikeśin*, who was a Pariah, was taken into the order and thus the privilege given to particular castes for entering monkhood was extended to others also.[3]

Sthānāṅgasūtra mentions that a eunuch, a sick person and a timid person should not be initiated and the commentary adds that the following categories of persons do not qualify for initiation : (1) A child under eight years, (2) a person who is old and infirm, (3) devoid of limbs, (4) dull, (5) robber, (6) offending the king, (7) mad, (8) blind, (9) slave, (10) wicked, (11) stupid, (12) in debt (13) attendant, (14) kidnapped, (15) a pregnant woman (16) and a woman with a child.[4]

1. *Anekānta, Varṣa* 10. *Kiraṇa* 11-12, pp. 433-456.
2. *Śrīmadbhāgavatapurāṇa*, 5.3, 4, 5 and 6.
3. *Uttarādhyayana*, 12.1.
4. Cf. Deo, S.B., *History of Jaina Monachism*, Poona, 1956, p. 140, footnote 3.

So far, we do not come across any restrictions of caste or birth and the conditions laid down are of a universal nature. But a glance at the following conditions, laid down by *Dharmasamgraha*, will prove that distinction of caste prescribed by Brāhmaṇism entered Jainism too. According to *Dharmasamgraha*, a person who wants to take to monkhood, must (1) be born in an Aryan country, (2) belong to a higher caste, (3) be free from gross sins, (4) have a pure intellect, (5) know the transitory nature of worldly pleasures, (6) be detached from the world, (7) be mild in passions, (8) have semi-passions only, (9) be grateful, (10) be humble, (11) not be a political rebel or criminal, (12) be friendly to all, (13) have his body intact, (14) be faithful, (15) be steadfast, (16) and be anxious for initiation.[1]

Besides, *Pravacanasāroddhāra* also prohibits initiation of an old man, of an effeminate person, of a person who is dumb or fattish or diseased and of those who practise condemnable professions or those who are not allowed by their relatives to renounce the world.[2]

Thus some of the conditions laid down for initiation refer to the physical fitness of the aspirant, while others refer to his moral fitness. But some of the conditions—that of birth in an Aryan country or a higher caste—are due to Brāhmaṇical influence.

It should also be interesting to note that *Nāradaparivrājakopaniṣad*, a text for the Hindu *Samnyāsi*, mentions almost the same conditions for initiation into *Samnyāsa*.[3] Of course, it contains some sectarian references which are irrelevant for a *Jaina* monk.

Types of monks

Śvetāmbara tradition mentions two types of *Sādhus* : (1) *Jinakalpa*; and (2) *Sthavirakalpa*.[4] *Jinakalpa Sādhu* is supposed to be above the rules of monastery. He remains

1. *Dharmasamgraha*, 3.73-78 (p. 1) quoted from *Śrī Jaina Siddhānta Bola Samgraha*, Vol. V, Bikaner, Vik. Sam. 2005, p. 158-161.
2. *Pravacanasāroddhāra*, Bombay, 1922, *Gāthās* 790 791 (p. 228a).
3. *Minor Upaniṣads*, Madras, 1912, *Vol* I, pp. 136-137.
4. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Ratalam, 1936, 7.

naked and eats in the hollow of his hands.[1] *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* says that a *Jinakalpa* eats food within one *'porisi'* of obtaining it,[2] and does not go beyond the chief garden for begging his food.[3]

Sthavirakalpa monk resides in *Saṁgha* and is bound by its rules. He wears clothes and has a greater number of requisites with him than *Jinakalpa*.

The distinction of *Jinakalpa* and *Sthavirakalpa* cannot apply to *Digambara* monks, all of whom remain naked. In Hinduism, of course, we can compare *Jinakalpa* with *'paramahaṁsa'*, *'turīyātīta'* or *'avadhūta'* types of *Sādhus* whereas the *sthavirakalpa* can be compared to *'kuṭīcaka'*, *'bahūdaka'* and *'haṁsa'* types of ascetics.[4]

Among other classes of Jaina monks, *sthānāṅga* makes a mention of the following types :

1. *Pulāka*—who lacks a higher degree of mental purity.
2. *Bakuśa*—who is slightly attached to his possessions.
3. *Kuśīla*—who, though observing the primary rules of conduct, transgresses the secondary rules.[5]

All these types refer to such *Sādhus* as are a little inferior to real *Sādhus* and fall short of that high standard.

There is another classification which mentions pseudo *Sadhus* of various types.

1. *Pārśvastha*—who try to earn their livelihood by religious observances.
2. *Samaśakta*—who practise magic.
3. *Avasanna*—who, though outwardly observing all the rules of conduct, are devoid of right attitude and knowledge.
4. *Mṛgacāritra*—who dissociate themselves with the *Saṁgha* and show looseness in character[6]

Essential qualities of a monk :

Mūlācāra, the basic text for the conduct of a *Digambara*

1. Max Müller, *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. 22, p. 57, f. n. 2.
2. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Vol. V. 5264-5267.
3. Ibid., Vol. V, 5290.
4. Cf. Sharma, Har Dutt, *Contribution to the History of Brāhmaṇical Asceticism*, Poona, 1939, pp. 30-31.
5. *Sthānāṅga*, Ahmedabad, 1937, 5.3.445.
6. Jaina, C.R., *Saṁnyāsa Dharma*, London, 1926, p. 23.

monk, gives the following twenty-eight qualities of a monk. These qualities are known as *Mūlaguṇas*.

1-5. Five great vows (*pañcamahāvratas*).
6-10. Five-fold path of vigilance (*Pañcasamitis*).
11-15. Control of five senses (*Indriyajaya*).
16-21. Six essential duties (*Ṣaḍāvaśyakas*).
22. Pulling out of the hair (*Keśaluñcana*).
23. Nudity.
24. Non-bathing.
25. Sleeping on the ground.
26. Not cleaning the teeth.
27. Taking food in standing posture.
28. Eating only once in twentyfour hours (*Ekabhakta*).[1]

The *Śvetāmbara* tradition, as already shown, does not take nudity to be an essential quality of a monk. Besides this, the last two qualities also do not find a place amongst essentials of a monk in the *Śvetāmbara* tradition. Both the sects claim antiquity for their respective traditions. The *Śvetāmbara* tradition enumerates the following essentials for a monk[2] :

1-5. Five great vows.
6. Not taking food in the night.
7-11. Controlling the five senses.
12. Inner purity.
13. Purity of possessions of a monk.
14. Forgiveness.
15. Detachment.
16. Mental goodness.
17. Vocal goodness.
18. Physical goodness.
19-24. Protection of the six types of living beings.
25. Threefold discipline.
26. Forbearance.
27. *Sallekhanāvrata*.

Now, before coming to the outfit of a monk, which constitutes his secondary attributes, we shall deal with these primary qualities.

1. *Mūlācāra*, 1.2-3. Also *Pravacanasāra* 3.8, 9; *Anagāradharmāmṛta*, 9.84, 85.
2. *Śrī Jaina Siddhāntabolasaṁgraha*, Vol. VI, pp. 228-230.

The five great vows :

The five great vows of a *Jaina* monk correspond to the five small vows of a *Jaina* householder. The five small vows have been framed keeping in view the social obligations of a householder. The great vows, however, are unconditional and absolute.

It may be noticed that the earlier Aṅga literature lays more emphasis on these moral virtues than on the details about monastic life which comes under the jurisdiction of post-canonical literature. Even though the *niryuktis* and *cūrṇis* take a liberal view of these vows, especially in case of emergency, the basic idea of these five great vows has remained intact through ages.

Great vow of non-violence :

The *Jainas* believe in the equality of all life. Therefore, the vow of non-violence includes abstinence from taking the life of any superior or inferior being in any form. Not only the '*trasa*', or mobile forms of life, are not to be destroyed; but any violence to '*sthāvara*' or immobile, such as vegetables, fire, air, water and earth, is also to be avoided.

Friendship for all, and subjugation of passions are necessary for *ahiṁsā mahāvrata*.[1] We shall see how *Jaina ācāryas* have taken care in prescribing rules for movement, speech, thinking, handling of things and food, while we discuss five *samitis*.[2]

In reality, deviation from the path of self-realisation is violence.[3] Attachment is suicidal for the aspirant.[4] It is against this background of detachment that the vow of non-violence is to be interpreted.

The epigraphical records show that *Jaina* monks have shown remarkable vigilance in observing non-violence. *Āryadeva* is said to be so careful that he removed a straw from his ear very gently even while he was sleeping. The straw was placed

1. *Jñānārṇava*, 8.11.
2. *Mūlācāra*, 5.140; Also *Anagāradharmāmṛta*, 4.34; *Tattvārthasūtra* 9.5; *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 1206.
3. *Amṛtacandra* on *Pravacanasāra* 3 16, and *Jayasena* on *Pravacanasāra*, 3 17.
4. *Pañcādhyāyī*, 2.756.

in his ear by others to test him and was taken to be a worm by him.[1]

Nevertheless, there are references in the post-canonical literature to show that some concessions were made for the *Jaina* monk in this matter, as in others, in later periods.

Great vow of truthfulness:

The monk leaves all worldly activities and, therefore, for him truth carries a deeper meaning than mere statement of facts. Truth means a considerate mode of expression, a thoughtful speech which is beneficial for all. Truth and all other vows being subservient to cardinal virtue of non-violence, a speech that may cause pain should be avoided even though it may be objectively true. Truth, therefore, in its wider sense is not only a negation of lie but a negation of all which is injurious. This is clear from the following classification of non-truth.[2]

1. Lie (*Alīkavacana*).
2. Insulting speech (*Hīlitavacana*).
3. Teasing speech (*Khiṁsitavacana*).
4. Harsh speech (*paruṣavacana*).
5. Speech used by householders, calling relatives by their relations as father, mother etc. (*gṛhasthavacana*).
6. Exciting speech (*vyavaśamitavacana*).

Mūlācāra asks a monk to avoid all words under influence of attachment, aversion, jest, fear, anger and greed.[3]

Niśīthasūtra lays down that a monk should be modest, true and gentle in his speech and should not talk about worldly affairs or past quarrels.[4]

The study of *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* reveals some interesting facts regarding the observance of this vow by the monks. A *Gītārtha*, meaning an old monk, pretended to have used pure water[5] (meaning water which has been rendered *acitta*) for

1. *Epigraphia Carnatica*, Bengalore, 1923, Vol. II, 67(54),1129 A.D. (pp. 23-30).
2. *Sthānāṅgas ūtra*, 6.3.527. Also *Pravacanasāroddhāra*, 235 1133.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 5.141. Also *Ānāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.45; *Acārasāra* 5.41 and *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 1207.
4. *Niśītha*, Agra, 1957, Vol. II, 2.18-19.
5. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Bhavanagar, 1936, Vol. III, 2882.

washing clothes before a novice, even though the water was actually not *acitta*. For this purpose the *Gītārtha* monk used *gulikā* (explained as *tubaravṛkṣaguṭikā*) or *khola*, meaning a cloth dripped in milk. Both these were used to conceal the fact that *sacitta* water had been used to wash the cloth. Obviously, the intention of the *Gītārtha* was to avoid indulgence of the novice in improper behaviour. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the *Gītārtha* lacked the moral courage to tell the truth to the novice. Similarly, we find the mention of a *Jaina* monk wearing the apparel of a heretic in order to seek food and drink.[1]

The vow of non-stealing

The great vow of non-stealing is much more exhaustive than the smaller vow of non-stealing. Whatever little possession a monk has, is acquired by him by begging of the householders. No object, howsoever small, should be acquired or used by the monk without an express permission of the owner.

The monk should refrain from taking any thing without being offered, not only in a village or a town, but also in a forest.[2] Books etc. are also to be taken with permission.[3] One should have an attitude of detachment towards one's possessions.[4] Rules for obtaining food, which we shall mention separately, should be observed.[5] *Tattvārthasūtra* speaks of certain rules for choosing one's residence also. It says that[6] :

1. The monk should stay in a solitary place.
2. Or he should stay in a deserted place.
3. He should not deny other persons the right to stay where he is staying.

The idea is that he should not claim his residence as his personal property even for a limited period during his stay. This vow also implies that the monk should not quarrel with his fellow monks over any of his possessions.[7]

1. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Bhavanagar, 1936, Vol. III, 2882.
2. *Mūlācāra*, 5.290.
3. *Vasunandī* on *Mūlācāra*, 5.142.
4. Ibid., 5.142.
5. Infra. pp. 171-174.
6. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.6.
7. Ibid., 7.6.

A study of *prāyaścittas* for transgression of this vow reveals some facts about the actual observance of this vow. There is *prāyaścitta* for an *ācārya* for stealing some requisites of his co-religionist, and also for a monk who secretly gathers extra requisites, or who has a duplicate set of requisites, or who refuses to give the requisites to his fellow monk on being asked to do so.[1] It is also mentioned that it is a more serious sin to take away the requisites of a monk of a rival sect than that of one's own sect.[2]

Vow of celibacy and sexual control

The monk, being a celibate, should be absolutely free from any type of sexual desire. He is to abstain not only from intercourse but also from bodily decoration, sense indulgence, exciting food, excessive food, songs and dance, association with women, exciting surroundings, passionate thinking, recalling past sexual enjoyment, and planning for future sexual enjoyment.[3]

Monks should have no connection with women.[4] Even in emergencies like famine, political upsurge, or in uncongenial society, he should keep his senses under control.[5] *Tattvārtha-sūtra* states the monk should avoid the following[6] :

1. Stories relating to attachment to women.
2. Looking at beauty of women.
3. Recalling past sexual enjoyments.
4. Rich delicious foods.
5. Decoration of the body

The list of *prāyaścittas* for transgression of this vow suggests that even monks sometimes yielded to the desire of the flesh.[7] The guiding principle before *Jaina ācāryas*, while fixing the rules of behaviour of a monk in relation to a nun, has been this vow of celibacy.

1. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* Vol. V, Bhavanagar, 1938, 5064-5087.
2. Ibid., Vol. V, 5088.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 10.105-106. Also *Uttarādhyayana*, 16.1-10; *Bhagavati Ārādhanā*, 879-880; *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 4.61 and *Jñānārṇava*, 11.7-9.
4. *Sūtrakṛtānga*, p. 272 (1.4.1.5). Also *Uttarādhyayana*, 16.1-10; *Daśavaikālika*, 2.9.
5. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Vol. V, 4955-58.
6. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*. 7.7.
7. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Vol. III, 2258-2262.

Vow of non-possession :

Parigraha has been defined as *mūrcchā* or attachment.[1] Attachment to anything is the cause of bondage and, therefore, should be avoided. In the state of meditation, a monk is self-absorbed and requires no paraphernalia. At other times, he requires certain objects for reasons of piety and decency, but he should not have any desire or attachment for such objects.[2] *Mūlācāra*, therefore, defines *aparigraha* as renunciation of sentient and insentient paraphernalia and non-attachment towards such objects as are allowed by the scriptures.[3]

As far as the definition of *parigraha* is concerned, both the *Digambaras* and the *Śvetāmbaras* agree.[4] But it would be observed that, as regards the objects which are allowed for a a monk, there is much difference of opinion between the two sects. Even amongst *Śvetāmbaras*, the number of articles allowed for a monk seem to have increased by the passage of time. The main difference between the two sects is regarding the question of possession of clothes by a monk. We need not go into the details of this sectarian question, but it may be pointed out that this difference regarding the mode of living of a *Jaina* monk is a very old one and is referred to by *Uttarādhyayana* also.[5] *Kundakunda* seems to have noted this difference, and according to tradition, he is also said to have had some debates with *Śvetāmbaras* on this point.

According to the *Digambara* tradition, a monk's possessions are classified under three heads[6] :

1. *Jñānopādhi*—or means of attaining knowledge. This includes *Śāstras*.

2. *Saṁyamopādhi*—or means of observance of vows. This includes a broom of peacock feather. This broom helps in observing non-violence, because the monk can gently remove

1. मुच्छा परिग्गहो वुत्तो ।
—*Daśavaikālika*, 6.20.
2. *Daśvaikālika*, 6.21.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 1.9.
4. Cf. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.16. and *Daśavaikālika*, 6.20.
5. *Uttarādhyayana*, Lecture XXIII.
6. *Mūlācāra*, 1.14.

small insects with its help while handling something or while himself making movements. The peacock-feather broom does not get soiled either with dust or with sweat, it is soft and non-injurious, tender and light.[1]

3. *Śaucopādhi*—or means of purity. It includes a *kamaṇḍala* in which acitta water can be carried for the purpose of of bodily cleanliness.

The *Ācārāṅgasūtra* in the *Śvetāmbara* tradition makes mention of four possessions of a monk : (1) Clothes (2) Alms-bowl (3) Blanket (4) Broom.[2] The *Mūlasūtras* are silent about the measurements etc. of these possessions. *Chedasūtra* and *Niryukti* furnish us with these details. In post-canonical literature some new requisites for a monk were also allowed. To alms-bowl, for example, the following requisites were also added :

1. *Pātrakabandha*—a string to bind the pot.
3. *Pātrakasthāpana*—a base for the pot.
3. *Gocchaka*—a small broom to clean the pot.
4. *Pātrakasaṁkā*—a small piece of cloth for cleaning the pot.
5. *Paṭala*—a small piece of cloth to cover the pot.
6. *Rajastrāṇa*—a piece of cloth to wipe the pot.[3]

Besides, the monk can have : (1) a *mukhavastrika* to be tied over the mouth to prevent small insects from going in, (2) a staff (*daṇḍa*), (3) a bed-sheet, (4) an umbrella and (5) a piece of cloth to wipe the mud off one's feet in the rainy season.[4]

These paraphernalia are called *ogha* or essentials. Besides, a list of what a monk may occasionally require is also given. These are called *Uvaggahiya* (*aupagrāhika*). Amongst others, they include (1) needle (2) razor (3) nail-cutter (4) ear-cleaner.[5]

The following list, taken from *Bṛhatkalpasūtra*, shows

1. *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 98 and *Mūlācāra*, 10.19.
2. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1.2 5.3.
3. Deo, S B, *History of Jaina Monachism*, pp. 269-271.
4. Ibid., pp. 273-277.
5. *Niśītha*, 1.15-38.

that in cases of emergency a tendency to keep many things, even against the precepts of the *Mūlasūtras*, did develop :[1]

1. *Tālika*—shoes to protect oneself from thorns.
2. *Puṭaka*—shoes to protect oneself from cold.
3. *Vardhna*—stitching instruments to bind the torn soles of the shoes.
4. *Kośaka*—protector of nails.
5. *Kṛtti*— a piece of skin to be worn if clothes were stolen.
6. *Sikkaka*—pingoes for hanging the alms-bowl.
7. *Kāpotikā*—carrier of ill monks.
8. *Pippalaka*—razor.
9. *Sūcī*—needle.
10. *Ārīka*—to stitch the soles of shoes.
11. *Nakharadana*—nail-cutter.
12. *Śastrakośa*—an instrument to mark the nerves etc.
13. *Nandibhājana*—pot for begging.
14. *Dharmakaraka*—a pot with straining arrangement for water.
15. *Paratīrthakaraṇa*—apparel of heretics to be used in emergency.
16. *Gulikā*—already explained under *satya*.[2]
17. *Khola*—already explained under *satya*.

The inscriptions bear testimony to the fact that *Jaina* monks were even granted gifts of land by their royal patrons.[3] But this should not prevent us from appreciating the high standards of the *Jaina* code of morality under the vow of non-possession for a monk.

The monk is to abandon not only possession of external objects but also of such ideas as, being alien to the nature of the self, may be termed as inner possessions. Such possessions are fourteen in number :

(i) False belief
(ii-iv) Three sex passions
(v) Laughter

1. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Vol. III, 2883-2892.
2. Supra, p. 153-154.
3. *Epigraphia Indica*, pp. 232-240. (1088 A.C.)

(vi) Liking
(vii) Disliking
(viii) Sorrow
(ix) Fear
(x) Disgust
(xi-xiv) Four *kaṣāyas*.[1]

Eight essentials (pravacanamātṛkās) of the conduct of a monk :

Self-control and vigilance in conduct are the two chief moral virtues. Self-control is three-fold : physical, mental and vocal. Vigilance in conduct is classified under five heads : vigilance in moving, speaking, taking food, keeping and receiving food and evacuating bowels. Three-fold self-control is mainly negative in its implication while the five-fold vigilance is positive.[2] These eight together protect the *Ratnatraya* of a monk just as a mother protects her child; and are, therefore, called *pravacanāīṛkā*.[3] The five vows, discussed above, are the guiding principles of morality, whereas these *pravacanamātṛkās* are the means to put those principles into practice.

The three 'guptis'

The '*guptis*' (the word is derived from the root '*gup*') protect the monk from sin. The *ātman* receives a shelter in these *guptis* against the mundane circle of birth and death.[4]

Mano-gupti means freedom from thought of passions, delusions, attachment, aversion and such other impure thoughts.[5] *Vāggupti* means avoidance of talks about women, politics, theft, food, etc. and refraining from telling a lie.[6] *Kāyagupti* means renunciation of such violent actions as piercing, beating, contracting, expanding, etc.[7]

1. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 116.
2. *Uttarādhyayana*, 24.26. Also *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*. 9.4-5.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 5.39.
4. यतः संसारकारणादात्मनो गोपनं भवति ।
—*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*. 9.2.
5. *Niyamasāra*, 66.
6. Ibid., 67.
7. Ibid., 68.

Five Samitis

The word *Samiti*, coming from the root √*i* (to go) with '*saṃ*' prefix, means vigilance in behaviour.[1] Negligence (*pramāda*) lies at the root of all sins and, therefore, constant vigilance is necessary to avoid them. Here again, it is emphasised that the best and perfect form of vigilance, from *niścaya* point of view, is the state of trance where the self becomes identical with its own nature; but from *vyavahāra* point of view, vigilance is five-fold :

1. *Īryāsamiti*

While moving, the monk should be careful about the following five points[2] :

(1) He should traverse only that path which is free from ants, seed, green vegetables, mud, etc.[3] The path which is repeatedly trodden by vehicles and by other people or which is scorched by the sun or which is ploughed should be regarded fit for movement.[4]

(2) He should move about only in day-light.[5] Moonlight or artificial lights of lamps etc. are not capable of properly showing small insects which may be lying in the path.[6]

(3) The monk should abstain from the objects of five senses and should devote his full attention towards his steps, while moving, so that no living being is injured through carelessness.[7]

(4) The monk should not move about for purposes other than religious. He should move for a pilgrimage, for a visit to the teacher, for religious discussion and for preaching of dharma only.[8]

(5) The monk should move always looking forward on

1. *Jayasena* on *Pravacanasāra*, 3 40.
2. *Mūlācāra*, 5.106. Also *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 1191; *Uttarādhyayana*, 24.4; *Tattvārthasāra*, 6.7
3. *Aparājita* and *Āśādhara* on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 1191.
4. *Mūlācāra*, 5.108-109.
5. *Mūlācāra*, 11. Also *Niyamasāra*, 61 and *Uttarādhyayana*, 24.5.
6. *Aparājita* on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 1191.
7. *Aparājita* and *Āśādhara* on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 1191; Also *Uttarādhyayana*, 24.5.
8. *Aparājita* on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*, 1191.

the ground to the extent of four cubits.[1] He should not run, jump or look in other directions.[2]

Thus the idea of *iryāsamiti* is to avoid all purposeless movements and to regulate all necessary movements in such a way that no living being is injured through carelessness.

2. *Bhāṣāsamiti*

This is supplementary to the vow of truthfulness on one side and to the *vacanagupti* on the other. Superfluous and harsh speech is to be avoided. Concise and salutary speech, is to be adopted, avoiding anger, pride, deceit, greed, laughter, fear, loquacity and gossip.[3] Backbiting, ridiculing others, and self-condemnation are to be abondoned.[4]

3. *Eṣaṇāsamiti*

The monk does not cook for himself; and, therefore, he has to beg his food to keep his body and soul together. His purpose in taking food is just to sustain life. There is therefore, no question of overeating or eating for the sake of taste. Moreover, he should keep the convenience of the householder in view.

He should take only that food which is neither prepared, nor suggested, nor approved by him. The food should be, moreover, pure and wholesome and should be such as offered with devotion. Right handling of sinless paraphernalia, and proper sweeping of sitting and sleeping places are also included in *eṣaṇāsamiti*.

For a monk, the aim of taking food should not be fostering strength, increasing longevity, gratifying relish, or attaining healthy and bright look but sustenance of life for constant study of scriptures, for exercise of self-control and for performance of meditation.[5] He takes food for satisfying hunger, for doing service to other monks, for preserving his *prāṇas* and

1. *Niyamasāra*, 61.
2. *Liṅgapāhuḍa*, 15-16.
3. *Uttarādhyayana*, 24.9-10.
4. *Mūlācāra*, 1.12.
5. Ibid., 6.62.

self-control and for observing six essentials and ten *dharmas*.[1] He should be completely detached towards this world and the next.[2]

As regards the quantity of food, only two portions of stomach out of four, should be filled with food and the remaining two should be left for water and air.[3]

The monk should not take food if he finds any one of the following fourteen impurities : nails, hair, insects, bones, chaff, grain particles, pus, skin, blood, flesh, seeds, fruits, bulb and roots.[4]

A monk should not go out for food when he suffers from disease, or when some misery befalls him, or when he wants to defend his celibacy or when he wants to refrain from causing injury to living beings or when he is desirous of renouncing the body.[5]

We shall deal with the rules of begging separately while discussing the food of a monk.

4. *Ādānanikṣepaṇāsamiti*

It means that the monk should carefully lift and put his articles.[6] He should use his *picchī* or *rajoharaṇa* to remove insects before placing it at any place.[7] He should avoid injury to any living being in this way.

5. *Pratiṣṭhāpana-samiti or utsarga-samiti*

While answering the call of nature, throwing away excrements,[8] urine, saliva, mucus, or any other uncleanliness of the body, pieces of food, waste things, torn clothes, dead bodies or other useless things, the monk should properly scrutinise the place and should throw away such wastes only in a place which is burnt, ploughed, used for cremation,

1. *Mulācārā*, 6.60.
2. *Pravacanasāra*, 3.26.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 6 72.
4. Ibid., 6.65.
5. Ibid., 6.61. Also *Uttarādhyayana*. 26.35.
6. *Niyamasāra*, 64. Also *Mūlācāra*, 1.14.
7. *Mūlācāra*, 5 123 Also *Uttarādhyayana*, 24.14.
8. *Niyamasāra*, 65.

unobjected, spacious, devoid of insects and seeds, not covered with grass or leaves, not perforated by holes, situated at a distance, neither frequented nor seen by other people, and having an *acitta* (inanimate) surface layer.[1]

These *samitis*, giving detailed rules of behaviour, show with what exactness and solemnity a monk is required to be vigilant in the observance of moral virtues. It may also be noted that these *samitis*, which have been framed to guide the conduct of a monk, should be taken as *upalakṣaṇa* only that these imply that all aspirants to liberation should keep constant vigilance in all walks of life.

The Excellent qualities

A monk should cultivate ten cardinal virtues in himself: (1) Forgiveness, (2) Humility, (3) Straightforwardness, (4) Contentment, (5) Truth, (6) Restraint, (7) Penance, (8) Renunciation, (9) Detachment, (10) Celibacy.[2]

As all these qualities are prefixed with the epithet "*uttama*" these are to be cultivated with the purpose of spiritual development and not with some worldly purpose. The fact is that a true monk will automatically be possessed of the above-mentioned qualities. He should employ his will-power against the tendency of transgressing these qualities.

The list of these qualities repeats many moral virtues which are already covered by the five great vows, guptis and samitis; but since they are specially helpful in stopping the inflow of *kārmic* matter, the *sūtra* on *saṁvara* has enumerated these qualities separately. The *Rājavārtika* commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* tries to explain the difference of *daśalakṣaṇadharma* and *vratas*, *guptis* and *samitis*.[3] In any case, it must be admitted that there is much of repetition. It seems that the tradition in Hinduism of having ten cardinal virtues prompted *Jaina* thinkers also to have ten virtues as the basis of their religion.[4]

1. *Mūlācāra*, 5.125-126 Also *Uttarādhyayana*, 24.15, 17-18.
2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.6.
   See Schubring, W., *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, pp. 305-306 for different lists given by different *Śvetāmbara* sects.
3. *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.6. (p. 958).
4. *Manusmṛti*, 6.92.

Repetition apart, the qualities of humility (*mārdava*), straightforwardness (*ārjava*) and contentment (*śauca*) are essential for a monk. In fact, the ten cardinal virtues leave out hardly any virtue which may be required of a monk.

The attitude of a monk towards hardships

The path of asceticism is full of hardships which a monk is expected to overcome with detachment[1] and forbearance.[2] The monk should get rid of the false impression of identity of body with soul and should understand the transitory nature of physical pains and pleasures.[3] While the worldly man tries to avoid these hardships and counteracts them by various means, the monk welcomes these hardships and faces them with fortitude. *Pariṣahajaya* or victory over these hardships is a part of *tapaścaryā* or penance; the difference between the two lies in the fact that the former refers to remaining calm amidst such hardships as befall a monk by chance, whereas the latter refers to remaining steadfast amidst self-inflicted hardships.[4] By facing these hardships boldly, the monk acquires a resolute will that no difficulty could bend.

The path of salvation is not an easy one. It necessarily involves denial of comforts to the body, which being only a means and not the end, should not be unduly pampered and coddled. The hardships that a monk may have to face are roughly twenty-two in number:[5]

(1) Hunger, (2) Thirst, (3) Cold, (4) Heat, (5) Insect-bites, (6) Nakedness, (7) Discontentment, (8) Woman, (9) Fatigue from walking, etc. (10) Disturbance by animals, (11) Sleeping or sitting on hard earth, (12) Abuse, (13) Beating, (14) Begging, (15) Failure to get alms, etc. (16) Disease, (17) Contact of thorny shrubs, etc. (18) Discomfort from dirt, (19) Respectful or disrespectful treatment, (20) Pride of knowledge, (21) Lack of knowledge, (22) Failures in religious practices.

1. *Aparājitasūri* on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*. 1171.
2. Cf. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.9.
3. Cf. Ibid., 9.9.
4. यदृच्छयोपनिपतितः परिषहः । स्वयंकृतः कायक्लेशः ।
   Ibid., 9.19. Also *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.19. (p. 1082).
5. *Uttarādhyayana*, 2.1. Also *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.9.

The list shows that the monk may have to face not only physical pains but mental hardships also. In any case, he should be impervious to pain.

Though these hardships are likely to be faced by a monk, a householder is also expected to become not too soft, hyper-civilised and a slave to luxuries. Any aspirant to liberation should never look for worldly comforts and should not be afraid of discomforts and privation.

Pañca cāritra or five types of conduct

The monk should have equanimity and should avoid all sinful activities. This is called *sāmāyika cāritra.*[1] If he infringes the moral law through negligence, he should again engage himself in the pursuit of righteousness. This is called *chedopasthāpana.*[2] A *gāthā* of *Jīvakāṇḍa* of *Gommaṭasāra* says that a person who, from the age of 30 to the age of 38, serves the *Tīrthaṅkara*, develops *parihāraviśuddhi*, i.e. his physical activities become perfectly free from injury.[3] The monk having only very minute passions is called to have *sūkṣmasāmparāya cāritra.*[4] When all passions are shed away, the ideal position of a *kevali* is called *yathākhyātacāritra.*[5] We shall deal with these various stages of conduct in detail while dealing with the *guṇasthānas* in a separate chapter.

In this manner, we have dealt with the primary moral qualities required of a monk. These qualities help him in checking the inflow of *kārmic* matter. The monk should also perform penances which are the means of shedding of the *kārmic* matter. On account of the importance of penances in the moral system of Jainism we shall deal with this subject in a separate chapter, where we shall have the occasion to dwell upon the important subject of meditation also, which is one of the most important internal penances. Now we turn to some other important aspects of a *Jaina* monk's life.

1. *Gommaṭasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa*, 470.
2. Ibid., 471.
3. Ibid., 472-473.
4. Ibid., 474.
5. Ibid., 475.

Ṣaḍāvaśyakas

The word *āvaśyaka* comes from *avaśa*, which means independence from *kaṣāyas*.[1] A monk who depends on others cannot, therefore, be said to have performed *āvaśyaka* karma.[2]

The traditional six *āvaśyakas* as enumerated in *Mūlācāra* and *Uttarādhyayana* are as follows :

1. *Sāmāyika*
2. *Caturviṁśatistava*
3. *Vandanā*
4. *Pratikramaṇa*
5. *Pratyākhyāna*
6. *Kāyotsarga*.[3]

Kundakunda gives a slightly different list :

1. *Pratikramaṇa*
2. *Pratyākhyāna*
3. *Ālocanā*
4. *Prāyaścitta*
5. *Paramasamādhi*
6. *Paramabhakti*.[4]

It seems that no later author followed the tradition of *Kundakunda*

Sāmāyika : *Sāmāyika* means equanimity of mind. *Mūlācāra* defines it thus : *Sāmāyika* is equanimity in life and death, profit and loss, union and separation, relative and enemy, and happiness and misery.[5]

It further adds that *śramaṇa* is one who is equally disposed towards one's own and others, who regards every woman as his mother and is equanimous in favourable and unfavourable circumstances. It is thus that he is said to perform *sāmāyika*[6]

Niyamasāra says, "What is the good of residing in forest, mortification of body, observance of various fasts, study of

1. *Niyamasāra*, 142.
   Also *Mūlācāra*, 7.14; *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.16.
2. *Niyamasāra*, 143.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 7.15. Also *Uttarādhyayana* 26, 2-4.
4. Introduction to *Pravacanasāra*, p. XLII.
5. *Mūlācāra*, 1.23.
6. Ibid., 7.20.

scriptures, and keeping silence, etc., to a saint, who is devoid of equanimity ?"[1]

Mūlācāra lays down the following conditions for *sāmāyika*: detachment, faith in scriptures, abstention from vices, three *guptis*, control over senses, austerity, victory over *kaṣāyas* and objects of enjoyment, abstention from *ārta* and *raudra dhyāna*, and devotion to *dharma* and *śukla dhyāna*.[2] *Anāgāradharmāmṛta* has classified *sāmāyika* as well as other *āvaśyakas* into six categories :[3]

1. *Nāma*—detachment from good or bad names.
2. *Sthāpana*—detachment from things placed proportionately or otherwise.
3. *Dravya*—detachment from good or bad material.
4. *Kṣetra*—detachment from good or bad place.
5. *Kāla*—detachment from good or bad time.
6. *Bhāva*—detachment from good or bad ideas.[4]

Caturvimśatistava

This includes offering prayers to twenty four *Tīrthankaras*. These *Tīrthankaras* are possessed of the following six qualities:

1. They spiritually illuminate the lokas.[5]
2. They pacify afflictions, destroy desire, and remove mental pollution and are, therefore, *dravyatīrthas*.[6] They are possessed of faith, knowledge and conduct and are therefore, *bhavatīrthas*.[7]
3. They have conquered the *kaṣāyas*.[8]
4. They have destroyed *karmans*.[9]
5. They are to be worshipped by all.[10]
6. They are possessed of *kevalajñāna*.[11]

1. *Niyamasāra*, 124. (Translation from *The Sacred Books of the Jainas*, Vol. IX., p. 57).
2. *Mūlācāra*, 7.22-32. Also *Anāgāradharmāmṛta* 8.18
3. Ibid., 7.17.
4. Ibid., 8.19-26.
5. Ibid., 7.59.
6. Ibid., 7.62.
7. Ibid., 7.63.
8. Ibid., 7.64.
9. Ibid., 7.64
10. Ibid., 7.65
11. Ibid., 7.67

These *Tīrthaṅkaras* are to be requested to bestow liberation, knowledge and *samādhimaraṇa*.[1] But this is an *asatyamṛṣa* and merely a devotional language, because, in reality, the *Jinas* being free from attachment and aversion, cannot impart any knowledge or *samādhimaraṇa*.[2] They have already imparted us the knowledge of the path of liberation and this is all that they could do for us.[3] Their devotion, of course, annuls previously accumulated *karmans*.[4] Attachment to *Arhantas*, *dharma*, scripture, *ācārya* and sages is but an auspicious type of attachment,[5] because it is free from mundane desire.[6]

According to *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, one should think of the meaning of 1008 names of *Arhantas*[7] It also lays emphasis on thinking of the physical beauty of *Tīrthaṅkaras*,[8] going on pilgrimage,[9] and contemplation of the knowledge of *Tīrthaṅkaras*.[10]

Vandanā

Vandanā means paying respect to the preceptor, to superiors, images of *Arhantas* and *Siddhas*, and to those who are seniors in austerity, the study of scriptures and knowledge. Those who are seniors in other qualities or have been initiated for long, should also be paid respect.[11] A monk is not to pay respect to those who do not observe vows. This includes parents, loosely disciplined *guru*, king, non-Jainas, *śrāvakas*, gods and pseudo-saints.[12] Vandanā should be free from thirty-two faults, which include, amongst others, disrespect,

1. Ibid., 7 69
2. *Mūlācāra*, 7 70.
3. Ibid., 7.71
4. Ibid., 7.72
5. Ibid., 7.74-75. (Verse No. 75 is wrongly numbered as 74 in the printed text).
6. Ibid., 7.76. (This verse is not numbered in the printed text.).
7. *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.39.
8. Ibid. 8.41
9. Ibid., 8.42
10. Ibid., 8.44
11. *Mūlācāra*, 25.
12. Ibid., 7.95 Also *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.52. For pseudo-saints see supra, p. 150.

pride, fear, ambition and deceit.[1] Besides this, one should observe the common etiquette by not paying respect to one who is lecturing, invigilant, taking food or excreting bowels.[2]

Pratikramaṇa

Pratikramaṇa consists in self-criticism (*nindā*) censuring before *guru* (*garhā*) and confession (*ālocanā*) of the moral transgressions.[3] It is to be performed in day, at night, for negligence of movements, fortnightly, four-monthly, yearly and for the whole life.[4] *Pratikramaṇa* is to be performed for wrong attitude, absence of self-control, passions, and inauspicious activities.[5] There should be no sense of pride, while performing *pratikramaṇa*.[6] There should be no delay in reporting one's faults to the guru.[7]

Besides the above-mentioned self-criticism, censuring, and confession, which are called *bhāva-pratikramaṇa*, the reciting of *Pratikramaṇa Sūtra* is called *dravya-pratikramaṇa*.[8] Both of these should go together.[9]

Kundakunda has also made a distinction between *vyavahāra pratikramaṇa* and *niścaya pratikramaṇa*. From niscaya point of view, meditation is the pratikramaṇa for all trangressions.[10] *Kundakunda* has included self-contemplation, conduct, righteousness, freedom from crookedness, thorns (*śalya*) of mind, self-discipline, avoidance of *ārta* and *raudra dhyāna*, and triple jewels of right attitude, knowledge and conduct, in *pratikramaṇa* so as to make it all-comprehensive.[11]

This may also be pointed out that *pratikramaṇa* was required to be performed for those transgressions alone which were actually committed in the time of all *Tīrthaṅkaras*, except

1. *Mūlācāra*, 7.106-111.
2. Ibid., 7.100. Also *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 8.53.
3. Ibid., 1.26.
4. Ibid., 7.116.
5. Ibid, 7.120.
6. Ibid., 7.121.
7. Ibid., 1.125
8. Ibid., 7.126.
9. Ibid., 7.128.
10. *Niyamasāra.*, 92, 93.
11. Ibid., 83-91.

the first and the last in whose time one was required to perform *pratikramaṇa* for all transgressions.[1] This difference is attributed to the firmness, concentration of mind and absence of infatuation in the monks of the times of the intervening period, and fickleminedeness and infatuation of the monks of the times of the first and last *Tīrthaṅkaras*.[2]

Pratyākhyāna

Pratyākhyana means determination to avoid sinful activities. *Pratikramaṇa* is connected with the sinful activities of the past whereas *pratyākhyāna* is related to the activities of the future. *Pratyākhyāna* can be easily practised by a person who is free from passions, self-controlled, brave, enterprising and afraid of the dangers of transmigration.[3]

Mūlācāra recommends modesty, correct following of the teacher in the recitation of the *sūtra*, observance of the vows even in emergency and detachment, as necessary for *Pratyākhyāna*.[4] It specially connects *pratyākhyāna* with fasting and classifies it into the following ten categories :

1. Keeping a fast earlier than the due time.
2. Keeping it later.
3. Keeping it according to one's capacity.
4. Keeping it at proper time.
5. Doing penances with concentration on constellations.
6. Doing penances at will.
7. Fasting for varying periods.
8. Keeping fasts by renouncing all foods throughout the life.
9. Fasting while crossing a forest, etc.
10. Fasting with some purpose.[5]

Kāyotsarga

It means devotion to auspicious meditation, keeping the feet at four-*aṅgula* distance, without moving the body and

1. *Mūlācāra*, 7.129-131.
2. Ibid., 7.132-133.
3. Ibid., 2.104.
4. Ibid., 7.145.
5. Ibid., 7.140-141.

without having any attachment to it.[1] Only a person who aspires for liberation, has conquered sleep, is expert in the meaning of the *sūtras,* pure in thoughts, strong in body and spirit, and pure in spirit, is capable of performing *kāyotsarga.*[2]

The *kāyotsarga* is practised for different lengths of time on different occasions.[3] *Mūlācāra* gives twenty three faults of *kāyotsarga,* which we need not enumerate here. We may simply summarise by saying that one should stand properly without spoiling the posture by such acts as bending one leg, shaking the body, taking the support of something like a wall, looking on all sides, or by any such unbefitting action.[4] The *kāyotsarga* is of four kinds, according to postures and the types of meditation :

1. *Dharma* and *śukla dhyāna* in a standing posture is *utthitotthita.*

2. *Ārta* and *raudra dhyāna* in a standing posture is *utthitaniviṣṭa.*

3. *Dharma* and *śukla Dhyāna* in a sitting posture is *upviṣṭotthita.*

4. *Ārta* and *raudra dhyāna* in a sitting posture is *upaviṣṭopaviṣṭa.*[5]

Food of the monk

Out of many fundamental necessities of human life, food is the most elementary. Even a monk cannot get rid of this necessity. The *Digambara* sect holds that a *Kevali* requires no food; but, according to *Śvetāmbara* sect, he does. In any case, the monk must reduce this basic necessity also to the minimum. We have already pointed out while discussing *eṣṇā samiti* that he should take only to allay the afflictions of hunger and should not develop any attatchment to it. He should beg his food in such a way that the householders are put to the least possible difficulties. *Hindu* scriptures also ordain the monk to take food like a medicine and not to relish it.[6]

1. *Mūlācāra,* 1.28 and 7.153.
2. Ibid., 7.154
3. For details cf Ibid., 7.159-164.
4. Ibid., 7.171-173.
5. Ibid., 7.176.180.
6. Sharma, Hardutta, *Contribution to Brāhmaṇical Asceticism,* p. 41.

As the monk has very limited sphere of worldly enjoyments, there is every likelihood of his concentrating upon the taste of his food. The *Jaina* scriptures have laid down very elaborate rules for the monk in this respect. He should not accept food if it involves any transgression either on the side of the giver or on the side of the receiver or in the manner in which it is offered.

Below we give the list of these faults[1] :

The first category of faults

The *udgama* mistakes or mistakes on the part of the giver are sixteen in number. The monk should not accept food—

1. if it is specially prepared for him;
2. if some additional food or new item has been cooked on seeing him;
3. if the sterilized or *prāsuka* food has been mixed with unsterilized food or water;
4. if he is asked to take the food together with layman;
5. if the food is offered to him after being removed from the place of its preparation;
6. if the food is remnant of offerings;
7. if the food is offered at wrong time;
8. if pots containing food are removed from one place to another at the sight of himself, or pots are washed before him, or a lamp is lit;
9. if the food has been purchased;
10. if the food has been borrowed;
11. if the food has been obtained in exchange for some other article;
12. if the food has been brought from another's house;
13. if the food has been kept uncovered;
14. if the food is offered at a place where he can reach only by mounting a ladder;
15. if the food is offered out of fear;
16. if someone has objected to the offering of food.

1. *Ācārasāra*, 8.14-57. Also *SBE*, Vol. XLV, pp. 131 f.n. 7; *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 5.2-38.

The second category of faults

The following sixteen faults pertain to the receiver (*utpādanadoṣa*) and should be avoided by the monk. The food becomes condemnable :

1. if it is achieved by teaching the giver the way of looking after the children;
2. if it is obtained by delivering some message;
3. if it is obtained by telling someone about his future, etc;
4. if it is obtained by describing one's high lineage or occupation;
5. if it is obtained by flattering the giver;
6. if it is obtained by giving medical advice or medicine;
7. by showing anger;
8. by showing pride;
9. by deceit;
10. by showing greed;
11. by praising the giver in anticipation;
12. by praising the giver afterwards;
13. by imparting occult powers;
14. by imparting *mantras* for snake-bite, etc.;
15. by imparting some powers for beautification, etc;
16. by imparting secrets for winning over one's love.

The third category of faults

It consists of the following ten faults concerning the manner of giving. The food becomes candemnable :

1. if there is any doubt about its purity;
2. if it is offered by hands or in utencils which are besmeared with oil or ghee,
3. if it has been placed on unsterilised water or green leaves;
4. if it is covered with unsterilised water or green leaves;
5. if the pots are not handled carefully by the giver;
6. if it is unclean;
7. if it is mixed with earth, insects or unsterilized things;
8. if it is not sterilized so as to make it incapable of

breeding any living creature;
9. if it is offered from pots or hands besmeared with flour, chalk, and the like ;
10. if it has been thrown away.

The fourth category of faults

While taking the food, the monk should be free from the following four faults :

1. Mixing up hot things with cold which have ceased to be sterilized.
2. Over-eating.
3. Having attachment to food.
4. Condemning food while eating it.

Besides, the monk should not help in preparing the food at any stage like grinding, crushing, igniting fire, sweeping or drawing of water. This is called *ādhākarmadoṣa*.

The underlying moral ideas in these rules for food and begging was non-violence and detachment. The monk should neither accept food specially prepared for him nor the food which causes violence to the living beings. The *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* gives various *prāyaścittas* for violation of the fortysix rules.[1] The *Daśavaikālika* says that a monk should beg his food just as a bee collects honey from flowers without hurting them or without getting attached to them.[2]

Saṁgha organisation

The monks have a community of their own. It is possible only for a monk of a high order to remain aloof and endeavour for spiritual development. We have referred to such monks as *Jinakalpa*. An ordinary monk has, however, to remain under organisation of the *saṁgha*.

This *saṁgha* organisation is headed by *ācārya*. The *ācārya* is responsible for the entire organisation of the *saṁgha*, from administrative to the spiritual. He should observe the following duties :

1. *Sūtrārthasthirīkaraṇa*—Decide the meaning of the scriptures.

1. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Vol. I, Bhavanagar, 1933, 532-540.
2. *Daśavaikālika*, 1. 2-3.

2. *Vinaya*—Should be humble to all.
3. *Gurupūjā*—Should be reverential to those who are senior to him in spiritual development.
4. *Saikṣabahumāna*—Should show respect for the aspirants of spirituality.
5. *Dānapatiśraddhāvṛddhi*—Encourage the giver to give alms.
6. *Buddhibalavardhana*—Enhance the intellect and capacity of his students.[1]

Besides, the *ācārya* should also keep in mind the following things :—

1. He should be careful in giving any order.
2. He should see that the junior monks behave properly towards senior monks.
3. He should see that the order of reading the scriptures is not violated by the monks.
4. He should provide proper facilities for those monks who are either diseased or are engaged in penance for studies.
5. He should do every thing in consultation with other monks.
6. He should see that every monk gets the equipment that he requires.
7. He should also take care of the equipments of monks.[2]

The commentary of *Pravacanasāroddhāra* gives thirty-six qualities of a monk.[3] We need not mention all these qualities here. The essential qualities of an *ācārya* are that he should have an excellent personality, should be free from self-praise and crookedness. He should be well-versed in the scriptures and should have good expression.

Monks and nuns

Monks and nuns in the *saṁgha* should observe strict reticence. It is only in case of emergency that they are

1. *Abhayadeva* on *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 7.3 570.
2. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 5.1.399 and 7.3.544.
3. *Pravacanasāroddhāra*, 64th *dvāra* (pp. 128-131).

allowed to share a common quarter.[1] They may talk to each other only for asking the way and showing it. The monk can touch a nun only to protect her against some harm. Thus full care should be taken against any chance of transgressing the right path of chastity.

Behaviour of a monk towards his fellow monks

The society of monks is guided by what is called *Saṁbhoga*. The rules of *Saṁbhoga* are twelve in number :

1. *Upādhisaṁbhoga*—The possessions of a monk are called *Upādhi*. The monks should exchange these *Upādhis* with other monks with care.
2. *Śrutasaṁbhoga*—The monk should instruct other monks with regard to the scriptures.
3. *Bhaktapāna*—The food given to other monks should be pure.
4. *Añjalipragraha*—The monk should pay due respect to other monks.
5. *Dānasaṁbhoga*—Pupils can be exchanged with the other monks of the same group.
6. *Nimantraṇa*—A monk can invite another monk of the same group for exchange of food, possessions and pupils.
7. *Abhyutthāna*—The monk should pay due respect to other monks of the same group by giving them seat etc., and by standing from his seat on their arrival.
8. *Kṛtikarma*—Should give proper salutation, etc.
9. *Vaiyyāvṛtya*—The old, diseased, and disabled monks should be served with due respect and care.
10. *Samavasaraṇa*—They should join the assembly at the time of religious discourse.
11. *Sanniṣadyā*—The monk can share his seat with the monk of his own group but not with the nun.
12. *Kathā-prabandha*—He should discuss various religious matters with fellow-monks.[2]

1. Schubring, W., *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, p. 251.
2. *Śrī Jaina-siddhānta-bola-saṁgraha*, Vol. IV, pp. 292-296.

Secondary duties of the monk (Uttaraguṇa)

We have dealt with the cardinal moral virtues of a monk. He must also possess some minor virtues which are corollaries of the main virtues. The monk is expected to be friendly to all. He should be punctual, indifferent to pains and pleasures, and should not give way to anger at being condemned. He should not be proud and should love loneliness.[1]

Daśavaikālika lays down that a monk should not reside at one place. He should not take food daily from the same houses. He should not move about in the four months of rainy season; but should not stay for those four months at the same place. Thus he avoids attachment to a particular place.[2]

Sallekhanā

We have already referred to this practice of voluntary death in the foregoing chapter. Deaths have been classified under five heads :[3] (1) The wisest or *'Paṇḍita-paṇḍita'* death is the death of a *kevali* who leaves his body after exhausting his *karmans* and, therefore, need not take any birth after death. He has attained the summum bonum of life. (2) The wiser or *'Paṇḍita'* death is the death of a monk who dies in tranquillity. He has performed his spiritual duties to the best of his capabilities in this life but unfortunately could not attain his ultimate end and is, therefore, leaving this body voluntarily to continue his aspirations in another body where he will have better chances to fulfil his aim. (3) The wise or *'Bāla-paṇḍita'* death is the death of a householder who could not take to monk's life but practised partial self-control while staying at home. (4) The foolish or *'Bāla'* death is the death of an uncontrolled right believer. Though he had the seed of salvation in him, his life could not be a success since he practically lost this life in enjoyment of worldly pleasures and did not practise any self-control. (5) The worst or *'Bālabāla'* death is the death of a wrong believer, who has

1. Cf. *Uttarādhyayana*, Lecture. XXI.
2. *Daśavaikālika*, *cūlikā*, 2.
   Also *Uttarādhyayana*, Lecture XI.
3. Jaina, C.R., *Saṁnyāsadharma*, pp. 121-122.

no chance of salvation. The true life, from the spiritual point of view, begins only at the dawn of right faith.

It is only when a monk is certain of his death that he is allowed to adopt *Sallekhanā*. The following passage from *Bhagavatiārādhanā* clarifies it :

> *Bhaktapratyākhyāna* (*samādhimaraṇa*) is not proper for him who has many years of saintly life before him, who has no fear of starvation from a great famine, who is not afflicted by an incurable disease, and who is not faced by any sudden cause of death. Whoever desires to put an end to his life, while still able, with his body, to observe the rules of the *dharma* and of the order properly, falls from the true path.[1]

When a monk takes *sallekhanāvrata*, the fellow monks and the *ācārya* should carefully see that the concerned monk is not led to consider the *sallekhanā* as a burden on him. He is to be carefully looked after and should be kept firm on the right path by means of constant inspiration from religious discourses.

The *ācārāṅga* gives the following four types of death :

1. *Bhaktapratyākhyāna*—This means total abstinence from food and drink. The monk lies on a bed of straw and waits for death even without moving his limbs.[2]
2. *Iṅgitamaraṇa*—The monk lies on a bare piece of ground and abstains from food and drinks although he can move according to the rules of *gupti* and *samiti*.[3]
3. *Pādopagamana*—The monk stands motionless like a tree till death comes.[4]
4. *Sallekhanā*—This means a planned scheme of fasting and mortification; the maximum period of mortification being twelve years and the minimum six months.

1. Quoted from *Saṁnyāsa Dharma*, p. 128.
2. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1.7.8.7-10.
3. Ibid., 1.7.8.11-18 (pp. 76-77).
4. Ibid., 1.7.8.19-23 (p. 77).

Conclusion

A study of the rules laid down for a *Jaina* monk would show that social conditions were also given due consideration in framing them. Secondly, every attempt has been made to preserve the puritanic form of monastic life. Thirdly, if a monk transgressed some law, the punishment given to him was of a reformative nature. Fourthly, the rules, though rigidly followed in normal circumstances, were flexible enough to make allowance for exceptional circumstances.

CHAPTER VII

PENANCES

The path of self-realisation is not an easy one. The demands of flesh and extrovert lower tendencies are so deeply rooted in our nature that any attempt to get rid of them is not likely to succeed without a tough struggle. These natural impulses, which when satisfied are the source of worldly pleasure, should be completely controlled by an aspirant to spiritualism. In fact, every progress involves some struggle. An aspirant is required not only to endure the hardships patiently but also to invite such hardships voluntarily. This process compels the soul to put forth its whole strength. It is, as it were, challenging the flesh.

So far we have spoken of these moral virtues which a householder or a monk imbibes mainly to avoid sins. This is a form of *saṁvara*. But this alone is not sufficient. Previously accumulated *karmans* are also to be annihilated by penance.[1] No doubt, those *karmans*, if left alone, exhaust themselves automatically after yielding their fruits (*savipāka nirjarā*); but an ardent aspirant cannot wait for such a long period. To strengthen the vitality of soul, therefore, he willingly challenges such natural instincts and fights against them. This appears to involve a lot of hardship and pain to casual observer, but to a true aspirant it is a source of great inspiration. It is here that he has a chance of strengthening his will-power against the allurements of worldly pleasures.

The quality of *tapas* has been held very high in all the systems of Indian philosophy. The word *āśrama*, which indicates the four stages of life in Brāhmaṇism, comes from the root *Śrama*, which means 'to toil'. The word *Śramaṇa*, which indicates *Jaina* and Buddhist monks alike, also comes from the

1. तपसा निर्जरा च ।

—*Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.3.

same root. This shows the basic attitude of Indian philosophy towards the relation between austerities and spiritual progress.

The *Atharvaveda* says that wise men conquer death by means of *tapas*.[1] The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* draws a distinction between *devayāna* and *pitṛyāna*.[2] Those who follow *Devayāna* attain liberation. The *devayāna* is characterised by performance of penances.[3] Both, *Muṇḍaka*[4] and *Praśnopaniṣad*,[5] mention *tapas* as a means of self-realisation. The *Mahābhārata* makes a mention of *ṛṣis* standing on one leg or devoured by *vermin*, adding at the same time that without inner purity, external austerities alone do not lead to salvation.[6] The *Manusmṛti* lavishly praises *tapas*.[7] The *Gītā* gives in detail the austerities of body, mind and speech.[8] These penances are classified by the *Gītā* into *rājasika* and *tāmasika*.[9]

Place of tapas in Jainism

Umāsvāti describes *tapas* not only as a means of stopping the inflow of *kārmic* matter but also as a means of annihilation of the previous *Karmans*.[10] In *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* it is said that *tapas* means extirpation of desire in order to strengthen the three jewels of right attitude, right knowledge and right conduct.[11]

The *Uttarādhyayana* praises *tapas* in these words : "As a large tank, when its supply of water has been stopped gradually, dries up by the consumption of water and by evaporation, so the *karmans* of a monk, which he has acquired in crores of births, is annihilated by austerites, if there is no

1. *Atharvaveda*, 11.5.19.
2. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 5.3.2.
3. Ibid., 5.10.1.
4. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 1.2.11.
5. *Praśnopaniṣad*, 1.2.
6. *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparva*, 174.48, 177.49. Also eight-fold path in *Viduranīti*.
7. *Manusmṛti*, 11.34-44.
8. *Gītā*, 17. 14, 15, 16.
9. Ibid., 17. 17-19.
10. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.3.
11. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 55).

influx of bad *karman*'.[1] It further says : 'Penance is my fire—*karman* is my fuel'.[2] It is penance which makes a man respectable.[3] It is on account of penance that a man is called *Brāhmaṇa*.[4]

Sthānāṅga Sūtra makes it clear that all penances should be devoid of any desire pertaining to this world or to the next world.[5] *Tapas* devoid of spiritualism is called *Bālatapa*. *Pravacanasāra* says that those who are spiritually endowed, get their *karmans* destroyed much more earlier than those who are not endowed with spirituality, even though they may perform external austerities.[6]

Even though the inner aspect of penances is duly emphasised in Jainism, yet the importance of external penances is also not underrated. Penances are classified under two heads : external and internal.[7] External austerity involves physical endurance and renunciation of something perceptible, whereas the internal austerity involves control of mind.[8] The external austerity being something physical can be pursued even by a man who is not possessed of right attitude.[9]

External austerities

There are six types of external austerities : 1. Fasting (*Anaśana*), 2. Eating less than one's fill (*Avamaudarya*), 3. Taking a secret vow to accept food from a householder only if certain condition is fulfilled (*Vṛttiparisaṁkhyāna*), 4. Abstention from one or more of the following six objects of taste (*Rasaparityāga*) : (i) *Ghee*,, (ii) Milk, (iii) Curd, (iv) Sugar, (v) Salt, (vi) Oil., 5. Sitting and sleeping in a lonely place

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 40.5, 6. *SBE Translation*.
2. *Uttarādhayana*, 22.44.
3. Ibid., 12.37.
4. Ibid., 25.22.
5. Cf. *Sthānāṅga*, 10.1.759.
6. *Pravacanasāra*. 3.38.
7. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 54), Also *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.19-20.
8. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.19-20.
9. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 59). Also *Anagāradharmāmṛta*, 7.6.

(*Vivikta Śayyāsana*), 6. Mortification of the body (*Kāya kleśa*).[1]

1. *Anaśana* : The food may be abandoned either for a limited period or till death.[2] *Pūjyapāda* says that penance is performed for the sake of self-control, exterminating attachment, annihilating *Karmans*, performing meditation and acquiring scriptural knowledge; and not for any worldly purpose.[3] Mere maceration of body should be distinguished from fasting, where detachment from food is essential.[4]

2. *Avamaudarya* : Normally the full quantity of food for an ascetic is thirty-two morsels in the case of a monk and twenty-eight in the case of a nun. Any reduction in this quantity constitutes this *tapas*.[5] *Mūlācāra* says that it helps control of senses and sleep, in practising *Dharma*, and in the performance of six essentials.[6]

3. *Vṛttiparisaṁkhyāna* : Like the first two types of penances, this type also involves control of food. The ascetic decides regarding the number of houses to be visited, the manner of taking food, the type of food and the qualification of the giver of food, before going out to beg food.[7] If he finds that his conditions are fulfilled he would accept the food, otherwise he would go without it. Sometimes the conditions are too difficult to be normally fulfilled and the monk has to go without food for a very long period. This helps him in uprooting the desire for food.[8]

4. *Rasaparityāga* : This again is connected with food. The monk should eat to live and not live to eat. This means a control of palate. He should, therefore, renounce one or more of the six objects of taste viz. milk, curd, *ghee*, oil, sugar and salt and also one or more of the following types of

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.19
2. *Mūlācāra*, 5.151-152. Also *Uttarādhyayana* 30.9 and *Bhagavatīārādhanā*, 209.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9 19.
4. *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 55).
5. *Mūlācāra*, 5.153. Also *Bhagavatī ārādhanā* 211, 212; *Uttarādhyayana* 30.15 and *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 56).
6. *Mūlācāra*, 5.153. Also *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.22.
7. *Mūlācāra*, 5.158. Also *Bhagavati Ārādhanā*, 218-221; and *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 57).
8. *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.26.

tastes : acrid, bitter, astringent, sour and sweet.[1] The purpose of this *tapas* is emasculation of the senses, subduing sleep, and unobstructed pursuance of study.[2]

5. *Vivikta śayyāsana* : The monk should choose a secluded place for his residence. It should not be frequented by women, eunuch, she-animals, and depraved house-holders.[3] It helps in celibacy, self-study and meditation.[4]

6. *Kāya kleśa* : It means inflicting some pain on the body by adopting certain postures or by exposing it to the vagaries of weather just like remaining in the hot sun in summer season.[5] The purpose of this *tapas* is to endure physical hardships and to alleviate attachment to pleasure.[6]

Mūlācāra makes it clear that external penances should not engender mental disquietude, or abate the zeal for the performance of disciplinary practices of ethical and spiritual nature but should rather enhance spiritual conviction.[7] *Samantabhadra* also emphasises the inner aspect of penance and says that external austerities are means for spiritual austerity.[8]

Internal austerities

The internal austerities are also classified under six heads. They are as follows :

1. Expiation (*Prāyaścitta*)
2. Reverence (*Vinaya*)
3. Service (*Vaiyyavṛtya*)
4. Study (*Svādhyāya*)
5. Detachment (*Vyutsarga*)
6. Meditation (*dhyāna*).

1. *Mūlācāra*, 5.155. Also *Uttarādhyayana*, 30.26; *Bhagavatiārādhanā*, 215; and *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII. p. 57).
2. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.19.
3. *Mūlācāra*, 5 160. Also *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 57).
4. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9 19.
5. *Uttarādhyayana*, 30.27; *Bhagavatī-Ārādhanā* 222-227; and *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 58).
6. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.19.
7. *Mūlācāra*, 5.161. Also *Bhagavatī-Ārādhanā*, 236.
8. बाह्यं तपः परमदुश्चरमाचरंस्त्वमाध्यात्मिकस्य तपसः परिबृंहणार्थम् ।

   —*Svayambhūstotra*, 83.

1. *Expiation (the sense of guilt)*

The *Prāyaścitta* samuccaya says that without *prāyaścitta* there cannot be any conduct, without conduct no piety, without piety no detachment, and without detachment all vows are futile[1] It is said that one should not try to conceal his defects from a benevolent king, doctor and teacher.[2]

While prescribing a *prāyaścitta*, time, place, availability of food, and individual capacity are to be kept in view.[3] In fact, there are as many *prāyaścittas* as there are shades of faults and, therefore, no body can draw up an exhaustive list of all the *prāyaścittas*.[4] It should also be kept in mind while prescribing a *prāyaścitta* whether the sinner has transgressed the law under some pressure or wilfully, once or repeatedly, follow the teaching of (truth) or otherwise, and whether resisting the temptation for sin or not.[5]

Prāyaścitta includes the following ten :—[6]

1. Self-criticism (*ālocanā*)
2. Self-repentence (*pratikrmaṇa*)
3. Both, confession and self-repentence (*tadubhaya*).
4. Renunciation of a bad thing (*viveka*).
5. To engage oneself in Vyutsarga (*kāyotsarga*).
6. Fasting or external penances (*tapas*)
7. Cutting short the life of monkhood (*cheda*)
8. Reordainment in monkhood (*mūla*)
9. Expulsion from monkhood (*parihāra*)
10. Re-establishing belief in the true order (*śraddhāna*)

The *Tattvārthasūtra* enumerates only nine of these eliminating *śraddhā* the last and mentioning the eighth as *upasthāpana*.[7]

Ālocanā (*Self-criticism*)

Ālocanā is meant for lapses in the movements of body,

1. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 5.
2. *Cūlikā* (*Prāyaścitta*), 163.
3. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 130-180.
4. *Cūlikā*, 163.
5. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 18-22
6. *Mūlācāra*, 5.165; *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 60).
7. Cf. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.22.

mind and speech,[1] and in *iryāsamiti*[2] as also for lapses while away from the community[3] and while visiting other party of saints.[4]

The transgression should be expressed and confessed before the *guru* avoiding the following ten defects (*doṣas*)[5] :

(i) *Akampita doṣa* : The monk should avoid serving the *Guru*, or offering him things, with the object he may prescribe a milder type of *prāyścitta*. This is known as *akampitadoṣa*.[6]

(ii) *Anukampita or anumānita doṣa* : To plead one's ill health so that the *guru* may prescribe a milder *prāyścitta* out of compassion is *anukampita doṣa*. Or inferring *guru* attitude towards lesser punishment is *anumānita doṣa*.[7]

(iii) *Yaddṛṣṭa* : It means expressing only those faults which are perceived by others.[8]

(iv) *Bādara doṣa* : It means concealing minor faults, disclosing only major faults.[9]

(v) *Sūkṣma doṣa* : It is just opposite of the previous fault. It means disclosing only minor faults and concealing major ones.[10]

(vi) *Channa doṣa* . If the monk asks *prāyaścitta* for a hypothetical case and then expresses his own fault, it is called *channadoṣa*[11]

(vii) *Śabdākulita doṣa* : If the monk expresses his faults indistinctly amidst great noise, it is called *śabdākulita doṣa*.[12]

(viii) *Bhūrisūri doṣa* : It results from asking many people regarding the propriety and authenticity of the *prāyaścitta* prescribed by the *guru*.[13]

1. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 184
2. Ibid., 185.
3. Ibid., 187.
4. Ibid., 188.
5. *Pūjyapāda* and *Bhaṭṭa Akalanka* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.22.
6. *Bhagavatī-Ārādhanā*, 563.
7. Ibid., 569-573.
8. Ibid., 574.
9. Ibid., 577.
10. Ibid., 581.
11. *Bhagavatīārādhanā*, 586.
12. Ibid., 590.
13. Ibid., 596.

(ix) *Avyakta doṣa* : To express one's fault before a person who is devoid of the three jewels is called *avyakta*.[1]

(x) *Tatsevita doṣa* : It means asking for *prāyaścitta* from a person who himself is involved in the same type of lapses for which *prāyaścitta* is to be prescribed.[2]

Pratikramaṇa :

This means self-condemnation for a transgression. The transgression may be in connection with speaking lie under the influence of sex,[3] throwing bodily excrements in prohibited areas,[4] forgetting about *vaiyyāvṛtya* or service of the saints[5] and being excited sexually.[6]

Tadubhaya

It means performing both *ālocanā* and *pratikramaṇa* for such faults as are committed unintentionally, i.e. bad dreams etc.[7]

Viveka

It means renunciation of an objectionable thing. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya* gives the following conditions for giving up an object :—

1. When it is objectionable.
2. When there is doubt about its purity.
3. When a part of it is objectionable.
4. When impure thoughts have become associated with it, even though it is pure.
5. When one intends to take food at night for fear of illness or famine.
6. When objectionable food has been served or a part of it has been put in the mouth.[8]

1. *Bhagavatī-Ārādhanā* 599.
2. Ibid., 602.
3. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 48.
4. Ibid., 48.
5. Ibid., 191.
6. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 192.
7. *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26., Vol. XIII, p. 60. Also *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.22.
8. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 196-202.

Kāyotsarga

It means to engage oneself in *vyutsarga*.[1] It is practised for —

1. Such common unavoidable slight faults as walking, eating etc.
2. Touching some living bodies, itching and contracting the body, and discharging bodily excrements in an improper place.
3. Pulling threads or straws to pieces, causing slight agitation, employing hands in some action, thinking of completing an accessory (*upakaraṇa*) like a book or a feather within a certain number of days.
4. Rubbing one limb against another, or against clay, hard seeds, green grass or insect life.[2]

Tapa

It means fasting or engaging oneself in external austerity. Many elaborate details are given concerning this type of penance. Control over the sense of taste is considered to be the main concern of the aspirant and hence there is much emphasis on fasting.

There are many methods of controlling the sense of taste e.g. one may resort to *ācāmla*, which means taking food prepared by one kind of grain with water; or *ekasthāna*, which means either eating only what is offered at one time or eating only as long as one does not change his position; or *nirvikṛti*, which means taking food devoid of six castes of milk, curd, ghee, oil, sugar and salt (called *rasas*); or *upavāsa*, which means totally abstaining from food for 24 hours, or *purumaṇḍala* which means abstaining from food till after the mid-day *sāmāyika* (i.e. upto 1.15 P.M.) or *kalyāṇaka*, which means one each of the quintet of the above five. Four such *kalāyāṇakas* are termed as *bhinnamāsa*, five as *gurumāsa* and five *kalyāṇakas* without *ācāmla*, *nirvikṛti*, and *upavāsa* as *laghumāsa*. There are various combinations of these *tapas* which are prescribed for various types of transgressions.

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.22. cf. infra, p. 193.
2. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 28-31.

Cheda :

It means cut in the period of monkhood.[1] It is prescribed for :

(i) leaving the *saṁgha* and roaming about alone.
(ii) being loose in one's saintly character.
(iii) failing to apologise for a fault.
(iv) leaving the *saṁgha* without apologising for one's faults.

It may be noted that the period of *cheda* for an *ācārya* is thrice and for a learned monk twice the period for an ordinary monk.

Mūla :

It is meant for such faults as are too grave to be cured by *cheda* but not so strong as to merit *parihāra* (*expulsion*). The monk is re-ordained in the *saṁgha* as a novice and loses his seniority completely.[2] It is meant for—

(a) (i) losing the faith, conduct and principal vows, non-observance of six essentials of a monk and ordaining a pregnant woman or an important person into sainthood.
(ii) propounding teachings contrary to the *Jaina* scriptures.
(iii) leading the life of a false monk.
(iv) adopting non-Jaina mode of living.
(v) committing sins against *mūlaguṇas*.[3]

Parihāra :

It means expulsion from the *saṁgha*.[4] It is of two types—(1) *anupasthāna* or *anupasthāpana* and (2) *pārañcika*. Under first type of expulsion, a monk is allowed to remain in his own *gaṇa* and has to respect even the junior-most monk. He is to observe a fast in which he is allowed meals only

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.22.
2. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26. Vol. XIII. p. 62. Also *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.55.
3. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 239-240.
4. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.22.

after five days in cases of mild punishment and even after six months in cases of hard punishment, though such hard punishments are rarely allowed in modern age when human capacity is limited.[1] Even so, some persons undertaking long fasts are mentioned.[2] The penance may continue for twelve years.

Under second type of expulsion (*pārañcika parihāra*) the monk has to live outside the *saṁgha* and observe such hard fasts as mentioned above. But such punishment is awarded only in cases of the worst sins like abduction of a monk of another faith, of a layman, a woman, a child, or the pupil of a saint and for assaulting a saint with a stick.[3]

Śraddhāna :

It means that a monk, who had been misled again joins the *saṁgha*.[4]

2. *Vinaya* (*reverence*) :

Vinaya means control over passions and senses and proper humility towards reverential personalities.[5] All knowledge is futile without *vinaya*.[6] Humbleness is shown for five reasons : (1) Imitation (2) Wealth (3) Sex (4) Fear and (5) Liberation.[7]

We are not concerned here with the first four types of *vinaya*. The last-mentioned type of *Vinaya* is again classified under five heads : (1) *Darśana* (2) *Jñāna* (3) *Cāritra* (4) *Tapa* and (5) *Upacāra*.[8]

(1) *Darśana vinaya* : One who has faith in the nature of things as taught by *Jinas* is said to have shown *darśana vinaya*.[9] It means having right faith with all its constituents and avoidance of its five faults.[10]

(2) *Jñāna vinaya* : A person who attains or knows

1. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 157.
2. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Vol. II, 1283-1284, Vol. V, 4492.
3. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya*, 244.
4. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 5.4.26 (Vol. XIII, p. 63). Also *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.57.
5. *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, 7.60.
6. *Bhagavatīārādhanā*, 128.
7. *Mūlācāra*, 7.83.
8. Ibid., 7.87.
9. Ibid., 7.88.
10. *Bhagavatī-Ārādhanā*, 114.

liberation, avoids sins, does not acquire new *karmans,* and acts with knowledge is said to have performed *jñāna vinaya.*[1] *Ācārya Śivakoṭi* says *jñāna vinaya* has eight varieties[2] : (i) *Kālavinaya*—it means reading the scriptures at proper time, (ii) *Vinaya*—it means devotion towards scriptures and those who are well-versed in them, (iii) *Upādhāna vinaya*—it means taking a vow of fast unless a particular scripture is finished, (iv) *Bahumāna vinaya*—it means reading with purity and with folded hands with concentration, (v) *Anihnava vinaya*—it means not proclaiming the name of the *ācārya* other than the one from whom one has actually studied, (vi) *Vyañjana vinaya*—it means proper recitation of the scriptures, (vii) *Artha vinaya*—it means proper understanding of the meaning of the scriptures, (viii) *Tadubhaya vinaya*—it means proper recitation and proper-understanding of the scriptures.[3]

(3) *Cāritra vinaya* : it means annihilating previously accumulated *karmans* and stopping the accumulation of new *karmans.*[4] This includes three *guptis,* five *samitis* and control over senses and passions.[5]

(4) *Tapa vinaya* : It means dispelling darkness by penance.[6] It also means devotion to penance and to those who are devoted to penance. One should not insult those who perform less penance but are possessed of knowledge.[7]

(5) *upacāra Vinaya* : It means paying proper respect physically, vocally and mentally. To stand up to salute, to bow down with hands folded on one's forehead, and to follow the sage while bidding him farewell—all these are included in physical *Upacāra vinaya.*[8] One should keep his seat lower than that of a senior and should also offer place and seat to him.[9]

1. *Vasunandi* on *Mūlācāra,* 7.89.
2. *Bhagavati-Ārādhanā,* 113.
3. *Aparājitasūri* on *Bhagavati-Ārādhanā,* 113.
4. *Mūlācāra,* 7.90.
5. *Bhagavati-Ārādhanā,* 113.
6. *Mūlācāra,* 7.90.
7. *Bhagavati-Ārādhanā,* 117.
8. Ibid., 119.
9. Ibid., 120.

Vocal *upacāra vinaya* includes respectful, beneficial, limited, sweet and non-harsh speech.[1] The speech should be calm, unconnected with worldly affairs and non-insulting.[2] Mental *upacāra vinaya* means controlling the mind against vices and diverting it to virtues.[3] All these *vinayas* should be observed whether the teacher sees it or not.[4]

3. *Vaiyyāvṛtya* :

It means rendering service to monk with one's own body or some other object when he is in misery such as disease, *Pariṣaha* or perversity or attitude.[5] This service may be rendered to the following ten : (i) *ācārya*, (ii) *upādhyāya*, (iii) one who performs some great penance, (iv) teacher, (v) diseased, (vi) old monks (vii) students of one's *ācārya*, (viii) the monks of one's *saṁgha*, (ix) a monk with long standing and (x) a popular monk.[6] This type of service expresses non-abhorrence for dirt and love for the religious path.[7]

4. *Svādhyāya* :

The scriptures should be studied for excellence of intelligence, good engagement, detachment, argumentation of penance, and purification of transgressions of vows.[8]

Svādhyāya has five varieties : 1. *Vācanā*, which means teaching the scripture and its meaning. 2. *Pṛcchanā*, which means asking others for removing the doubt or for ascertaining the meaning. 3. *Anuprekṣā*, which means contemplating on the scripture which has been read. 4. *Āmnāya*, which means correctly revising a scripture. 5. *Dharmopadeśa*, which means giving religious sermons.[9]

1. *Bhagavatī-Ārādhanā*, 123.
2. Ibid., 124.
3. Ibid., 125.
4. Ibid., 127.
5. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.24.
6. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.24.
7. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.24.
8. Ibid., 9.25.
9. Ibid., 9.25.

5. *Vyutsarga* :

It means renunciation of external and internal possessions. Property etc. are external possessions whereas anger etc. are internal possessions. This penance enhances detachment, fearlessness and indifference towards one's life.[1]

6. *Dhyāna* :

After dealing with the above five kinds of internal penances, we come to the sixth kind, *dhyāna*, which occupies the most important place in the scheme of *Jaina* ethics and is, therefore, dealt with in some detail herebelow.

The position of dhyāna in Indian Philosophy

As a means to self-realisation, meditation holds the supreme position. In fact, all ethical discipline aims at perfect state of meditation. The conception of the state of meditation differs from one system to another, but they all agree regarding the importance of meditation.

The *Kaṭhopaniṣad* declares : "He who has not turned away from frivolity, who is restless and uncollected, who does not have a peaceful mind cannot through searching realise the self."[2] The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* says : "By practising churning in the form of meditation, one should realise God as one would find out something hidden."[3]

Lord *Buddha* declared in *Dhammapada*[4] that 'those in whom wisdom and meditation meet are not far from salvation'. *Patañjali* says in his *Yogasūtra* that the action of meditation is free from vehicles.[5] *Nyāyasūtra* recommends meditation as a means of knowledge.[6]

Dhyāna in Jainism

Tattvārthasūtra defines *Dhyāna* as concentration of mind on a particular object. This concentration is possible only

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.26.
2. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, 1.2.24.
3. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 1.14.
4. *Dhammapada*, 25.13.
5. *Yogasūtra*, 4.6.
6. *Nyāyasūtra*, 4.2.38.

for a period below forty-eight minutes (*antarmuhūrta*) and can be practised by a person possessed of the best type of body.[1]

Types of Dhyāna :

Tattvārthasūtra has classified *Dhyāna* into four categories : 1. *ārta*, 2. *raudra*, 3. *dharmya* and *śukla*.[2] The first two are inauspicious and the other two auspicious.[3] The last two types of *dhyāna* are said to lead to liberation.[4]

The ārta dhyāna :

The *ārta dhyāna* has been further classified under four heads : (i) *aniṣṭa saṁyogaja*, (ii) *iṣṭa viyogaja*, (iii) *vedanā janita*, (iv) *nidāna janita*. As is clear from the names of these types of *ārta dhyāna*, all of them are connected with worries emanating from worldly objects. *Aniṣṭa saṁyogaja* relates to anxiety to remove the undesirable objects like poison, thorn, enemy, weapon, etc.[5] The opposite of it is *iṣṭa viyogaja* where one thinks of means of attaining such desirable objects as son, wife or wealth in their absence.[6] *Vedanā janita ārta dhyāna* is connected with anxiety for finding devices to remove the physical diseases.[7] *Nidāna janita* means concentrating on the means of obtaining the worldly pleasures by a person who yearns for them.[8] *jñānārṇava* includes in this type of *ārta dhyāna*, the desire to attain the status of *Tīrthaṅkara* or god by performing meritorious actions.[9]

The *ārta dhyāna*, though agreeable in the beginning, yields bad results in the end.[10] It continues upto the sixth stage of spiritual development. The last type of this *dhyāna*, however, continues only upto the fifth stage.[11] From the point

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.27, 28. Also *Jñānārnava*, 25.15.
2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.28.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on Ibid.. 9.28. Also *Jñānārṇava*, 25.20.
4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.29.
5. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.30. Also *Jñānārṇava*, 25.25.
6. Ibid., 9.31. Also Ibid., 25.29.
7. Ibid., 9.32. Also Ibid., 25 32.
8. Ibid., 9.33. Also Ibid., 25 34.
9. *Jñānārṇava*, 25.35
10. Ibid., 25.38.
11. Ibid., 25.39.

of view of *leśyas*, *ārta dhyāna* is the result of the three inauspicious *leśyas*.[1] The *ārta dhyāna* requires no efforts but proceeds spontaneously from the previous impressions of *karmans*.[2] Its signs are : doubt, sorrow, fear, negligence, dispute, confusion, intoxication, eagerness for mundane pleasure, sleep, fatigue, and unconsciousness.[3]

The raudra dhyāna :

The *raudra dhyāna* is even worse than *ārta dhyāna*. It arises from relishing ideas about sinful violence, falsehood, theft, and preservation of objects of enjoyments; it is found only upto the fifth stage of spiritual development.[4]

The first type, *raudra*, called *hiṁsānandī* means taking delight in killing, crushing, or destroying the living beings either by self or through others[5]. It includes skill in violent actions, advising sins, and association with cruel people.[6] Desire of killing in the battle;[7] taking delight in hearing, seeing or remembering the miseries of sentient beings;[8] being envious of other's prosperity[9] are all included in this type of *Raudra dhyāna*

Mṛṣānandī raudra dhyāna includes falsehood,[10] composing deceptive literature for one's own pleasure,[11] collecting wealth by deceit[12] and deceiving the simple-minded.[13]

Cauryānandī raudra dhyāna includes not only the act of theft but also preaching dexterity in theft.[14]

Viṣayānandī raudra dhyāna includes desire to take posses-

1. *Jñānārṇava*, 25.40.
2. Ibid., 25.41.
3. Ibid., 25.43.
4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.35. Also *Jñānārṇava*, 26.3.
5. *Jñānārṇava*, 26.4.
6. Ibid., 26.6.
7. Ibid., 26.9
8. Ibid., 26.10.
9. Ibid., 26.13.
10. *Jñānārṇava*, 26.16.
11. Ibid., 26.17.
12. Ibid., 26.18.
13. Ibid., 26.19
14. Ibid., 26.24.

sion of all good things of the world[1] and thinking of fighting ferociously for attainment of the objects of enjoyment.[2]

It is obvious that only a man who is fully disciplined can avoid *raudra dhyāna* which persists upto the fifth stage of spiritual development.[3] *Pūjyapāda* has, however, pointed out that the *raudra dhyāna* of a person with right attitude is of less intensity and cannot lead to hellish existence.[4]

Sometimes this *dhyāna* occurs in the monk also on account of the force of previously accumulated *karman*.[5] The *raudra dhyāna* is characterised by cruelity, harshness, deceitfulness, hard-heartedness and mercilessness.[6] The external signs of *raudra dhyāna* are red eyes, curved eyes-brows, fearful appearance, shivering of body and sweating.[7]

The auspicious types of dhyāna

The above-mentioned inauspicious types of *Dhyāna* require no effort and are spontaneous.[8] They do not lead to liberation. It is only the auspicious types of *dhyāna* viz. *dharma dhyāna* and *śukla dhyāna* which lead to liberation.

Requirements for dharma dhyāna :

The aspirant should be possessed of knowledge and detachment, self-control, firm desire for liberation, should be active, calm and steadfast.[9]

Place for dharma dhyāna :

Whether crowded or lonely, any place is fit for meditation, if the mind is firm.[10] But the surroundings also influence the mind.[11] Therefore, that place should be avoided which is inhabited by low people, ruled by a wicked king, and surrounded by hypocrites, highly perverted persons, *Kaulas* and *Kāpālikas*, gamblers and drunkards.[12] In short, all such

1. Ibid., 26·29.
2. Ibid., 26.30-35.
3. Ibid., 26.36.
4. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.35.
5. *Jñānārṇava*, 26 42.
6. Ibid., 26.37.
7. Ibid., 26.38
8. Ibid., 26.43.
9. Ibid., 27.3.
10. Ibid., 28.21.
11. Ibid., 28.22.
12. Ibid., 27.22.

places, where disturbances may be caused by people of reprehensible profession, bad character, women, or animals, should be avoided.[1]

On the other hand, a place which is sanctified by the association of great persons,[2] and is lonely like sea-shore, forest, mountain, island, etc., should be chosen.[3] The place for meditation should not have disturbance by noise, rain or wind.[4]

Postures for dharma dhyīna :

Every place and every posture is suitable for meditation for him, who is detached, steadfast, firm and pure.[5] Yet postures have importance of their own. *Śubhacandra* mentions seven pastures : 1. *paryaṅkāsana*, 2. *ardhaparyaṅkāsana*, 3. *vajrāsana*, 4. *vīrāsana*, 5. *sukhāsana*, 6. *kamalāsana*, 7. *kāyotsarga*.[6] The first and the last of these seven, are specially suitable for the modern age, when people lack energy.[7] The aspirant should face east or north,[8] though there is no such fixed rule.[9] One who has controlled his posture becomes immune from the clemencies of nature.[10] Sitting cross-legged, one should place his left hand on the lap,[11] concentrating his sight on the tip of the nose,[12] and making his face as motionless as the lake with fish asleep.[13]

Other auxilaries of dhyāna :

In *Pātañjala yoga*, much import nce has heen attached to *prāṇāyāma*. In Jainism also, *Śubhacandra* considers control

1. *Jñānārṇava*, 27.28-33.
2. Ibid., 28.1.
3. Ibid., 28.2-4.
4. Ibid., 28.5-7.
5. Ibid., 28.21.
6. Ibid., 28.10.
7. Ibid., 28.12.
8. Iibd., 28.23.
9. Ibid., 28.24.
10. Ibid., 28.32.
11. Ibid., 28.34.
12. Ibid., 28.35.
13. Ibid., 28.36.

over breath of much importance for control over mind.[1] At the same time he also says that controlling the breath may lead to *ārta dhyāna*.[2] Still *Śubhacandra* has devoted a full chapter to describing *prāṇāyāma* of three types, *pūraka*, *kumbhaka* and *recaka*.[3] The main purpose of these *prāṇāyāmas* is to control the mind, and they give power to know the whole world also.[4]

Better than *prāṇāyāma* is *pratyāhāra*, which means concentrating on forehead by withdrawing the senses.[5] Besides, one can concentrate on the eyes, the ears, the tip of the nose, the mouth, the naval, the head, the heart and the place between the two eyebrows.[6]

The object of dharma dhyāna :

Leaving attachment and infatuation, one should cut, as it were, the enemy of *karmans* by the sword of *dhyāna*.[7] The chief object of *dhyāna* is ātman.[8] *Ātman* should strive for the attainment of *paramātmahood*.[9] All these *yonis* are the result of *karmans*, the real self is *siddha* [10] Self is possessed of the four infinitive qualities of energy, knowledge, perception and bliss.[11]

Amongst the objects of *dhyāna* are the sentients and the insentients, their triple nature of continuance, birth and destruction, *arhants* and *siddhas* [12] What is necessary is to distinguish the self from the body.[13] The self should think that he is simply a light which has no foe or friend.[14] He should know that he himself is the object of worship.[15] There-

1. *Jñānārṇava*, 29 2.
2. Ibid., 30.9.
3. Ibid., 29 28.77.
4. Ibid. 29.80-98.
5. Ibid., 30.3-4.
6. Ibid., 30-13.
7. Ibid., 31.3.
8. Ibid., 31.4; 32.1-4.
9. Ibid., 31.9. For the nature of *paramātman* see *Jñānārṇava*, 31.22.41.
10. Ibid., 31.12.
11. Ibid., 31.13.
12. Ibid., 31.17.
13. Ibid., 32.21-24.
14. Ibid., 32.32.
15. Ibid., 32.45.

by he should leave all desire for beauty, age, strength, wealth etc.[1]

Types of dharma dhyāna :

Tattvārthasūtra mentions four types of *dharma dhyāna*. (i) *ajñānavicaya dharma dhyāna*; (ii) *apāya vicaya dharma dhyāna*; (iii) *vipāka vicaya dharma dhyāna*; and (iv) *saṁsthāna vicaya dharma dhyāna*.[2]

(i) *Ajñāna vicaya dharma dhyāna* :—*Ajñāna vicaya dharma dhyāna* means having firm faith in the nature of things as taught in the scriptures composed by the omniscients. It becomes necessary when there is no teacher, one's own intellect is not so subtle, when there is rise of *karmans* and the objects are subtle and when one does not find proper causes and illustrations.[3] Or, the person, who has himself grasped the nature of things, uses *naya* and *pramāṇa* for supporting the truth, is also said to have performed *ajñāna vicaya dharma dhyāna*.[4] All studies of scriptures constitute this type of *dharma dhyāna*.[5]

(ii) *Apāyavicaya dharma dhyāna* :—To think that the perverted souls are opposed to the path of the omniscient, or to ponder over the ways and means of releasing preachers from wrong belief, knowledge and conduct, constitutes *apāya vicaya dharma dhyāna*.[6] To contemplate on seven *tattvas* is also *apāya vicaya dharma dhyāna*.[7]

(iii) *Vipāka vicaya dharma dhyāna* :—It means thinking of the various effects of the *karmans* on the creatures.[8] All pleasures and pains are the result of one's own actions which should be regulated and controlled. All reflections on this aspect are included in this type of *dharma dhyāna*.

(iv) *Saṁsthāna vicaya dharma dhyāna* :—It means reflect-

1. *Jñānārṇava*, 32-55.
2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.36. Also *Jñānārṇava*, 33.5
3. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.36.
4. Ibid., 9.36.
5. *Jñānārṇava*, 33.9.
6. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.36.
7. *Jñānārṇava*, 34.11.
8. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*. 9.36. Also *Jñānārṇava*, 35.1.

ing over the nature and form of the universe with a view of attaining detachment.[1] It includes reflection over the shape of the universe,[2] the seven hells and their miseries,[3] the middle region,[4] the sixteen heavens and their pleasures,[5] and the *Siddha śilā* or the place where liberated souls reside.[6]

Saṁsthāna vicaya dharma dhyāna is again of four types : (A) *piṇḍastha*; (B) *padastha*; (C) *rūpastha*; and (D) *rūpātīta*.[7]

(A) *Piṇḍastha dhyāna* :

Piṇḍastha dhyāna means concentration based on the body. It is possible in the following five ways :[8]

(i) *Pārthivī dhāraṇā* : In this state one has to imagine a peaceful, noiseless and all-white ocean. In the ocean, he imagines a hundred petalled lotus, as wide as *Jambūdvīpa*, and of golden colour. The lotus has the pollen of attachment and attracts the bee of mind. It has the pericarp of yellow colour, on which is made a royal seat. One should imagine himself seated on that seat and should believe that he is capable of destroying all *karmans*.[9]

(ii) *Āgneyī dhāraṇā* : After *pārthivī dhāraṇā*, the aspirant should think of a beautiful sixteen petalled lotus in his navel, each petal having one of the sixteen vowels from '*a*' to '*aḥ*' (अ to अः). He should imagine the pericarp of the lotus with an illuminating '*rhaṁ*' (र्हं) inscribed on it. He should think of a line of smoke arising from the stroke of '*r*' (र्) above the '*ha*' (ह). The fire, then, should be imagined as burning an eight-petalled lotus in the region of heart. This lotus, representing the eight *karmans*, is reduced to ashes. This fire reduces everything, including the body, to ashes and then extinguishes itself.[10]

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra* 9.36.
2. *Jñānārṇava*, 36.1-9.
3. Ibid., 36.10-81.
4. Ibid., 36.82-87.
5. Ibid., 36.88-181.
6. Ibid., 36.182-185.
7. Ibid., 37.1.
8. Ibid., 37.2.
9. Ibid., 37.4-9.
10. Ibid., 37.10-19.

(iii) *Māruti dhāraṇā* : The ashes of the body should be imagined to be carried away by a powerful wind, which moves everything, the army of the gods, *Meru* mountain, clouds, and oceans. Afterwards the wind should be imagined to be peaceful and calm.[1]

(iv) *Vāruṇī dhāraṇā* : Afterwards, the aspirant should think of a sky overcast with clouds having rainbow, lightning and thundering. Then follows, in imagination, a downpour of raindrops as big as pearls. These raindrops wash away the remnants of the ashes of the body.[2]

(v) *Tattvarūpāvatī dhāraṇā* : This includes imagining one's soul to be omniscient, bereft of seven elements of the body. One should think himself to be possessed of all the glories of a *Siddha*. He should think that all his *karmans* have exhausted.[3]

2. *Padastha dhyāna* :

It means concentrating on the syllables of certain *mantras*. Many of the letters are to be imagined inscribed on the various petals of the lotus [4] The *bīja* letter '*Rha*' (र्ह) carries a special significance and *Śubhacandra* gives a detailed process of meditating on it.[5] Similarly, *japa* of *praṇava*,[6] *namokāramantra*,[7] *ṣoḍaśākṣara mantra*,[8] and many other *mantras* of different syllables have been prescribed.

The *japa* of these *mantras* may lead to the attainment of supernatural powers[9] as well as omniscience.[10]

3. *Rūpastha dhyāna* :

It means concentrating on the spiritual qualities of *arhants*. This type of *dhyāna* leads to the realisation of the

1. *Jñānārṇava*, 37.23.
2. Ibid., 37.24-27.
3. Ibid., 37.28-30.
4. Ibid., 38.2-6.
5. Ibid., 38.7-30.
6. Ibid., 38.31-37.
7. Ibid., 38.38-47.
8. Ibid., 38.48-50.
9. Ibid., 38.92.
10. Ibid., 38.93.

ideal on which one concentrates.[1] Here *Śubhacandra* has given a detailed description of the qualities of *arhants*.[2]

4. ***Rūpātīta dhyāna***

Rūpastha *dhyāna* implies concentration on embodied liberated souls, *Arhants*; whereas *rūpātīta dhyāna* implies concentration on disembodied liberated souls, *Siddhas*. Here ***Śubhacandra*** gives a detailed description of *Siddhas*.[3]

The fruits of dharma dhyāna :

The first signs of *yoga* are non-sensuality, health, soft-heartedness, agreeable smell, scantiness of excretion, glory, blissfulness, and clarity of voice.[4] *Dharma dhyāna* leads directly to heavenly pleasures and indirectly to liberation.[5]

Śukla dhyāna :

In *dharmadhyāna*, the consciousness of the distinction between subject and object of knowledge persists; whereas in *śukladhyāna* all conceptual thinking ceases gradually.[6] *Śukla-dhyāna* is so-called, because it emerges when the filth of passions has been destroyed or has subsided.[7]

Śukla dhyāna is possible only for a person with a body of of the best order (*vajravṛṣabha nārācasaṁhanana*) and for one who has the knowledge of the eleven *aṅgas* and fourteen *pūrvas*.[8]

Stage of Śukladhyāna :

With gradual disappearance of conceptual thinking, the *śukladhyāna* has following four stages, the first two of which occur upto the twelfth *guṇasthāna* and the last two only to an omniscient :

1. *Pṛthakatva vitarkasavicāra*

1. *Jñānārnava*. 39.32.
2. Ibid., 39.1-31.
3. Ibid., 40.22-31.
4. Ibid., 41,15(1). Also cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*. 2.13.
5. Ibid., 41.16-27.
6. Ibid., 42.4.
7. Ibid., 42.6.
8. Ibid., 42.5.

2. *Ekatva vitarkavicāra*
3. *Sūkṣmakriyā pratipatti*
4. *Vyuparatakriyānivṛtti.*[1]

1. *Pṛthakatva vitarkavicāra* :

In this stage, all the three types of activities of body, speech and mind (*yogas*) continue and the aspirant shifts from one kind of activity to another,[2] from one substance to another, and from one modification to another.[3] All these stages of thinking depend on the scriptural knowledge.[4] In spite of the fact that the object of thinking changes here, it is called *dhyāna*, because many *dhyānas* together also form *dhyāna*.[5]

2. *Ekatva vitarkavicāra* :

Here only one of the three *yogas* persists[6] and there is no shifting from one object of thinking to another. In this stage also, thinking depends on scriptural knowledge.[7] After this stage, the aspirant becomes omniscient, and all the obscuring *karmans* are destroyed.[8]

3. *Sūkṣmakriyāpratipatti* :

Now only the subtle activities of body persist, and all types of vocal and mental and gross type of physical activities cease. Only the four non-obscuring *karmans*, viz. age-determining, feeling-determining, name-determining and family-determining *karmans*, remain. Now, if the age-determining *karman* has the same length as other three *karmans*, the aspirant attains liberation, but if other *karmans* exceed age-determining *karman*, they are brought in line with the last-mentioned *karman* by means of *samudghāta*.[9] *Śubhacandra* says

1. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.39.
2. Ibid., 9.40. Also *Jñānārṇava*, 42.12.
3. Ibid., 9.44. Also Ibid., 42.16-17.
4. Ibid., 9.43.
5. Ibid., 9.44.
6. Ibid., 9.40.
7. Ibid., 9.41.
8. *Jñānārṇava*, 42.29.
9. Cf. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.44.

that all *Kevalins,* who have an age-determining *karman* of a length of less than a period of six months, have to perform *samudghāta,* whereas other *Kevalins* may or may not perform it.[1] He also gives the process of eliminating the *yogas.* While resorting to gross physical activities, he makes the gross vocal and mental activities subtle; and then resorting to the later, he makes the former also subtle. Resorting to the subtle physical activities, he stops other two activities completely.[2]

4. *Samucchinnakriyā*:

Here all activities stop completely. The soul shines forth in its intrinsic lustre, all *karmans* exhaust, and he leaves his body in the time taken for pronouncing five small letters.[3]

Conclusion :

We have given the description of different varieties of external as well as internal penances in this chapter. In conclusion, we may note the following points:

1. Jainism lays emphasis on penance; but it must be characterised by spiritual awakening, or else it becomes a mere torture of the body (*bālatapa*).

2. Jainism prescribes voluntary infliction of physical pains to a greater extent than other religions. In this respect, it remarkably differs from Buddhism which holds such penances as futile.

3. The transcendental morality culminates in meditation which should never be used as a means for attaining supernatural powers.

4. *Prāṇāyāma, āsana* etc. do not form an essential part of *Jaina Yoga* and are even condemned sometimes from spiritual point of view.

1. *Jñānārṇava,* 42.42.
2. Ibid,, 42.48-50.
3. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra,* 9.44. Also *Jñānārṇava,* 42.53-59.

CHAPTER VIII

STAGES OF SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction :

From the first stage of impulsive life, which is comparable to animal existence, to the ultimate end of liberation, where one attains perfection, the aspirant passes through many stages. Fighting against *karmans*, which have held the soul in check from beginningless time, the aspirant continues his moral struggle till he achieves the state of supra-moral existence of complete harmony Strictly speaking, the stages through which an aspirant passes differ from moment to moment and are therefore innumerable; yet for the sake of convenience and for a better understanding of the process of spiritual development, the *Jaina ācāryas* have described fourteen stages of the spiritual journey, called *guṇasthānas*, which we propose to deal with in the present chapter.[1]

It may be pointed out these fourteen stages of developments do not imply any mechanical process. They merely afford a complete picture of spiritual development from the beginning to the end. Some of these *guṇasthānas*, for example 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th, last for a short duration, not more than a fraction of 48 minutes.[2] This classification is, therefore, more important for reading the psychology of an aspirant in different places of his spiritual *sādhanā*. Many details regarding these *guṇasthānas* belong to the sphere of *karaṇānuyoga* rather than to *caraṇānuyoga*. As we are here concerned only with the ethical implications of these *guṇasthānas*, we will not go into details of such particular as are not connected with our subject.

1. Cf. यावन्तः परिणामास्तावन्त एव गुणा किन्न भवन्तीति चेन्न,
   तथा व्यवहारानुपपत्तितो द्रव्यार्थिकनयसमाश्रयणात् ।
   —*Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.17 (Vol. I, p. 184).
2. Cf. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.8. (pp. 32-33).
   Also *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.5.19-22 (Vol. IV, pp. 350-355).

It may also be pointed out here that there are examples of aspirant, like *Bharata*, who attained liberation within no time of attaining the *samyaktva*.[1] This proves that liberation is not necessarily a slow process. The speed depends on the intensity of the previously accumulated *karmans* on the one hand, and the intensity of earnestness of the aspirant on the other.

The great obstacle 'delusion' (moha):

Before we proceed to describe the stages of development, let us state it clearly that the main enemy of the spiritual progress is delusion (moha). It has two aspects : (1) that which perverts-attitude of soul (*darśanamohanīya*) and (2) that which obstructs right conduct in the form of mental pollution (*cāritra mohanīya*). Once the first type of delusion is removed, the aspirant is bound to get rid of the second type of delusion also. We have already referred to the various sub-varieties of *darśanamohanīya* and *cāritramohanīya*.

It is after subsidence or annihilation of all the three types of *darśanamohanīya* and attainment of the first degree of intensity, *anantānubandhī*, of four *kaṣāyas* that the aspirant comes to the fourth stage of development from where his real struggle begins.

The threefold division of ātman :

Broadly speaking, the *ātman* can be divided into the following three categories according to the position occupied in the laddar of spiritual development :

1. Extrovert soul (*bahirātman*)
2. Introvert soul (*antrātman*).
3. Super-soul (*paramātman*).[2]

Extroversion is to get rid of. Introversion is the means to the goal of the supra-ethical stage, which is the *paramātman*.[3]

Bahirātman :

This is a state of impulsive life of lust and worldly en-

1. *Ādipurāṇa*, 47.395.
2. *Paramātamaprakāśa*, 1.12. Also *Jñānārṇava*, 32.10.
3. *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, 5-8.

joyments. The soul is absolutely ignorant as to its true destiny. It is at animal plane of existence, where indiscriminate and wanton activities predominate. This state can be compared to *saṁsārapragbhāra* of *Yoga* and *pṛthagjana* of *Buddhism*.

A person, identifying himself with the body,[1] relatives and possessions,[2] is afraid of self-destruction at their separation.[3] Even if he performs penances, it is with a view to attain worldly pleasures.[4]

The first three *guṇasthānas* consist of extrovert souls. *Śubhacandra*, while commenting upon *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, says that the *jīvas* in the first, second and third *guṇasthānas* are called *utkṛṣṭa*, *madhyama* and *jaghanya*, *bahirātmans* respectively.[5]

2. *Antarātman* :

With this stage begins the dawn of moral consciousness. Licentious activities are checked by voluntary regulations. This state corresponds to *kaivalyaprāgbhāra* of *Yoga* and *srotāpanna* of Buddhism.

Here the aspirant distinguishes between the self and the non-self.[6] He relinquishes all the eight types of pride.[7] This stage is also classified under three categories. The best type of *antarātman* includes those who observe the five great vows, are steadfast in *dharma* and *śukladhyāna* and overcome all types of *pramādas*. This includes stages from the 7th *guṇasthāna* (*apramattasaṁyata*) to the 12th *guṇasthāna* (*kṣīṇakaṣāya*).[8] The next best type of *antarātaman* includes those who observe the vows of a householder and a stage in the 6th *guṇasthāna*.[9] The lowest type of *antarātman* is of those who, though possessed of right attitude, are devoid of observance of any moral vow.[10]

1. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 193.
2. *Jñānārṇava*, 32.17, 21.
3. Ibid., 32.18.
4. *Samādhiśataka*, 42.
5. *Śubhacandra* on *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 193.
6. *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, 17.
7. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 194.
8. Ibid., 195. Also *Śubhacandra* on it.
9. Ibid., 196.
10. Ibid., 197.

Parmātman :

This stage is the goal of all spiritual exertion. Here all conflicts disappear and the soul shines forth in its natural qualities. This is a state of complete harmony. This state is comparable to *jīvanmukta* and *mukta* of Hinduism and *anāgāmin* and Arhat-ship of Buddhism.

The *jīvanmukta* state can be compared to Arhat, who is an embodied *Paramātman*; whereas the *Siddha* state is the state of disembodied liberation.[1] We have already dealt with the nature of liberated soul in the second chapter. This stage is free from birth, old age and death, where the four infinitive qualities of soul shine forth on account of freedom from all the four *ghātī karmans* in the case of an *arhant* and of all the eight *karmans* in the case of a *Siddha*.[2]

Five labdhis

A soul before attaining right attitude in the fourth *guṇasthāna* passes through stages which are five in number. The first four of them are possible even without right attitude.[3] Therefore, they do not indicate any real spiritual progress. They are ethically important only if they lead to right attitude through the fifth *labdhi*.

1. The first *labdhi* is called *kṣāyopaśama*, which means destruction-cum-subsidence of the kārmic matter.[4] This *labdhi* is not the result of any conscious effort on the part of the aspirant but occurs automatically in the normal course of time.

2. As a result of first *labdhi*, the self inclines towards auspicious types of actions which lead to happiness. This is called *viśuddhi labdhi*.[5]

3. The third *labdhi*, *deśanā labdhi*, means obtaining a teacher who initiates and leads into the nature of six *dravyas* and nine *padārthas*.[6] If no such teacher is available in hell,

1. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* 198.
2. *Niyamasāra*, 176.
3. *Labdhisāra*, Bombay, 1946, 3
4. Ibid., 4.
5. Ibid., 5.
6. Ibid., 6.

then this *labdhi* means inclination towards the true nature of things on account of the impressions of previous births.[1]

4. The fourth *labdhi*, *prāyogya labdhi*, means the capacity to so reduce the duration of all *karmans*, except *āyuḥ karman*, that they are squeezed in the time of crore into crore (*koṭākoṭi*) years and this *labhdi* is possible for *bhavyas* and *abhavyas* alike.[2]

5. The first four *labdhis* are important only if they lead to the fifth, *karana labdhi*. The *karaṇa labdhi* is attained by a *bhavya jiva* only.[3] The *karaṇa labdhi* consists of the following three *karaṇas*.

Three karaṇas :

The soul, through its wanderings, feels sometimes inclined towards self-realisation, but because of the eternal force of passions it is wavering between the right path and the wrong path. This is called *yathāpravṛttikaraṇa*.[4] During this process, whenever the intensity of the bondage of *karman* is lessened the soul faces what is called *granthī*.[5] Once the *granthī* is broken asunder, the soul is sure to get liberation.[6] This process is called *granthibheda* or cutting of the Gordian knot. Some souls come out victorious from this struggle; some accept defeat; and some others remain engaged in the struggle for a considerable period. This struggle is the cause of development. The soul, if successful in this struggle, realises the emptiness of worldly enjoyments and a sense of dissatisfaction with them. The struggle continues in the

1. *Keśavavarṇi* on *Labdhisāra*, Calcutta, 1916,6.
2. *Labdhisāra*, 7.
3. *Gommaṭasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa*, 631
4. *Koṭyācārya* on *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Ratalam, 1936, 1207.
5. गंठित्ति सुदुब्भेओ कक्खडघणरूढगंठिव्व ।
   जीवस्स कम्म जणिओ घण रागद्दोसपरिणामो ॥
   —*Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 1200.
   Also तीइ वि य थोव मित्ते खविए इत्थंतरम्मि जीवस्स ।
   हवइ हु अभिन्नपुव्वो गंठी एवं जिणा बिंति ॥
   —*Śrāvakaprajñapti*, Bombay, Vik. Saṁ. 1961, 32.
6. भिन्नमि तंमि लाभो जायइ परमपयहेउणो नियमा ।
   —Ibid., 33.

apūrvakaraṇa, but this time consciously. As this has never happened before, it is known as *apūrvakaraṇa*.[1] If *yathāpravṛttikaraṇa*, is not followed by *apūrvakaraṇa* and *anivṛttikaraṇa*, it is futile. Even *abhavyas* experience *yathāpravṛttikaraṇa*, but without any use. The *apūrvakaraṇa* further reduces the duration and intensity of *karmans*. This is made possible by the following five processes : (1) *sthitighāta*—destruction in the duration; (2) *rasaghāta*—destruction of the intensity; (3) *guṇaśreṇī*—conversion of *karmans* of longer duration into those having a duration of not more than a *muhūrta*; and (4) *guṇasaṁkramaṇa*—conversion of the *karmans* of intensive degree into those of milder degrees.[2]

The third step is *anivṛttikaraṇa*.[3] Here the struggle ends in favour of the aspirant. The most intense type (*anantānubandhī*) of passions and vision-deluding *karmans* are annihilated and the aspirant reaches the fourth stage of spiritual development.

Two śreṇis :

Before coming to the description of *guṇasthānas*, it will be in the fitness of things to mention that the aspirant ascends the stages of spiritual development either by subsidence (*upaśama*) or by annihilation (*kṣaya*) of karmans.[4] These are called two ladders (*śreṇīs*) of spiritual development.

The aspirants belonging to the first *śreṇī* are those who subside their delusion. The dirt in the bottom comes up in the water, similarly the delusion gives a defeat to the aspiring spirits and they fall down from the arduously attained height. These aspirants cannot go beyond the eleventh stage of development.[5] The other aspirants are those who rise through destruction of delusion.[6] One can climb the ladder of subsidence only twice in one life.

According to the *Karmagrantha*, a person who has climbed

1. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.16 (Vol. I, p. 180).
2. Ibid., 1.9-8 5. (Vol. VI, p. 222).
3. Ibid., 1.9-8.5. (Vol. VI, p. 221).
4. Ibid., 1.9-8.14 (Vol. VI, p. 317).
5. Cf. *Pravacanasāroddhāra*, 700-708.
6. Cf. Ibid., 694-699.

only once the ladder of subsidence can attain liberation in that very life through the ladder of annihilation. But a person, who has climbed the ladder of subsidence twice, has no chance of liberation in that life. According to Canons, however, a soul can climb only one of the two ladders in one life.[1]

Mithyādṛṣṭi guṇasthāna:[2]

This is a state of absolutely perverted attitude. A person in this *guṇasthāna* may even attain heaven, but is far away from liberation. The soul has been rotting in it from time immemorial without knowing the real path.

Though any man with a perverted attitude is equally away from the goal, whatever his external conduct, yet a distinction has to be made between one soul and the other, even in the first *guṇasthāna*. *Muni Śrīyaśovijaya*, in his *Yogāvatāradvātriṁśikā* classifies souls into eight : *mitrā*, *tārā*, *balā*, *dīprā*, *sthirā*, *kāntā*, *prabhā* and *parā*.[3] The first four of them belong to first *guṇasthāna*.[4]

In the very first stage called *mitrā*, the soul gets the first indistinct enlightenment. He serves the ascetics, worships the founders of religion, performs good deeds and shows a sympathy towards the suffering but without making any real distinction between self and non-self. As his desire to know the truth becomes more earnest, the soul enters the second stage of *tārā*. Here the soul is more steady and conscious of its shortcomings.

In the third stage, called *balā*, the evil desires cease and the enlightenment becomes clearer. The fourth stage, called *dīprā*, where the soul, though having a verbal knowledge of the truths of religion, does not understand its reality. He has not as yet come face to face with the reality. The next four stages belong to a soul who has realised the self

Thus we see that even the unveiling of vision-deluding

1. *Śrī Jaina Siddhāntabola saṁgraha*, Vol. V, pp. 83-84
2. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.9.
   Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 8-18.
3. *Yogāvatāradvātriṁśikā*, 25. Quoted by Pt. *Sukhalāla*, *Jaina dharma aura darśana*, Ahmedabad, 1957, p. 268.
4. Ibid., 28. ff.

karmans is not a sudden phenomenon. It may be noted here that the conduct of a person in these four stages can not be termed as right as it does not necessarily lead to liberation.[1] It is only after cutting the Gordian knot (*granthibheda*) through *anivṛttikaraṇa* that one attains the real spiritual insight.[2] Till then, we can compare his condition with that of a wanderer who is sometimes nearer the real path sometimes away from it. But in no case does he find it. His coming nearer the real path is useful only if he finds it; otherwise he is again lost in the thickness of the jungle. We have spoken of the types of *mithyātva* in the second chapter.

It may be interesting to note here that amongst those who get liberation even *anyaliṅgasiddhas* or those wearing the dresses of other religions are included.[3] Commentaries on *karmagranthas*, however, make it clear that every word of the *Jaina* scriptures must be believed by a *samyagdṛṣṭi*.[4]

For those souls who are *abhavya* or *jātibhavya* and will never get liberation,[5] the first *guṇasthāna* has neither beginning nor end; for those who get liberation it has no beginning but end and for those who having broken the knot, again descend to first stage, it has a beginning as well as an end. As every soul has some element of purity in it, this stage, though of complete darkness, is also considered to be *guṇasthāna* in as much as it has also a ray of purity, just as even though the rays of the sun and the moon are completely obscured by clouds yet we cannot say that the light has been completely destroyed.[6] If there had been a complete destruc-

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 28.30. Also *Gommaṭasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa*, 12.
2. Supra, p. 209.
3. Śrī *Jaina Siddhāntabola saṁgraha*, Vol. V, p. 119.
4. यतो भगवदर्हत्प्रणीतं सकलमपि द्वादशाङ्गार्थमभिरोचयमानोऽपि यदि तद् गदितमेकमप्यक्षरं न रोचयति तदानीमप्येष मिथ्यादृष्टिरेवोच्यते ।
   —*Karmagranthaṭikā*, Vol. II, Quoted by *Muni Nathamala*, '*Jaina darśana ke maulika tattva*', Vol. II, p. 449.
5. Cf. *Virasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.141. (Vol. I, p. 394). Also *Śrāvakaprajñapti*, 66-67.
6. तथाहि समुन्नतातिबहलजीमूतपटलेन दिनकररजनीकरकरनिकरतिरस्कारेऽपि नैकान्तेन तत्प्रभानाशः संपद्यते....
   —*Karmagrantha*, Vol. II, Quoted by *Muni Nathamala*, '*Jaina darśana ke maulika jñaptitattva*'. Vol. II. p. 449.

tion of knowledge *Jīva* would have become *ajīva*.[1]

2. *Sāsvādana-samyagdṛṣṭi-guṇasthāna*[2] :

The soul while falling from fourth *guṇasthāna* to the first makes a sojourn through this *guṇasthāna*. This is a stage not of development but that of degradation. A soul which has attained *Aupaśamikasamyaktva* (i.e. subsided vision—deluding *karman* temporarily), at the rise of life-long, intense types of four passions, falls to the first stage. In this process of degradation, he passes through this stage. He has an indistinct idea of *samyaktva* for a very short period (one *samaya* to six *āvalis*) before he reverts to *mithyātva*. The soul in second stage invariably falls down to the first stage. But this stage has an indistinct element of *samyaktva* and, therefore, is considered to be higher than the first *guṇasthāna*. Just as a person who has tasted something sweet (like *khīra* etc.) and then vomitted it out feels a strange taste of sweetness, similarly the soul in this stage has a strange feeling of *samyaktva*. Because of the existence of this taste it is called *sāsvādana*.[3] The *Bṛhatkalpa-bhāṣya* gives another two examples. Just as a person falling from a ladder stays for sometimes in the vaccum, before coming to the earth, a person falling from *samyaktva* to *mithyātva* also experiences an admixture of the two for some time.[4] Another example is that of a person who has tasted sugar. He goes to sleep but has not completely slept. In that state, he still feels the sweetness of sugar indistinctly. Similar is the case with the soul in the second *guṇasthāna*.[5]

3. *Samyag mithyādṛṣṭi guṇasthāna* :[6]

This is a stage of uncertainty and tension. Due to the

1. *Karmagrantha*, Vol. II, Quoted by Muni Nathamala *Jaina darśana ke Maulika tattva* Vol. II. p. 449.
2. *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.10 (Vol. I, p. 163). Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 19-20.
3. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, Vol. I, 128.
4. Ibid., 126. Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 20.
5. Ibid., 128.
6. *Vīrasena* on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.11 (Vol. I, p. 166). Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 21-24.

rise of *miśramohanīyakarmans*, the soul remains indifferent to truth. It neither believes nor disbelieves it.

After this stage, a soul may ascend to true belief or may descend to false belief. Either a person may ascend to this third stage or a person may descend from some higher stage to this stage. It is, therefore, a stage of development as well as of degradation, according to circumstances. This stage has been compared to curd mixed with sugar which has sour as well as sweet taste.[1]

4. *Aviratasamyagdṛṣṭi guṇasthāna*[2] :

An aspirant having firm belief in truth attains this stage. The *anantānubandhi* category of passions is subdued and only the weak form, called *apratyākhyānavaraṇ kaṣāya*, remains which does not last more than a year. We have already dealt with the character of an *aviratasamyagdṛṣṭi*. In this *guṇasthāna* on account of *apratyākhyānakaṣāya*, the existence of the aspirant is not able to observe any moral vows. Therefore, he is called *avirata*.

Here the aspirant realises for the first time that the sensual pleasures, for which he strives so much, are only temporary, finite and painful in the end. Still he cannot leave them.[3]

The moral condition of an aspirant in the fourth stage can be compared to the state of *Duryodhana*, who said "I know the truth but I cannot follow it; I know the falsehood but I cannot shun it."[4]

Morally, a man in the fourth stage is still not mature, yet this stage is very important in as much as it indicates the beginning of real spiritual exertion.

5. *Deśasaṁyata guṇasthāna*[5] :

Here the stoppage of karmans begins. With the removal

1. *Gommaṭasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa*, 22.
2. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭakhaṇḍāgama*,, 1.1.12 (Vol. I, p. 170), Also *Gommaṭasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa*, 27-29.
3. *Gommaṭasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa*, 29.
4. Cf *Muni Nathamala*, *Jaina darśana ke maulika tattva*, p. 301.
5. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.13. (Vol. I, p. 173), Also *Gommaṭasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa*, 30-31.

of *apratyākyāna kaṣāya* the aspirant takes partial vows. This *guṇasthāna* includes not only those persons who inhabit the houses but also the person who leaves the house but cannot take to monkhood. Thus the highest type of a *śrāvaka* is he who neither does, nor makes others do, any prohibited action. We have already dealt with the eleven stages of this *guṇasthāna* at the end of the fifth chapter.

6. *Pramatta saṁyata guṇasthāna*[1] :

After subduing the third degree of passion viz. *pratyākhyānavaraṇa*,[1] when only *saṁjvalana* type remains, the aspirant joins the order of mendicants. He observes complete restraint but is still open to such negligences as pride, enjoyments of senses, passions and sleep. The partial peace that one gets in the fifth stage of spiritual development inspires him to adopt complete self-control and to proceed towards self-realisation. Now he relinquishes all social obligations and joins the order of mendicants to devote his entire time and energies to the supreme goal. He abstains not only from killing harmless animals but even harmful animals. He does not take even a trivial things without the permission of the owner. He does not hold any property at all. Thus, even though self-controlled, he is not free from negligence. There is no appearance of *Pratyakhyānavaraṇa kaṣāya* and only *saṁjvalana* form of *kaṣāya* remains Due to *saṁjvalana* form of *kaṣāya* and existence of negligence, the energy of the soul is not fully expressed. We have already dealt with the conduct of a monk, who begins his life from this *guṇasthāna*, in the sixth chapter.

7. *Apramattasaṁyata guṇasthāna*[2] :

When negligence, which is the cause of small defects in the sixth stage, is removed, the soul ascends to the seventh *guṇasthāna*. In this stage, the aspirant wins the three stronger types of sleep, viz. *nidrānidra*, *pracalāpracala* and *styānagṛddhi*. He

1. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.14 (Vol. I, p. 175), Also Ibid., 32-33.
2. Ibid., 1.1.15 (Vol. I, p. 178).
Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 45-48.

tries to overcome the milder types of passions also and is always struggling against them. His condition is comparable to that of a log of wood moving up and down with the rise and fall of the waves.

8. *Nivṛttibādara guṇasthāna*[1] :

Here the soul comes out successful in the struggle going on in the seventh *guṇasthāna*. The soul ascends positively either of the two *śreṇies* described in the beginning. Uptil the seventh stage the soul follows the path of *kṣayopaśama*. This means that *anantānubandhikaṣāya* etc. are neither completely repressed nor destroyed uptil the seventh stage. These *kaṣāyas* do rise in the previous *guṇasthānas* but without the fruit-giving potency. Thus the soul is able to reduce the effect of *karmans* in the four ways mentioned earlier in the beginning of this chapter. In the eighth *guṇasthāna*, the soul adopts *apūrvakaraṇa*. Those who are in the *upaśama śreṇī*, remain in the eighth *guṇasthāna* minimum for a *samaya* and maximum for *antarmuhūrtta*; and those who are in the *kṣapakaśreṇī* for *antarmahūrtta*. Here anger and pride disappear.

9. *Anivṛtti-sāmparāya guṇasthāna*[2] :

Through the four ways mentioned above, the progress becomes automatic and uniform in cases of all aspirants Anger and pride have already disappeared; now deceit disappears and three types of sexual desires also subside. In this stage, the struggle for spiritual progress comes to an end in the sense that the aspirant has not to make any conscious efforts for progress. His progress becomes automatic. Here the soul performs the process of *anivṛttikaraṇa*. In this stage, there is still a fear of attack of gross passions. Therefore, this is called *bādarasāmparāya* in contradistinction to the next stage, *sūkṣma sāmparāya*, where only subtle types of greed can occasionally disturb the peace of soul.

1. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.15 (Vol. I, p. 183).
   Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 50-54.
2. Ibid., 1.1.17 (Vol. I, p. 183).
   Also Ibid., 56-57.

10. *Sūkṣmasāmparāya guṇasthāna*[1] :

As indicated already, only subtle form of greed remains in this *guṇasthāna*. This greed means the subtle attachment of the soul with the body. Here the soul, following the *upaśama śreṇi*, ascends to the eleventh *guṇasthāna* and those following the *kṣapakaśreṇī* directly ascend to the twelfth *guṇasthāna*.

11. *Upaśāntamohanīya guṇasthāna*[2] :

This is the highest stage which can be reached on the *upaśamaśreṇī*. Only the *upaśamakas* ascend this *guṇasthāna*. It lasts minimum for one *samaya* and maximum for *antarmuhūrtta*. The soul in this *guṇasthāna* does not go further. As aspirant from this *guṇasthāna*, descends either to the sixth or fifth or fourth or first *guṇasthāna*. But, ultimately within a period of *ardhapudgalaparāvarta* he again becomes a *kṣapaka* and attains liberation.

12. *Kṣiṇakāṣāyachadmastha vitarāga guṇasthāna*[3] :

Here the *mohanīya*, which is the main obstruction, is completely destroyed. The *kṣapaka* comes directly to this stage without going to the eleventh stage. After remaining *antarmuhūrtta* in this stage, he becomes omniscient without fail and ascends to the thirteenth stage. In the penultimate *samaya*, the first two kinds of sleep (*nidrā* and *pracalā*) are eliminated. In the last *samaya* of this stage, five types of *Jñānāvaraṇī*, *darśanāvaraṇī* and *antarāya karmans* are completely annihilated.

13. *Sayogakevali guṇasthāna*:[4]

As soon as the *ghātikarmans* are destroyed at the end of the twelfth *guṇasthāna*, the four infinities (*anantajñāna*, *ananta*

1. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.18 (Vol. I, p. 187), Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 58-60.
2. Ibid., 1.1.19 (Vol I, p. 188). Also Ibid., 61.
3. Ibid., 1.1.20. (Vol. I, p. 189). Also Ibid., 62.
4. *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.21 (Vol. I, p. 190). Also *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 63, 64.

vīrya, *ananta darśana* and *ananta sukha*) are obtained. It may be mentioned that it is only in this *guṇasthāna* that the *jñānāvaraṇikarmans* are removed. The actual struggle consists of conquering the passions. Hence the importance of conduct rather than that of knowledge in Jainism. Here only the *Yoga*, out of the four causes of bondage, remains. But the bondage lasts only for two *samayas*; and that bondage relates only to four *aghāti karmans* viz. *vedanīya*, *āyuṣ*, *nāman* and *gotra*. Due to the existence of these *karmans*, the soul has bodily existence and can be compared to *jīvanmukta* of *Vedānta*.

14. *Ayogakevali guṇasthāna*:[1]

At the end of the thirteenth stage, the aspirant prepares himself for salvation. In case the duration of *Vedanīya*, *nāman* and *gotra* is longer than that of *āyuṣ*, he equalises these *karmans* by a process called *samudghāta*. Then the soul proceeds to check the three *yogas* also. This is done in the following order.

The gross mental and vocal activities are checked by gross physical activities, which are checked by subtle physical activities in turn. Subtle physical activities also check subtle mental and vocal activities. The subtle physical activities are checked by *sukṣmakriyānivṛtti* type of *śukladhyāna*. Here the subtle activity of body is checked by itself. This *dhyāna* also makes the soul contract and fill up the cavities of body The soul is thus reduced to two-third of its previous volume. Then the soul enters the last type of *śukladhyāna* which is called *samucchinna kriyātipāti*, which stops all activities and leads to what is called *śaileśikaraṇa* i.e. a state of complete motionlessness. This state lasts for only as much time as is required to pronounce five short vowels. At the end of this period the soul leaves the embodied state for ever and goes straight above, to the end of the universe, to enjoy its inherent blissfulness for ever.

1 *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.22. (Vol. I, p. 192). Also Ibid., 65.

Conclusion :

In *Jainism* the spiritual progress begins from right faith. Right faith leads to avoidance of sins. Avoidance of sins makes a man vigilant. Vigilance leads to passionlessness and passionlessness leads to cessation of *karmans*. This, in short, is the path to liberation.

CONCLUSION

We have studied in the foregoing chapters the ethical principles of Jainism and compared them with those of Hinduism and Buddhism, with which it came into close contact. We find that the 'unity in diversity' found in Indian culture, is as much true in the sphere of ethics also. There has been much give-and-take between these religions; and the virtue of non-violence may be mentioned as the greatest contribution of Jainism to the current of Indian thought.

The history of Jaina ethics is a fine example of what the *Jainas* hold to be the nature of reality, viz., continuity in change. We have noticed during our study that the fundamentals of Jaina ethics have remained unchanged through all these years, though the rules of code of conduct have shown some modification, which we have noted here and there, specially while dealing with the conduct of a house-holder and a monk.

It may also be noted here that though the rules of conduct as prescribed by Jainism and recorded by us appear to be too elaborate and sometimes even superfluous, yet the basic idea behind these rules is that of self-realisation. When there is a feeling-realisation of the true nature of the self and when one is completely lost in the bliss of self-meditation, the observance of all the moral rules becomes spontaneous, coming from within and not being an imposition from without.

Though we have already recorded our conclusions at the end of every chapter, and sometimes even at the end of our discussion of a particular topic, yet no ethical study could be useful unless it provided an answer to the problems with which our lives are beset. We are, therefore, tempted to conclude our discussion with a few observations on how the principles of Jaina ethics could be helpful in solving the problems of humanity at large.

The problems ot human life arise out of various factors, which can be classified under the following broad heads :

1. Scarcity.
2. Injustice.
3. Ignorance.
4. Selfishness.

Scarcity

In spite of the great strides of science and technology, we know that humanity suffers from scarcity. Science tries to solve this problem in its own way by inventing tools for increasing production, by improving means of comforts and luxuries, and by developing new means of fighting against the furies of nature. But we know that apart from the scarcity caused by natural circumstances, there is also an artificial scarcity created by indulgence into such selfish tendencies as hoarding and profiteering not only by individuals but by nations also, trying to expand and wanting to occupy others' territories by force.

'The greater the possessions, the greater the happiness' is the motto of many. Jainism teaches us quite the opposite : 'the lesser the possessions the greater the happiness'. Happiness comes from what we are and not from what we possess. We should realise the blissful nature of the self, become free and be not the slaves of worldly objects. This puts an end to the struggle for wealth and other possessions. For those who can reach the highest stage of monkhood, scarcity becomes a self-imposed virtue followed voluntarily in pursuance of complete freedom from bondage; for those who cannot attain that height, limitations of possession, coupled with a sense of detachment towards what one has, is recommended. The idea behind the vow of non-possession is not a morbid feeling of self-mortification but a sense of, and belief in, the inherent bliss of the self.

The answer of Jainism to the problem of scarcity is : Be not attached to the worldly objects; be not their slaves; turn to the self within wherefrom comes the true happiness. This does not imply a life of inertia, but that of contemplation and contentment.

What is true of the individual is true of the nations. The glorification of a king who desires to conquer others' territory (vijigīṣu), though very common in other ancient

Indian literature, is foreign to Jaina literature; the greed for expansion is unmistakably condemned in the too well-known story of *Bharata* and *Bāhubali*.

Injustice

The bigger fish swallow the smaller ones. The mighty and the aggressive prosper, the humble and the meek suffer. The result is the rule of jungle. In the sphere of politics we kill and crush in the name of caste, creed and colour. The result is war and bloodshed.

Jainism brings us hope of justice in the form of doctrine of karman. As we sow, so shall we reap. Though there is no God who sits upon judgment on us, there is a law, based on the theory of cause and effect, which works automatically and unfailingly.

All life is equal and the stronger have no right to do any injustice to the weaker; and if they do, they do not harm anybody but themselves. Ill-feeling vitiates our moral structure first; it harms anybody else afterwards. To kill a man with a hot rod of iron, the killer will burn his own hands first before he can kill the other. It is not so much out of regard for the life of others that we are forbidden to kill, as out of regard for our own selves.

We should meet an injustice not with force but with forbearance. Enmity leads to enmity: but if we do not retaliate it, it subsides. The attitude of equanimity of *Pārśva* to *Dharaṇindra* and *Kamaṭha*, when the former tried to save him from the latter who tried to kill, beautifully illustrates the *Jaina* attitude.

Jainism has also opposed from the beginning any social injustice arising out of casteism or racialism. 'Mankind is one community', says *Jinasena*.[1]

Mahātmā Gāndhi successfully applied the creed of non-violence to redress the injustice of one nation against another. The creed of non-violence, if applied to the international problems, has the potentiality of wiping out the institution of war from the surface of earth.

1. मनुष्यजातिरेकैव ।

—*Ādipurāṇa*, 38.45.

Thus the answer of Jainism to the problem of injustice is four-fold : doctrine of *karman*, equality of life, non-violence and, equanimity.

Ignorance

In spite of the spread of education in modern times, the problems of life seem to multiply rather than decrease. Of what use is knowledge which binds us rather than liberate ?

Jainism teaches us that all knowledge is relative and co-related. Let us be receptive to, every thought. Let us not assume the attitude of finality about our knowledge. One-sided attitude only complicates problems rather than solve them. It does not give us any solution to such ethical questions as 'determinism' and 'freedom of will'. Non-absolutism shows us the path of synthesis among fate and human effort; faith, knowledge and action; and supra-moral plane of life and practical code of morality.

The answer of Jainism to the problem of knowledge is represented in its doctrine of non-absolutism.

Much of misunderstanding between one nation and the other could be solved if we could adopt the attitude of non-absolutism on political problems.

Selfishness

Selfishness lies at the root of all problems. All immoral practices arise out of selfish nature of man.

Selfishness can be overcome by realising the true nature of self. According to *Vedānta*, the individual self (*ātman*) is identical with the universal self (*brahman*); and the summum bonum of life is to realise this identity. This broadens our outlook and lifts us above selfishness. Buddhism, on the other hand, asks us not only to destroy our ego but also to believe that the self, for which we struggle so much, is a non-entity. Both of these views represent idealism, whereas Jainism is a realistic system. It propounds that the self is a real, permanent entity and that each soul has a distinct existence. What Jainism lays down is neither a belief in the unity of life nor in the non-entity of the self, but a distinction between the self (*jīva*) and the non-self (*ajīva*) and a victory over passions

which are based on a false conception of the identity of the two.

An ordinary *Jaina* (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) is not allowed to indulge in feelings of anger, pride, hypocrisy and greed continuously for more than a year, a householder at an advanced stage (*śrāvaka*) for more than four months, and a monk for more than fifteen days. Perfection or liberation is attained when these feelings are completely overcome; and not, as the *Vedānta* will have us believe, when the self merges into the universal self; or, as the Buddhism believes, when it is annihilated. We need not discard commonly experienced, separate, existence of the self.

The above ethical idea, which Jainism gave with reference to individual *sādhanā*, could be interpreted afresh in the context of modern day problems to suggest that all nations could also maintain their individuality, and yet live in peace and harmony if negative ideas of anger, pride, hypocrisy and greed could be renounced. It could, thus, teach the possibility and utility of co-existence in modern times and bring the hope of a brighter future for war-ridden humanity of to-day. If *Jaina* ethics could bring home to us that alone, its purpose will be more than achieved.

APPENDIX

ETHICAL LITERATURE OF THE JAINAS

The history of the Jaina literature begins from *Mahāvīra*. The tradition mentions that a bulky literature classified under fourteen heads, called *Pūrvas*,[1] existed even before *Mahāvīra*,[2] but unfortunately that literature became extinct as early as 182 B.C. according to *Digambara* tradition,[3] and in 473 A.D. according to *Śvetāmbara* tradition.[4]

The post *Mahāvīra* literature can be classified under two heads : (i) canonical literature; and (ii) non-canonical literature. The canonical literature can again be classified into two categories :

(i) *Aṅgapraviṣṭa*, which consists of the twelve *Aṅgas*, the essence of which is claimed to have been imparted to his eleven principal disciples, known as *gaṇadharas*,[5] by Lord *Mahāvīra* himself.

(ii) *Aṅgabāhya*, which includes the composition by later *ācāryas* also and consists of twelve *Upāṅgas*, six *Chedasūtras* and four *Mūlasūtras*.[6] The *Digambaras* disown the extant canonical literature, which, according to them, was gradually lost by 156 A.D.[7] Besides the canonical literature, there is a vast non-canonical literature of both the sects of Jainism.

The whole of the *Jaina* literature, is, again, classified under four *anuyogas*, based on the subject-matter with which each one deals.[8]

1. *Nandīsūtra*, *Rājakoṭa*, 1958, p. 634.
   Also *Siddhāntasārādisaṁgraha*, Bombay, Vik. Sam. 1979, *Aṅgaprajñapti*, 2.1-117.
2. Jaina, H.L., *Bhāratīya saṁskṛti meṁ Jainadharma kā yogadāna*, Bhopal, 1962, pp. 51-53.
3. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Amaravati, 1939, Vol. I, *prastāvanā*, p. 26.
4. *Bhagavatīsūtra*, Ahmedabad. Vik. Sam., 1988, 20.8.9.
5. *Nandīcūrṇī*, *Ratalam*, 1928, p 6.
6. *Nandīsūtra*, pp. 524-547.
7. *Kaṣāyaprābhṛta*, Mathura, 1944, Vol. I, *prastāvanā*, p. 49. For canonical literature of the *Digambaras*, see further.
8. *Bhadrabāhu* on *Daśavaikālikasūtra*, Ahmedabad, 1932, *gāthās*, 3-4.

(i) The literature dealing with ethical aspect is called *Caraṇakaraṇānuyoga*. The *Digambaras* call it simply as *Caraṇānuyoga*.

(ii) The literature dealing with metaphysical problems is called *dravyānuyoga*.

(iii) The biographies of religious personalities are included in *dharmakathānuyoga* or *prathamānuyoga*.

(iv) The works dealing with mathematics are called *gaṇitānuyoga*. The *Digambaras* have *karaṇānuyoga*, as the fourth *anuyoga*. *Karaṇānuyoga* deals with the details of doctrine of *karman*.

It would be interesting to know that *Caraṇānuyoga*, which has a direct bearing on ethics is given the highest place and the other *anuyogas* are considered only subsidiary to it.[1]

The Aṅga literature

The *Aṅgas*, composed in *Ardhamāgadhī* language and twelve in number, are supposed to have been passed down from generation to generation by oral transmission till *Bhadrabāhu*, who belonged to the 8th or 7th[2] generation following *Mahāvīra*, and died 170[3] or 162[4] years after him (357 B C. or 365 B.C.) according to *Śvetāmbara* and *Digambara* tradition, respectively.

Redaction of Āgamas

Council of Pāṭaliputra (4th Cent. B C.) :

The *Cūrṇī* on *Āvaśyaka* informs us that at the time of *Bhadrabāhu*, there was a wide-spread famine, lasting for twelve years. This meant a disturbance in the study of *Jaina* scriptures. After the end of the said famine, the monks of *Jaina Saṁgha* assembled at *Pāṭaliputra* and recollected the first eleven *Jaina Aṅgas* but could not recollect the twelfth

1. चरणकरणानुयोगश्चाचारादिकः, स च प्रधानतमः शेषाणां तदर्थत्वात् ।
   —*Śīlāṅka* on *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, Calcutta, Vik Saṁ. 1936. p. 3.
2. Vide infra, p. 229.
3. *Pariśiṣṭaparva*, Bhavanagar, Vik. Saṁ. 1968, 9.112.
4. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*. Vol. I, *Prastāvanā*, p. 26.

Aṅga, dṛṣṭivāda.[1] *Bhadrabāhu*, who was practising *Mahāprāṇa* penance at *Nepāla*, knew *dṛṣṭivāda* and agreed to teach it, at the instance of *Saṁgha*, to 500 *Sādhus*, only *Sthūlabhadra* among whom could stay to the last. But even he, out of 14 *pūrvas*, which formed part of the last *Aṅga*, could learn only 10 *pūrvas* completely; the last four *pūrvas* were taught to him verbally, without giving their meanings. With the death of *Sthūlabhadra* in 215 *Vīra Nirvāṇa Saṁvat*[2] (312 B.C.), the knowledge of these last four *Pūrvas* was lost for ever, because he was debarred from teaching these by *Bhadrabāhu*.[3] After this, the knowledge of *pūrvas* was gradually on decay, and the last *ācārya*, *Vajra*, who knew 10 *pūrvas*, died in 584 *Vīra Saṁvat* (57 A.D.). According to *Śvetāmbaras*, these *pūrvas* were completely lost in *Vīra Saṁvat* 1000 (473 A.D.).[4] According to *Digambaras*, the last *Ācārya*, who knew 10 *pūrvas*, was *Dharmasena*, who died in 345 *Vīra Saṁvat* (182 B.C.), when the knowledge of the *pūrvas* was completely lost.[5]

According to *Digambara* tradition, after the death of *Dharmasena* (182 B.C.), five more *ācāryas* possessed the knowledge of eleven *Aṅgas* for 220 years more (i.e. upto 38 A.D.), after which four *ācāryas* possessed the knowledge of the first *Aṅga*, *Ācārāṅga* only, for 118 years more (i.e. upto A.D. 156).[6] After this period, only a small part of *Aṅgas* existed, the rest of it being lost for ever.

The *Śvetāmbara* tradition, however, does not agree with it. It holds that though the last *Aṅga*, *Dṛṣṭivāda*, was lost in 473 A.D., yet the remaining eleven *Aṅgas* are available to us. It is, however, true that all the *Aṅgas* handed down to us are not the result of the first council of *Pāṭaliputra*.

Council of Mathurā (4th Cent. A.D.) :

In the time of *Skandila Sūri* (*Vīra Saṁvat* 827 to 840

1. *Jinadāsagaṇimahattar*, on *Āvaśyaka*, Ratlam, 1928, part II. p. 187.
2. Referred to as '*Vīra Saṁvat*' hereafter.
3. *Muni Kalyāṇa, Vijaya Vīra nirvāṇa saṁvat aura Jaina kālagaṇanā*, Jalore, Vik. Sam. 1987, pp. 98-103.
4. Kapadia, H.R., *A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas*, Surat. 1941, pp. 73-74.
5. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Vol. I, *prastāvanā*, p. 26.
6. *Kaṣāyapāhuḍa*, Vol. I, *prastāvanā*, p. 49.

i.e. 300 A.D. to 313 A.D.),[1] there was again a famine for 12 years, after which the monks again met at a council in *Mathurā* under the headship of *Skandila Sūri* and recollected *Āgamas* into what is known as *Kālikasūtra*. Some hold that it was not *Sūtra* literature but *Anuyogas* which were in a danger of being lost and were therefore taught by *Skandila* to others.[2]

Council af Valabhi (4th. Cent. A.D.):

Almost at the same time as that of *Skandila Sūri*, *Nāgārjuna Sūri* held another council at *Valabhī*. The recensions of canons codified by this council, many times differed from those of the *Mathurā* recension.[3]

Council of Valabhī (6th Cent. A.D.):

The fourth and the last council was held under the presidentship of *Devarddhi Gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa* in *Vīra Saṁvat* 980 (553 A.D.) according to the followers of *Skandila*, in Vīra Samvat 993 (466 A.D.) according to the followers of *Nāgārjuna*.[4] It was at this council that the *Āgamas* assumed their present form.

Thus the story of the redaction of *Jaina* Canons which represent the direct teachings of *Mahāvīra*, is very interesting. To facilitate the comparison of the traditions of *Śvetāmbaras* and *Digambaras*, we give below a chart of the *ācāryas*, according to both of them, in their chronological order :

Digambara Tradition[5]	*Śvetāmbara Tradition*[6]
Lord *Mahāvīra* (527 B.C.)[7]	Lord *Mahāvīra* (527 B.C.)[7]

1. Kapadia, H.R., *A History of the Canonical Literature of Jainas*, p. 61, footnote 4.
2. *Nandicūrṇi*, p. 8.
3. *Muni Kalyāṇa Vijaya*, *Vīranirvāṇa Saṁvat aura Jaina kālagaṇanā*, pp. 110-111.
4. Kapadia, H.R., *A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas*, p. 63.
5. Cf (i) *Trilokaprajñapti*, Sholapur, 1943, part I, 4.1476-1491.
   (ii) *Vīrasena* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, 1.1.1. (pp. 65-66).
   (iii) *Vīrasena* on *Kaṣāyapāhuḍa*, 1.1. (pp. 84-87).
   (iv) *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṁgraha*, *Śrutāvatāra* (*Indranandī*), Bombay, *Vik. Sam.* 1975, verses 72-83 (p. 80).
   (v) Ibid., *Śrutaskandha*, pp. 158-159.
6. Cf. (i) *Nandīsūtra*. *Sthavirāvali*, *Gāthās*, 25-50.

(Contd. on the next page)

A. *Kevalins*

Gautama	12 years[1]	
Sudharmā	12 ,,	

B. *Śruta kevalins*[2]

Jambu	38 years	
Viṣṇu	14 ,,	
Nandīmitra	16 ,,	
Aparājita	22 ,,	
Govardhana	19 ,,	
Bhadrabāhu	29 ,,	(365 B.C.)[3]

C. *Daśapūrvadharas*[4]

Viśākhācārya	10 years
Proṣṭhila	19 ,,
Śrotriya	17 ,,
Jayasena	21 ,,
Nāgasena	18 ,,
Siddhārtha	17 ,,
Dhṛtisena	18 ,,
Vijaya	13 ,,
Buddhiliṅga	20 ,,
Deva	14 ,,
Dharmasena	(182 B.C.)

D *Ekādaśāṅgadhārī*[6]

Nakṣatra
Jayapāla
Pāṇḍu
Dhruvasena

A. *Kevalins*

Sudharmā	20 years
Jambu	44 ,,

B. *Śruta kevalins*[2]

Prabhava	11 years
Śayyambhava	23 ,,
Yaśobhadra	50 ,,
Sambhūtivijaya	8 ,,
Bhadrabāhu	(357 B.C.)
Sthūlabhadra	(312 B.C.)[4]

C. *Daśapūrvadharas*[4]

Mahāgiri	30 years
Suhastin	46 ,,
Guṇasundara	44 ,,
Kālaka	41 ,,
Skandila	38 ,,
Revatīmitra	36 ,,
Āryamaṅgu	20 ,,
Āryadharmā	24 ,,
Bhadragupta	39 ,,
Śrīgupta	15 ,,
Vajra	(57 A.D.)[5]

(A list of all the *ācāryas*, after *Vajra*, is not available. The most important of them in their chronological order are given below :

(ii) *Muni Kalyāṇa Vijaya*, *VīraNirvāṇa Saṁvat aura Jaina kālagaṇanā*, pp. 119-131.

7. Year of death.

1. Period for which an *ācārya* remained as the head of the Saṁgha.
2. They knew all the twelve *aṅgas* with fourteen *pūrvas*.
3. Though he himself knew all the *pūrvas* he was not allowed to teach the last four *pūrvas*. Cf. supra, p. 227.
4. They knew only ten *pūrvas*.
5. He was the last to know the ten *pūrvas*.
6. Those who knew the eleven *Aṅgas*.

Kaṁsācārya (38 A.D.)	*Āryarakṣita* (70 A.D.)[3]
E. *Ācārāṅgadhārī*[1] *Subhadra*	*Puṣpamitra* (70 A.D.)[4] *Skandila* (300 A.D.—313 A.D.)[5]
Yaśobhadra	*Nāgārjunīya* (about 300 A.D.)[6]
Yaśabāhu	*Devardhi Gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa*
Lohācārya (156 A.D.)[2]	(527 A.D.)[7]

The extant Āgamas

The *Āgamas*, which were lost according to *Digambara* tradition gradually by 156 A.D., were put into their final shape in 527 A.D. according to *Śvetāmbara* tradition. Without going into the sectarian question of the authenticity of these *Āgamas*, we may point out that almost all scholars agree on four points about the extant *Āgamas*:

(i) These *Āgamas* do contain, directly and indirectly, some of the teachings of *Mahāvīra*.

(ii) There were certain changes in, and additions to, these *Āgamas* as they were remodelled in the four councils.[8]

(iii) Though they took their final shape as late as 527 A.D., yet many of them can be easily ascribed to a period much earlier than that, as early as 3rd cent. B.C.[9]

(iv) All the *Āgamas* are not the work of *gaṇadharas*. For example, *Daśavaikālika*, is ascribed to *Āryaśyāma*; the

1. Those who knew the *Ācārāṅga* only.
2. The *Digambaras* hold that after him the knowledge of *Aṅgas* was completely lost. They disown the *Aṅgas* codified at *Valabhī* by *Devardhi Gaṇi Kṣamā śramaṇa*.
3. He knew nine *pūrvas* completely and 24 *yavikās* of the 10th *pūrva*.
4. He was taught the first nine *pūrvas* by *Āryarakṣita* but could not remember all of them.
5. Head of *Mathurā* Council.
6. Head of the first *Valabhī* Council.
7. Head of the second *Valabhī* Council.
8. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Calcutta, 1933, Vol. II, p. 434.
9. Max Müller (ed.), *SBE*, Vol. XXII, Introduction, Oxford, 1884. p. XLIII.

Piṇḍaniryukti and *Oghaniryukti* to *Bhadrabāhu*; the third *Mūlasūtra* to *Śayyambhava*; and the *Nandī* to *Devardhi*.[1]

It is needless to go, here, into such questions of detail, as to whether the number of *Āgamas* is 32 or 45 or 48.[2] The extant *Āgamas* include 11 *Aṅgas*, 12 *Upāṅgas*, 10 *Prakīrṇas*, 6 *Chedasūtras*, 1 *Nandīsūtra*, 1 *Anuyogadvāra* and 4 *Mūlasūtra*. In this extant literature, apart from the *āvaśyaka* formulae, the most ancient style presents itself in the *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the *Uttarādhyayana*, the old *Chedasūtras*, the *Ṛṣibhāṣita* and in portions of the *Daśavaikālika*.[3] Fortunately for us, these most ancient portions of the Āgamas are those which deal with *Jaina* ethics primarily. In fact, it is but natural that the *Jaina* monks, with utmost devotion to conduct, preserved that portion of *Āgamas* with greatest care which dealt with conduct.

With these general remarks about the chronology and position of *Āgamas*, we proceed to present a brief survey of the individual works of *Jaina* canonical literature, keeping in view their importance as a source-book of *Jaina* ethics.

(i) *Ācārāṅgasūtra* :

Ācārāṅga is the first and the most important *Āgama*. It contains pithy sentences which directly touch the soul and appear to be the instruction of Lord *Mahāvīra* himself. It is the earliest authoritative source-book for *Jaina* ethics. It's first *Śrutaskandha*, containing nine *adhyayanas* of which only eight are available at present, is earlier than the 2nd *śrutaskandha* containing three *cūlikās*.[4]

Śilāṅka in his commentary takes the last but one verse of the first *śruta skandha* to be the *maṅgala* at the end, which shows that he also considered second *śrutaskandha* to be a later addition.[5] The 2nd *śrutaskandha* was added to the original *Ācārāṅga* before *Bhadrabāhu* wrote his *Niryukti* on

1. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 433.
2. *Daśavaikālika*, Calcutta, *Vik. Sam.* 2020, *bhūmikā*, pp. 9-12.
3. Schubring, W., *The Doctrines of the Jainas*, Delhi, 1962, p. 82.
4. Max Müller, (ed) *SBE*, Vol. XXII, Introduction, p. XLVII.
5. Max Müller, (ed.) *SBE*, Vol. XXII, Introduction, p. XLVII.

Ācārāṅga.[1] Some hold that the first *adhyayana* of the first *śrutaskandha* is the oldest of all.[2]

As regards the date of *Ācārāṅga*, Jacobi has placed it in the first part of the 3rd century B.C.[3]

Among the commentaries of *Ācārāṅga* may be mentioned *Niryukti* by *Bhadrabāhu* in about 367 *gāthās*, *Ṭīkā* by *Śīlāṅka* (876 A.D.) and *Dīpikā* by *Jinahaṁsa*. Velankar has mentioned as many as thirteen commentaries.[4]

(ii) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*:

Sūtrakṛtāṅga, the second *Aṅga*, is later than *Ācārāṅga*.[5] It has two *śrutaskandhas*. Jacobi[6] and Winternitz[7] agree in assigning the second *śrutaskandha* to a later period.

Niryukti by *Bhadrabāhu* is the oldest commentary on *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* followed by *Śīlāṅka's* (876 A.D.) commentary on it. Then comes the *Dīpikā* of *Harṣapāla* (1517 A.D.). Besides *Niryukti* and *Cūrṇi*, Velankar mentions seven more commentaries.[8]

As the purpose of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* according to *Samavāyāṅga*, is 'to fortify young monks against the hererical opinions of alien teacher,'[9] it is but natural that it must contain, in the main, refutation of heretical sects. Amongst these heretical sects,[10] the sects of *Purāṇa Kāśyapa* and *Makkhali Gosāla* are of special ethical interest.

(iii) *Sthānāṅga*:

Sthānāṅga is divided into ten *sthānas*. This *aṅga* contains 783 *sūtras*. In the ten *sthānas*, each *sthāna* gives the name of such objects as can be divided into the same number of classes. The first *sthāna*, for example, enumerates such objects

1. Kapadia, H.R., *A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas*, p. 112.
2. Ibid., p. 114.
3. Max Muller, (ed.) *SBE*, Vol. XXII, Introduction. p. 43.
4. Velankar, H.D., (ed.), *Jinaratnakośa*, Poona, 1944, p. 23-24.
5. Max Muller (ed.), Vol. XLV, Introduction, p, XXXVIII.
6. Ibid., p. XXXIV.
7. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 438.
8. Velankar, H.D., (ed.), *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 450-51.
9. Max Müller (ed.), *SBE*. Vol. XLV, Introduction, p. 38.
10. Cf. Sen, Amulyacandra, *Schools and Sects, in Jaina Literature*, Calcutta, 1931. Also Vide supra. pp. 17-18.

as have one class, and the tenth the objects which have ten classes. Thus, attempts have been made to cover the whole *Jaina* philosophy under divisions and subdivisions of objects. This *aṅga* contains many important facts about things which are not religious. It says, for example, that there are three types of trees, four types of *Alaṅkāras*, five types of livelihood, six types of *Ārya* families, seven types of *Gotras*, eight types of *Āyurveda* and so on.

Abhayadeva's (1063 A.D.) *Vṛtti* is the most important commentary on this aṅga. Velankar mentions six more commentaries on *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*.[1]

(iv) *Samavāyāṅga* :

Samavāyāṅga contains 275 *sūtras*. This aṅga is a continuation of the third *aṅga*, giving the objects having one to *sāgropamakoṭākoṭi* varieties.

This *aṅga* is important in giving us the contents of the twelfth *aṅga*, *dṛṣivāda* and fourteen *pūrvas* which are lost to us. This *aṅga* is also important as a source of ancient Indian culture as it contains much material about secular subjects from 246 *sūtra* to 275 *sūtra*. Like *Sthānāṅga*, this *sūtra* also helps us in giving the varieties of various moral qualities.

Abhayadeva (1063 A.D.) wrote a *Vṛtti* on this *sūtra*. Velankar mentions two more commentaries on it.[2]

(v) *Vyākhyāprajñapti* :

It contains mostly dialogues between *Mahāvīra* and *Gautama*, his principle disciple.

W. Schubring has pointed out that sections 1 to 20 form the germ of the whole whereas sections 24 and 30 as such and 21 to 23, 26 to 29, 31 and 32, 33 and 34, 35 to 40 form groups of uniform contents.[3]

Abhayadeva wrote a *Vṛtti* (1071 A.D.) on this *Aṅga*. Velankar mentions ten commentaries more on this *Aṅga*.[4]

1. Velankar, H.D., (ed.), *Jinaratnakośa*, pp. 454-455.
2. Ibid., p. 420.
3. Schubring, W., *The Doctrines of the Jainas*, p 88.
4. Velankar, H.D. (ed.), *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 290-291.

(vi) *Jñātādharmakathā* :

Divided into two *śrutakhaṇḍas*, this Aṅga gives us stories with a moral purpose behind them. The 8th *Adhyayana* of the *Jñātādharmakathā* carries a special significance in describing the 19th *Tīrthaṅkara* as a female. Obviously this goes against *Digambara* tradition which holds the 19th *Tīrthaṅkara* to be a male and does not accept the possibility of a woman getting liberation.

(vii) *Upāsakādhyayana* :

This *Aṅga* is supplementary to *Ācārāṅga* from the point of view of *Jaina* ethics. The former deals with the conduct of an ascetic whereas the latter deals with the conduct of a house-holder by relating ten stories of righteous house-holders.

This work is important ethically as it gives us details about right attitude, and the twelve vows of a householder together with their transgressions.

Besides commentary of *Abhayadeva* (1060 A.D.), Velankar mentions five commentaries more.[1]

(viii) *Antakṛtadaśāṅga* :

It has eight *vargas* containing 10, 8, 13, 10, 10, 16, 13 and 10 *adhyayanas* respectively. It gives the stories of those who attained liberation. This *aṅga* gives us *Jaina* version of the story of *Kṛṣṇa*. Almost in all stories, we find many descriptions of long penances. We find an interesting account of ten types of penances whose explanation involves mathematical arrangement of numbers, of meals and fast days, in different permutations and combinations.

Abhayadeva wrote a *Vṛtti* on this *aṅga* also. There seems to be no other commentary on this work.

(ix) *Anuttara Upapātikadaśā* :

This *aṅga* gives the story of those who have gone to heaven, known as *Anuttara Vimāna*, from where they will have to assume human body for one time only before attaining liberation. This *aṅga* is divided into three *vargas*, each *varga* having 10, 13 and 10, *adhyayanas* respectively. In this *aṅga*

1. Velankar, H.D. (ed.), *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 55-56.

also, we find that full stories are not given. In the first *adhyayana* of the 3rd *varga* graphic descriptions of the penances of *dhanya* have been given.

(x) *Praśna-Vyākaraṇa* :

It is divided into two *śrutakhaṇḍas*. Each *śrutakhaṇḍa* has five *adhyayanas*. The first *śrutakhaṇḍa* deals with *āśrava* and the second with *saṁvara*. These two *tattvas*, *āśrava* and *saṁvara*, which deal with the inflow of *karmas* and their stoppage respectively are very important for understanding the moral teachings of Jainism.

Besides the *ṭīkā* by *Abhayadeva*, Velankar mentions seven more commentaries on this *Aṅga*.[1]

(xi) *Vipākasūtra* :

The two *śrutaskandhas*, each having ten *adhyayanas*, of this *Aṅga* give the pleasant and unpleasant consequences of our actions respectively. The first *śrutaskandha* thus brings out the immorality of tyrannising, flesh-eating, egg-selling, sexual indulgence and human sacrifices, etc. The second *śrutaskandha*, on the other hand, praises such qualities as giving of alms.

Besides *Vṛtti* of *Abhayadeva*, Velankar mentions one more commentary on this work.[2]

(xii) *Dṛṣṭivāda* :

As already mentioned, this *Aṅga*, together with 14 *pūrvas*, which formed its part, was lost in 1000 *Vīra Saṁvat*. *Nandīsūtra* says that it has five divisions—*Parikarma*, *Sūtra*, *Pūrvāgata*, *Anuyoga* and *Cūlikā*[3]—dealing with mathematics, *Nayas*, *pūrvas*, life-stories of great persons, and *mantra vidyā*, respectively.

The Upāṅgas

The *Upāṅgas*, occupy a secondary position as compared to the above-mentioned *Aṅgas*. Some of these *Upāṅgas* are works of little ethical interest. *Sūryaprajñapti* and *Chandra-*

1. Velankar, H.D. (ed.), *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 274-275.
2. Ibid., p. 357.
3. Jain, J.C., *Prākṛta sāhitya kā itihāsa*, Varanasi, 1961, p. 102.

prajñapti, for example, are works of astronomy. *Jambūdvīpa-prajñapti* deals with *Jaina* cosmology. Nevertheless these *Upāṅgas* sometimes furnish us with ethical material. *Aupapātika*, for example, gives us stories which elaborate and illustrate the doctrine of *karman*. *Rājapraśnīya* deals with materialism as against spiritualism; *Jīvābhigama* with categories of *jīvas*. Rest of the *Upāṅgas* contain many mythological stories.

The Chedasūtras :

Literally the word '*cheda*' means 'cut'. It refers to 'cut' in the period of *dikṣā* as a sort of punishment to a monk. As a result, he has to pay respects to his juniors. The *Chedasūtras*, six in number, are valuable for the study of *Jaina* ethics, for though many of them belong to a fairly later age, they deal, in detail, with the rules of conduct of a monk, specially with expiation (*prāyaścittas*) for various violations of moral rules. Besides, these *Chedasūtras* are important to know the organisation of *Jaina* monasticism.

(i) *Niśītha* :

The word '*Niśītha*' means 'night'. The word is perhaps allegorically applied to denote punishment which was treated as secret and not announced in the assembly. It contains 20 *uddeśas*. It is considered to be the second *cūla* of *Ācārānga*. It is also known as *Ācārakalpa*. It gives atonements and penances to be prescribed by the *ācārya* for transgressions of a moral rule by the monks. It is important to know the daily routine of a monk's life.

(ii) *Mahāniśītha* :

The original *Mahāniśītha* is said to be lost; it was restored by *Haribhadra Sūri*. It also deals, together with other sundry matters, with consequences of evil deeds, atonement and confession.

(iii) *Vyavahāra* :

Consisting of ten *uddeśakas*, it is said to have been composed by *Bhadrabāhu*. It gives the rules for *ācārya* and *upādhyāya* in detail. It also gives the syllabus for the study of *Āgamas* for a monk.

(iv) *Daśaśrutaskandha*:

It is also said to be composed by *Bhadrabāhu*, and known by the name of *Ācāradaśā*. It has ten *adhyayanas* and deals with the hindrances in the moral life of a monk. It gives eleven *pratimās*, the stages of spiritual practices for a householder. The *kalpasūtras*, forming its 8th section, deal with the life-story of *Mahāvīra*.

(v) *Kalpa* :

Composed by *Bhadrabāhu* and consisting of six *uddeśakas*, it seems to be a fairly old account of the conduct of a *Jaina* monk. It deals specially with the regulations regarding food, begging, and mutual co-operation of *Jaina* monks. It is termed as *Bṛhatkalpasūtra*, as distinguished from *Kalpasūtras*, forming part of the original *Daśaśrutaskandha*.

(vi) *Pañcakalpa*:

The *Pañcakalpa Sūtra* having been lost, *Jītakalpa Sūtra* of *Jinabhadra gaṇi kṣamāśramaṇa* is taken to be the sixth *cheda-sūtra*. It deals with the ten traditional *prāyaścittas*.

The Mūlasūtras

The *Mūlasūtras*, four in number, are important to know the fundamentals of *Jaina* ethics. They specially deal with asceticism.

(i) *Uttarādhyayana* :

Consisting of 36 *adhyayanas*, it is a *sūtra* of multiple authorship. Leaving aside the 29th *adhyayana* and the beginning portions of the 2nd and 16th *adhyayanas*, the rest of the work is written in verses. Winternitz compares it with *Dhammapada*, and *Suttanipāta*.[1] He has rightly called it 'one of the most valuable portions of the canon.'[2]

Besides the moral teachings which stories like that of *Hari Keśin* bear, it enunciates such ethical principles as that of forbearance, voluntary death. celibacy, vigilance and penance. It also contains spiritual explanation of sacrifices

1. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 467.
2. Ibid., p. 466.

and teaches us that caste is based on actions and not on birth.

(ii) *Daśavaikālika* :

The work, a composition of *Śayyambhava* (429 B.C.), consists of ten *adhyayanas* and two *cūlikās*, all of them dealing with the conduct of a monk in a poetical way.

The importance of *Daśavaikālika* can be well imagined from the fact that, after its composition, it took the place of *Ācārāṅga* in the curriculum of study for monks.[1]

Its fourth, fifth and seventh *Adhyayanas* are believed to have been taken from *Ātmapravāda*, *Karmapravāda* and *Satyapravāda*, respectively; the rest of the *Adhyayanas* have been derived from *Pratyākhyānapūrva*.[2]

(iii) *Āvaśyaka* :

This deals with the six essential duties of a monk which should be daily performed by him. There is a huge exegetical literature on this *Mūlasūtra*; including *Niryukti*, *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* by *Jinabhadra*, and *ṭikās* by *Haribhadra* and *Malayagiri*. *Śiṣyahitā* by *Hemacandra Maladhār* in is a commentary upon *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*.

(iv) *Aughaniryukti or Piṇḍaniryukti*:

There is difference of opinion about the fourth *Mūlasūtra*. Some take both *Aughaniryukti* and *Piṇḍaniryukti* to be the fourth *Mūlasūtra* whereas others accept either of the two as the *Mūlasūtra*. *Piṇḍaniryukti* deals specially with the rules regarding begging of food by a *Jaina* monk.

Ten Prakīrṇakas:

There is no uniformity regarding the list of these *Prakīrṇakas*. The list of 84 *Āgamas* includes as many as 30 *Prakīrṇakas*. The following ten, however, are mostly included in the traditional list of *Prakīrṇakas* :

1. *Daśavaikālika*, *Bhūmikā*, p. 16.
2. *Bhadrabāhu* on *Daśavaikālika*, 16-17.

1. *Catuhśaraṇa*, 2. *Āturapratyākhyāna*, 3. *Mahāpratyākhyāna*, 4. *Bhaktaparijñā*, 5. *Tandulavaicārika*, 6. *Saṁstaraka*, 7. *Gacchā cāra*, 8. *Gaṇividyā*, 9. *Devendrastava*, 10. *Maraṇa samādhi*.[1]

These *Prakīrṇakas* contain, respectively, 63, 70, 142, 172, 586, 123, 137, 82, 307 and 663 *Gāthās*. The first and ninth of these *Prakirṇakas* are attributed to *Vīrabhadra*. The first of these *Prakīrṇakas* deal mainly with devotion, *Arhanta*, *Siddha* and *Sādhus*; the second with voluntary death; the third with vow; the fourth again with voluntary death; the fifth with *brahmacarya*; the sixth with process of voluntary death; the seventh with rules regarding the behaviour of monks and nuns; the eighth with astrology; the ninth with the praises of 24 *tīrthaṅkaras*; the tenth with twelve *anuprekṣās* and voluntary death.

Cūlikāsūtras :

The word '*cūlikā*' means 'appendix'. The two *cūlikā-sūtras*, *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra*, are the latest parts of the *Āgamas*.

Nandī is the work of *Deva Vācaka* (3rd cent. A.D.).[2] It gives a long list of *Sthaviras* and classification of *Āgamas*.

Anuyogadvāra is the work of *Ārya Rakṣita* (5th cent. A.D.)[3] which deals with many secular matters like grammar and politics together with moral material of little originality.

Exegetical literature on Āgamas

We have noted above a view of the important commentaries on the eleven *Aṅgas*. There are many commentaries on the *Angabāhya* canonical literature, also. Many of these commentaries are no less important than the original as belonging to pre-Christian era. The *Saṁskṛta* commentaries are our main help in understanding the original *sūtras* in *Ardhamāgadhi*. Some of the main commentaries and their authors may be mentioned here :

1. Jaina, J.C., *Prākṛta sāhitya kā itihāsa*, p. 123.
2. Kapadia, H.R., *A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas*, p. 165.
3. Ibid., p. 165

1. *Niryukti* :

The *Niryuktis* are ascribed to *Bhadrabāhu*, who seems to be a different person from the author of the *Chedasūtras* and died in 297 B.C. Leumann holds that the present *Niryuktis* were composed in about 90 A D.[1] At present we have *Niryuktis* on *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Vyavahāra*, *Kalpa*, *Daśaśrutaskandha*, *Uttarādhyayana*, *Āvaśyaka*, and *Daśavaikālika*. We have already referred to *Piṇḍaniryukti* and *Aughaniryukti*, which are considered to be *Mūlasūtras*.

2. *Bhāṣya* :

Like *Niryuktis*, these *Bhāṣyas* are also written in *Prākṛta* verses. Many times it has led to the intermingling of the two. *Bhāṣya* on *Kalpa*, *Vyavahāra* and *Niśītha* are attributed to *Saṅghadāsa Gaṇī* and *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* to *Jinabhadra*. There are *Bhāṣyas* on *Pañcakalpa*, *Jītakalpa*, *Uttarādhyayana*, and *Daśavaikālika* also.

3. *Cūrṇī* :

The *Cūrṇis*, written partly in *Saṁskṛta* and partly in *Prākṛta*, are the forerunners of the *Saṁskṛta Ṭikās*. Kapadia informs us that the *Cūrṇis* are available on *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Vyākhyāprajñapti*, *Kalpa*, *Vyavahāra*, *Niśītha*, *Pañcakalpa*, *Daśaśruta*, *Jītakalpa*, *Jīvābhigama*, *Jambudvipaprajñapti*, *Uttarādhyayana*, *Āvaśyaka*, *Daśavaikālika*, *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra*.[2] These *Cūrṇis* also help us in interpreting the *Jaina Āgamas*. These are mostly ascribed to *Jinadāsagaṇī Mahattara*. Leumann ascribes *Āvaśyaka Cūrṇī* to 600-650 A.D.[3]

4. *Ṭīkā*:[4]

Beginning from *Haribhadra Suri* (705-775 A.D.), who wrote *Saṁskṛta Ṭikās on Āvaśyaka*, *Daśavaikālika*, *Nandī* and *Anuyoga*, there was a chain of *Saṁskṛta* commentators. *Śīlāṅka Sūri* (862 or 872 A.D.) is said to have written commentaries on all the *Aṅgas*, but only the first two are available to us.

1. Schubring, W., *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, p. 84.
2. Kapadia, H.R., *A History of Indian Literature of the Jainas*, p. 190.
3. Schubring, W., *The Doctrine of the Jainas*. p. 85.
4. Jaina, J.C., *Life in Ancient India*, Bombay, 1947, p. 42.

Śāntisūri (11th cent. A.D.) wrote a commentary on *Uttarādhyayana* in *Saṁskṛta*. *Nemicandra Sūri* (11th. A.D.) also wrote a commentary on *Uttarādhyayana*. *Abhaya Deva Sūri* (11th cent. A.D.) wrote commentaries on the last nine *Aṅgas*. *Malayagiri* wrote commentaries on six *Upāṅgas* from second to seventh, and also on *Vyavahāra Bhāṣya*, *Piṇḍa Niryukti*, *Āvaśyaka*, *Bṛhatkalpa Bhāṣya* and *Nandī*. The last mentioned work was completed in 1235 A.D.

Besides, we may mention, *Vijaya Vimala* (1578 A.D.), *Śānti Candra* (1594 A.D.) and *Samaya Sundaragaṇī* (17th cent. A.D.) as some of the commentators on *Āgamas*.

Non-Canonical literature of the Śvetāmbaras

Besides the canonical literature, there is a vast literature of *Śvetāmbara* sect covering every branch of knowledge. Herebelow we survey the most important works on *Jaina* morality in *Prākṛta* and *Saṁskṛta*.

1. *Śrāvakaprajñapti and Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti* :

The history of non-canonical literature of *Śvetāmbaras* begins with *Umāsvāti*, to whom the authorship of *Tattvārthasūtra* and *Śrāvakaprjñapti* is attributed. The former of these, as quite convincingly proved by R. Williams, seems to belong to the *Digambara* tradition from the point of view of its contents,[1] and shall be dealt with under *Digambara* literature.

Śrāvakaprajñapti, on the other hand, is certainly a *Śvetāmbara* text. R. Williams thinks that it must be attributed to some author other than that of *Tattvārthasūtra*.[2] Though *Abhayadeva*, in his commentary on *Pañcāśaka*, refers to a *Śrāvakaprajñapti* of *Umāsvāti*,[3] and *Yaśovijaya* and *Municandra Sūri* also refer to a *Śrāvakaprajñapti* of *Umāsvāti*, yet *Abhayadeva* himself refers to the second *gāthā* of the present *Śrāvakaprajñapti* as that of *Haribhadra*. Dr. Hiralala Jaina,

1. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, London, 1963, p. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
3. वाचकतिलकेन श्रीमदुमास्वातिवाचकेन श्रावकप्रज्ञप्तौ ।
   सम्यक्त्वादि: श्रावकधर्मो विस्तरेणाभिहित: ।।
   Quoted from Jaina, H.L., *Bhāratīya Saṁskṛti meṁ Jainadharma kā yogadāna*, p. 110.

therefore, ascribes this work to *Haribhadra* (8th cent. A.D.). Velankar also informs that one of the manuscripts of the private library of *Śrī Haṁsavijayajī Mahārāja* ascribes it to *Haribhadra*.[1] R. Williams, however, ascribes this work to *Umāsvāti*, who must be a different *ācārya* from the author of *Tattvārthasūtra*, and must have lived not later than the fifth century A.D.[2]

Consisting of 400 verses, it gives us the nature of *samyaktva* and *vratas* with their *aticāras*.

Haribhadra Sūri and his works :

Haribhadra Sūri is a versatile writer. He is said to have composed 1444 works. He tried to Brahmanise Jainism. He gave us a concept of *Jaina* society. To him are ascribed *Pañcavastuka* and *Samyaktvasaptati*, which deal with the conduct of a monk, and *Śrāvakadharmavidhi* and *Pañcāśikā prakaraṇa*, dealing with the conduct of a householder.

Pañcavastuka, consisting of 1714 *gāthās* is a comprehensive work dealing with the (1) Initiation into monkhood (2) Daily routine of a monk (3) Conduct of *gaccha* (4) *Anujñā* and *sallekhanā* (i.e. voluntary death).

The *Samyaktvasaptati* deals with *samyaktva* by giving examples of various saints.

Śrāvakadharmavidhi, consisting of 120 *gāthās*, deals with the life and conduct of a householder. Some idea as to the contents of *Pañcāśikās* can be had from their titles given below :

(1) *Śrāvakadharma* (2) *Dīkṣāvidhāna* (3) *Vandanavidhi* (4) *Pūjāvidhi* (5) *Pratyākhyānavidhi* (6) *Stavavidhi* (7) *Jinabhavanakaraṇavidhi* (8) *Pratiṣṭhāvidhi* (9) *Yātrāvidhi* (10) *Upāsakapratimāvidhi*, (11) *Sādhudharma* (12) *Samācārī* (13) *Piṇḍavidhi* (14) *Śīlāṅgavidhi* (15) *Ālocanāvidhi* (16) *Prāyaścitta* (17) *Sthitāsthitavidhi* (18) *Sādhupratimā* and (19) *Tapovidhi*.

R. Williams attributes the *Pañcāśikas* to an earlier *Haribhadra*, whom he calls *Haribhadra Virahāṅka*, and places him in 529 A.D,[3] whereas the rest of the works he ascribes to

1. Velankar, H.D. (ed), *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 393.
2. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, p. 4.
3. Ibid., p. 5.

Haribhadra Yākinīputra, whom he places, following *Muni Jina-vijaya*, in 750 A.D.[1]

Siddhasena Gaṇi and his commentary on Tattvārthasūtra

After the *Svopajñabhāṣya* of *Umāsvāti*, the most authoritative *Śvetāmbara* commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* is that of *Siddhasena Gaṇi*, who gives us much information on the *aticāras* of *vratas*. R. Williams places him in the 8th century A.D.[2]

Devagupta

He wrote *Nava-pada-prakaraṇa* in which he tried to explain each *vrata* from nine points of views. He is also said to have written *Nava-tattva-prakaraṇa*. He composed his first work in 1016 A.D.[3]

Śānti Sūri

He is the author of *Dharma-ratna-prakaraṇa*, consisting of 181 *gāthās*. It deals with the conduct of a householder and monk. *Śānti Sūri* died in about 1040 A.D.[4]

Deva Sūri

He was the disciple of *Vīracandra Sūri* and wrote his work *Jīvānuśāsana* in 1105 A.D.[5] This work deals with the conduct of a *Jaina* monk. It consists of 323 *Gāthās*.

Nemicandra and his Pravacanasāroddhāra

Nemicandra wrote *Pravacanasāroddhāra*, which is an encyclopaedia of *Jaina* religion and philosophy. It deals almost with all topics of the code of conduct of a *Jaina* monk, in about 1600 *gāthās*.

R. Williams says that *Nemicandra* is not later than the

1. Williams, R. Jaina Yoga, p. 6. For a summary of the views about the date of *Haribhadra* Cf. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*. Vol. II, p. 479, f.n.1.
2. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, p. 7.
3. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 588.
4. Ibid., p. 486.
5. *Jaina, H. L. Bhāratīya Saṁskṛti* [illegible]

12th century A.D.[1] *Siddhasena Sūri* wrote a *Saṁskṛta* commentary, *Tattvajñānavikāsinī*, on it in *Vik. Saṁvat* 1242.[2]

Hemacandra and his Yogaśāstra

The knowledge of *Hemacandra* is so comprehensive that he is styled as *Kali-kālasarvajña*. He contributed to almost all branches of knowledge of his time.

Yogaśāstra or *Adhyātmopaniṣad* is the great monumental work of *Hemacandra* on the conduct of a householder and a monk. It consists of about 1000 verses with a *Svopajña* commentary, which is much more informative than the original. *Hemacandra* has vast knowledge of *Brāhmaṇism* also.

The special interest of this work lies in the detailed description of meditation and its attributes, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra* and *dhāraṇā*. These descriptions are very much influenced by the *Jñānārṇava* of *Śubhacandra* though some of the scholars seem to believe just the reverse.

The personality of *Hemacandra* assumes a special interest in view of the part he played in the political set-up of *Gujarāta* through his patron, *Kumārapāla* He lived between 1089 and 1172 A.D. He completed his *Yogaśāstra* in about 1160 A.D.

Yaśovijaya

After *Hemacandra*, many minor works of authors like *Devendra*, *Dharmaghoṣa* and *Ratnaśekhara* supply material regarding *Jaina* ethics. But the last and the most important of these authors is *Yaśovijaya*, who lived from 1624 to 1688,[3] and whose commentary on *Dharmasaṁgraha* is the last authoratative work on *Jaina* ethics.

Literature of Digambaras

Canonical literature

1. *Kaṣāyaprābhṛta of Guṇadhara* :

In tenth century A.D., *Indranandī* in his *Śrutāvatāra* has

1. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, p. 10.
2. Velankar, H.D., (ed.). *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 271.
3. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 593.

said that there is no ascetic to give the lineage of *Guṇadhara*.[1] He also tells us that *Arhadbali*, whose time according to *Prākṛta Paṭṭāvalis*,[2] is 152 B.C. (565 *Vira Nirvāṇa Saṁvat*), gave the name of *Guṇadhara Saṁgha* to one of the *Saṁghas* of *Jaina* ascetics.[3] *Parmānanda Śāstri* has compared many passages of *Kaṣāyaprābhṛta* with those of *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* to prove that the former was composed before the latter and was the first of all scriptures of *Digambara* tradition. He has assigned this work to the 2nd century B.C.[4] Dr. *Nemi Candra* ascribes it to 1st century A.D.[5]

Kaṣāyaprābhṛta contains 233 *gāthā-sūtras* which are very precise and are classified under fifteen *adhikāras*. This book is also known as '*Pejjadosapāhuḍa*', after the name of the third sub-chapter of the tenth chapter of the fifth *pūrva*, *jñāna-pravāda* '*Pejjadosa*' means attachment and aversion, which are dealt with in this book with reference to their importance in the *Jaina* doctrine of *karman*.

Indranandī tells us that *Āryamaṁkṣu* and *Nāgahasti* wrote commentaries on *Kasāyapāhuḍa*.[6] Another commentary available on *Kasāyapāhuḍa* is that of *Yativṛṣabha*,[7] who is placed in the 6th century A.D. by J.C. *Jaina*.[8] *Ācārya Vīrasena* wrote a big and comprehensive commentary, *Jayadhavalā*, on the original *Kaṣāyapāhuḍa* and *Cūrṇi Sūtra* of *Yatiwṛṣabha*, which was completed by *Jinasena*, the teacher of *Amoghavarṣa*, a king of *Rāṣṭrakūṭa* in the year 759 of *Śaka* era in *Vaṭagrāmapura*.[9]

2. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama and Mahābandha of Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali*

Puṣpadanta and *Bhūtabali* were taught the scriptures by *Dharasenācārya*. *Śrutāvatāra* of *Indranandī* mentions *Arhad-*

1. *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṅgraha*, *Śrutāvatāra* (*Indranandi*), 151.
2. *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Vol. I, *Prastāvanā*. p 26
3. *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṅgraha*, *Śrutāvatāra* (*Indranandi*), 94.
4. "*Anekānta*", *Vira Sevā Mandira, Delhi*, year 14, *Kiraṇa* I, (August, 1956), pp. 8-10.
5. *Śāstri*, *Nemicandra*, *Prākṛtabhāṣā aura sāhitya kā ālocanātmaka itihāsa*, Varanasi, 1966, p. 213.
6. *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṅgraha*, *Śrutāvatāra* (*Indranandi*), 154.
7. Ibid., 155.
8. Jaina, J.C., *Prākṛta sāhitya kā itihāsa*, p. 291.
9. *Kaṣāyaprābhṛta*, *prastāvanā*, p. 72.

bali, *Māghanandī* and *Dharasena*, one after another, without showing their relation to each other.[1] *Prākṛta Paṭṭāvalī*, however, mentions them as successors of each other. We have already referred to the time of *Arhadbali* as 152 B.C. If we subtract from it the time of *Arhadbali*, *Māghanandī* and *Dharasena*, which is 28, 21 and 19 years respectively, the time of *Puṣpadanta* comes to 84 B.C.; and if we further subtract 30 years of *Puṣpadanta*, the time of *Bhūtabali* comes to 54 B.C.[2] Dr. Nemicandra ascribes it to the first century of *Śaka* era.[3] The sixth *khaṇḍa* of *aṭkhaṇ S'ḍāgama* is composed by *Bhūtabali* alone and is termed as *Mahābandha* and is not commented upon.

Saṭkhaṇḍāgama gives us details about fourteen *guṇas thānas*, which are quite important from ethical point of view. *Vīrasena* wrote a commentary on the first four *khaṇḍas* of *Saṭakhaṇḍāgama* also, which is called *Dhavalā*. According to the *Praśasti*, this commentary was completed in 816 A.D.[4] *Vīrasena* has quoted not only *Digambara* books but also *Śvetāmbara Āgamas* like *Ācārāṅga*, *Bṛhatkalpasūtra*, *Daśavaikālikasūtra*, *Sthānāṅgaṭīkā*, *Anuyogadvāra* and *Āvaśyakaniryukti*.[5] This is a proof of his non-approach. *Vīrasena* refers to the opinion sectarian of *Nāgahasti* as following the tradition of the ancient *ācāryas*.

Besides *Dhavalā*, commentaries by *Kundakunda*, *Śāmakuṇḍa*, *Tumbulūrācārya*, *Samantabhadra* and *Bappadevaguru* are also referred to by *Indranandī*[6], and they have been assigned to 2nd 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th century, respectively.[7] None of these commentaries is available today.

Pro-canonical literature of Digambaras

1. *Kundakundācārya*

One of the most important and earliest *Digambara*

1. *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṅgraha*, *Śrutāvatāra (Indranandi)*, 102-104.
2. *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, *prastāvanā*, p. 26-27.
3. *Śāstri*, *Nemicandra*, *Prākṛtabhāṣā aura sāhitya kā ālocanātmaka itihāsa*, p. 212.
4. *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Introduction, p. ii.
5. Ibid., Introduction, p. iii.
6. *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṅgraha*, *Śrutāvatāra (Indranandi)*, 160-173.
7. Jaina, J.C., *Prākṛta sāhitya kā itihāsa*, p. 275.

authors is *Kundakundācārya*. *Pravacansāra*, *Samayasāra*, *Pañcāstikāya*, *Niyamasāra* and *Dvādaśānuprekṣā* are undisputedly his works. Besides, tradition ascribes to him 84 *Pāhuḍas* and *Prākṛta Bhaktis*. We have noted that *Indranandī* has ascribed a commentary on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* to *Padmanandī* of *Kundakundapura*, who is identified with *Kundakundācārya*. *Vibudha Śrīdhara*, however, ascribes this commentary to *Kundakīrti*, a disciple of *Kundakundācārya*.[1] This commentary is not available: and, therefore, nothing definite can be said about it. Another important book, the authorship of which is ascribed to *Kundakunda*, is *Mūlācāra* with which we shall deal separately. As for the 84 *Pāhuḍas*, only eight of them are available to us and six of them have been commented upon by *Śrutasāgara*. Tradition ascribes these *Pāhuḍas* to *Kundakundācārya*.

Ratnasāra is another book of doubtful authorship, ascribed to *Kundakunda*. Ten *Prākrta bhaktis* are ascribed to *Kundakunda* by *Prabhācandra* in his commentary on *Kriyākalāpa*. Dr. A.N. Upadhye is of the view that part of these *Bhaktis*, containing traditional prayers, might have been written by *Kundakunda*. As for *Dvādaśānuprekṣā*, it is quoted by *Pūjyapāda* in his commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi* in the 6th century A.D. and according to Dr. A.N. Upadhye there is 'an appearance of antiquity about the text'.[2]

As for the date of *Kundakunda*, the fact that *Kundakundānvaya* is referred to in a copper plate inscription of Merkara, dated 466 A.D.,[3] helps us to fix the lower limit of his time. This inscription also gives the names of six disciples of *Kundakunda* lineage in succession. If we roughly allow hundred years for these six disciples, and keep in the mind that it takes some time to start the lineage of an *ācārya* after his death, we can fix the date of *Kundakunda* in the middle of 3rd century A.D. This is also corroborated by the tradition, which ascribes to him a commentary on *Ṣaṭakhaṇḍāgama*, which we have already placed in the 2nd century A.D. Winternitz tells us that

1. *Siddhāntasārādisaṅgraha*, *Śrutāvatāra (Vibudhaśrīdhara)*, Bombay. Vik. Sam. 1979, p. 318.
2. *Pravacanasāra*, Bombay, 1935, Introduction, p. XL.
3. Rice Lewis, (ed.), *Coorg Inscriptions*, Bangalore, 1886, p. 3. (line 15).

according to geneologies of the *Digambaras*, he lived in 1st century A.D.[1]

Amṛtacandrācārya and *Jayasena* are the two most important commentators on *Prābhṛtatraya* i.e. *Samayasāra*, *Pravacanasāra* and *Pañcāstikāya*. *Amṛtacandrācārya* also wrote *Samayasārakalaśa*, which is a part of his commentary on *Samayasāra* in the form of beautiful *Saṁskṛta* verses. His commentaries on *Pañcāstikāya*, *Pravacanasāra* and *Samayasāra* are called the *Tattvapradīpikāvṛtti*, the *Tattvadīpika* and the *Ātmakhyāti*, respectively. He is placed in the 10th century A.D.[2] whereas *Jayasena* is placed in the 12th century A.D. by Dr. Upadhye.[3] An early commentator on *Niyamasāra*, who quotes profusely from *Amṛtacandra*, is *Padmaprabhamaladhārī* (1000 A.D.).[4]

Śrutasāgara, who wrote commentaries on six out of eight available *Pāhuḍas*, is placed in the 15th century A.D. by Winternitz.[5]

2. *Mūlācāra*

Consisting of 1248 *gāthās*, it is the earliest work on the conduct of a *Jaina* monk from Digambara point of view. It gives 28 *Mūlaguṇas of* the *Jaina* monk. It is ascribed to *Vaṭṭakera*[6] or *Vaṭṭakerī*[7] by its commentator *Vasunandī* (11th century A.D.).[8] The *Puṣpikā* of *Vasunandī*'s commentary mentions *Kundakunda* as the author of *Mūlācāra*.[9] This has led to a great controversy about authorship of *Mūlācāra*. Shri Premi thinks that *Vaṭṭakerī* should not be identified with *Kundakunda* because he is more influenced by *Śvetāmbara* traditions.[10]

In the absence of any decisive evidence regarding the

1. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 476.
2. *Pravacanasāra*, Introduction, p. CI
3. Ibid., p. CVI.
4. Jaina, J.C., *Prākṛta sāhitya kā itihāsa*, p. 300.
5. Winternitz., M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 592.
6. *Vasunandi* on *Mūlācāra*, Bombay, Vik. Sam. 1977, Part I, p. 2.
7. Ibid., Bombay, Vik. Sam. 1980, Part II, p 324.
8. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, *Kāśī*, 1952, *prastāvanā*, p. 18.
9. *Vasunandī* on *Mūlācāra*, Part II, p. 324.
10. Premī, Nathurāma, *Jaina sāhitya aura itihāsa*, (Second ed.), Bombay, 1956, pp. 550-553.

authorship of *Mūlācāra*, and following Dr A.N. Upadhye and Mukhtar, we assign it to *Kundakunda* whose date we have already discussed. *Vasunandi*, mentioned above, tells us that *Mūlācāra* is a summary of *Ācārāṅga*.[1]

3. *Bhagvatī-Ārādhanā*

This is an old book on the conduct of Jaina monk attributed to *Śivakoṭi*, who has been referred to by *Jinsena* in his *Ādipurāṇa*.[2] It is difficult to identify *Śivakoṭi*. One *Śivabhūti* is mentioned in the *Kalpasūtra*; and the *Āvaśyakamūlabhāṣya* refers to a *Śivabhūti* who established *Boḍika* (*Digambara*) *Saṁgha* in 609 *Vīra Saṁvat*.[3] *Ārādhanā Kathā Koṣa* and *Rājā Vali Kathe* speak of a *Śivakoṭi* who is disciple of *Samantabhadra*.[4] *Pūjyapāda* in his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* quotes 562nd *gāthā* of *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*.[5] The author of *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā* should be distinguished from a *Śivakoṭi* who wrote a commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* and is mentioned in the 105th inscription of *Śravaṇabelagolā* of 1455 *Vikrama era*.[6] Similarly, he should be distinguished from the author of the same name of *Ratnamālā*.[7] Premi has shown that he has some inclination towards *Śvetāmbara* sect and belongs to *Yāpaniya Samgha*.[8]

Consisting of 2166 *gāthās*,, the *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā* dwells on the scheme of *darśana*, *jñāna*, *cāritra* and *tapas*. *Śivakoṭi* has included almost all subjects on *Jaina* ethics under these four heads. Many *Ācāryas* have written commentaries on *Bhagvatī Ārādhanā*. The most important and exhaustive of them is *Śrīvijayodayā*[9] of *Aparājitasūri* who wrote a commentary on *Daśvaikālikasūtra* also.[10] Premı places him between 6th and 9th

1. *Vasunandī* on *Mūlācāra*, p. 2.
2. *Ādıpurāṇa*, *Kāśī*, 1963. Vol. I. 1.49.
3. Jaina, H.L., *Bhāratīya saṁskṛtı meṁ Jaınadharma kāyogadāna*, p. 106.
4. Ibid., p. 106.
5. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra* (*Sarvārthasıddhi*), *Śolāpura*, *Śaka era*, 1839, 9.22.
6. *Premī*, *Nāthurāma*, *Jaina sāhitya aura itihāsa*, p. 78.
7. Ibıd. p. 77.
8. Ibid., pp. 68-73.
9. Ibid., pp. 78-86.
   Also *Mukhtāra*, *J.K.*, *Jaına sāhitya ke itihāsa para viśada prakāśa*, Calcutta, 1956, pp. 485-491.
10. *Aparājitasūri* on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā* (*Mūlārādhanā*), *Śolāpura*, 1936, 6. 1197

century of *Vikrama* era.[1] *Mukhtara* places him in the 8th century of *Vikrama* era.[2]

Amitagati (11th century A.D.) wrote a *Saṁskṛta* version of the *gāthās* of *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*. Many of the *Saṁskṛta* verses of this versions have been quoted in the commentary of *Anāgāradharmāmṛta* by Pt. *Āśādhara*.

Pt. *Āśādhara* (13th century A.D.) also wrote a commentary, *Mūlārādhanādarpaṇa*, on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*. Premi has referred to two more commentaries, hitherto unpublished and preserved in Bhandarkar Research Institute of Poona.[3] One of these *ṭikās* is *Ārādhanā-pañjikā*, whose author is not given in the commentary. *Prabhācandra*, author of *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, also wrote an *Ārādhanāpañjikā*. If he is the author of *Ārādhanāpañjikā* preserved at Bhandarkar Research Institute, then the commentary can be placed in 8th or 9th century A.D.[4] The other commentary *Bhāvārthadīpikā*, by *Śivājīlāla* is ascribed to 1818 of *Vikrama* era.[5] *Mūlārādhanādarpaṇa* of *Āśādhara* mentions a *Prākṛta ṭīkā*[6] and a *ṭippaṇī* by *Śrīcandra*[7] and *Jayanandi*[8] also on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā*. All these commentaries have become extinct now.

4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*

Dr. A. N. Upadhye is of the opinion that *Kārtikeya* came later than *Kundakunda*, *Vaṭṭakera*, *Śivārya*, *Umāsvāti*, *Pūjyapāda* and *Joindu*[9] i.e. later than 6th century A.D., and he is even doubtful whether *Kārtikeya* could have lived even after *Nemicandra* (10th century A.D.). Mukhtara has rejected *gāthā* number 279 of *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* as an interpolation and has refuted any possible influence of *Yogānuśāsana* of *Yogīndu*

1. *Premī, Nāthurāma, Jaina sāhitya aura itihāsa*, p. 79.
2. *Mukhtāra, Purātana Jaina vākya-sūci, Sahāranpura*, (year of publication is not given), *prastāvanā*, p. 21.
3. *Premī, Nāthurāma, Jaina sāhitya aura itihāsa*, p. 80-81.
4. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 582, foot note 6.
5. *Premī, Nāthurāma, Jaina sāhitya aura itihāsa*, p. 82.
6. *Āśādhara* on *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā* (*Mūlārādhanā*), *Śolapura*, 1335, 4.526.
7. Ibid., 4.589.
8. Ibid., 7.1999.
9. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, (ed.), Upadhye, A.N., Agas, 1960, p. 69.

on *Kārtikeya*.[1] He places *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* just after *Tattvārthasūtra* of *Umāsvāti*. This book was commented upon by *Śubhacandra* in *Vikarma Saṁvat* 1613.[2]

5. *Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāmī*

Tattvārthasūtra is recognised as an authority by all sects of Jainism. J. L. Jaini has ascribed this *sūtra* to 135-219 A.D. In his introduction to *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, *Pt. Hīrā Lāla* has said that *Umāsvāmī* followed *Svāmī Kārtikeya*.

According to *Digambara* tradition, *Umāsvāmī* was the pupil of *Kundakunda*, whereas according to *Śvetāmbara* tradition he was the pupil of *Ghoṣanandī Kṣamāśramaṇa*. His *Tattvārtha sūtra* is believed to have been taken from the sixth *Aṅga*, *Jñātṛdharmakathā* and the second *Pūrva*, *Āgrāyaṇī*. *Jaina* ethics is dealt with in the last five chapters of *Tattvārthasūtra*.

Another work ascribed to *Umāsvāmī* is *Śrāvakaprajñapti*, with which we have already dealt. R. Williams thinks that it was written by some *Śvetāmbara Ācārya* other than *Umāsvāmī*.[3]

Tattvārthasūtra is one of the most commented upon work of Jainism. There are 31 commentaries on this work. *Sarvārthasiddhi* of *Pūjyapāda* (7th cent. of Vik.),[4] *Rājavārtika* of *Akalaṅka* (7th-8th cent. of Vik.),[5] *Ślokavārtika* of *Vidyānandi* (9th-10th cent. of Vik.)[6] and commentary of *Śrutasāgara* (16th cent. of Vik.)[7] deserve special mention amongst *Digambara* commentaries. We have already referred to the *Svopajñabhāṣya* and commentary of *Siddhasena Gaṇī* amongst *Śvetāmbara* tradition.

6. *Samantabhadra*

The time of *Samantabhadra* is a controversial question.

1. *Mukhtāra, Purātana Jaina vākya-sūci, prastāvanā*, p. 24-26.
2. Ibid., p. 22.
3. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, p. 3.
4. Bhandarkar, R.G., *Early History of Deccan*, (Second edition), Bombay, 1895, p. 59.
5. *Tattvārthasūtra*, (ed.), *Saṁghvī, Sukhalāla*, (Second edition), Banaras, 1952, p. 48.
6. Ibid., p. 48.
7. Ibid., p. 48.

Winternitz assigns him to 8th century A.D ,[1] whereas the traditional view places him in the 2nd century A.D. Here we may refer to a *Sūtra* of *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa*[2] of *Pūjyapāda*, where *Samantabhadra* is mentioned. One *Paṭṭāvalī*[3] mentions *Śaka Saṁvat* 60 (138 A.D.) in relation to *Samantabhadra*. Inscription of *Śravaṇabelagolā* places *Samantabhadra* after *Siṁhanandī*, who was the teacher of *Koṅgaṇivarman* (103 A.D.).[4] *Samantabhadra* is, therefore, to be placed in the 1st century A.D. That *Samantabhadra* preceded *Siṁhanandī* is borne out by three other inscriptions also.[5] R. Williams says that Mukhtara places *Samantabhadra* between the first and fifth centuries A.D.[6] He was perhaps not aware of the latest views of Mukhtara, where he has decidedly favoured 1st century A.D. as the probable date of *Samantabhadra*.[7] It is as yet an open question as to which century *Samantabhadra* belonged. What we may do for the present is to place him after *Kundakunda*, *Umāsvāmī*, *Svāmikārtikeya* and *Śivakoṭi* on one hand, and before *Pūjyapāda* on the other hand. This position is accepted by Pt. *Hīrālāla*[8] and R. William[9] also.

Besides *Devāgamastotra* or *Āptamīmāṁsā*, which is said to be the introduction to the lost commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*, *Yuktyanuśāsana* and *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra* are also attributed to *Samantabhadra*. Most important of all, *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra* occupies an important place in the discussion of *Jaina* ethics as the earliest Digambara treatise on the rules of conduct for a laity.

Āptamīmāṁsā has been commented upon by *Akalaṅka*. His commentary is called *Aṣṭaśatī*, which has been again com-

1. Winternitz, M., *History of Indian Literature*, Vol II, p. 580. Mukhtāra, J.K , *Jaina-sāhitya ke itihāsa para viśada prakāśa*, pp. 297-322.
2. *Jainendravyākaraṇa*, *Kāśī*, 1956, 5 4.168.
3. Bhandarkar, R G., *Report of the Skt. Mss. in the Bombay Presidency during* 1883-1884, Bombay, 1887, p. 320.
4. One of the inscriptions on Koṅgaṇivarman is dated Śaka era 25. *Epigraphia Carnatica*, III, No. 110.
5. *Epigraphia Carnatica*, VII[1], Nos, 35, 36, 37
6. Williams, R. *Jaina Yoga*, p. 19.
7. Mukhtara, J.K., *Jaina sāhitya ke itihāsa para viśada prakāśa*, pp. 689-697.
8. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, *prastāvanā*, p. 45.
9. Williams, R., *Jaina-Yoga*, p. 19.

mented upon by *Vidyānanda* under the name of *Aṣṭasāhasrī*. *Prabhācandra* wrote a commentary on *Ratnakaraṇḍa-śrāvakācāra*.

7. *Pūjyapāda*

Pūjyapāda's another name is *Devanandin*. He wrote the most authoritative commentary on the *Tattvārthas ūtra*. This commentary is called the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Bhandarkar places *Pūjyapāda* about 678 A.D.[1] Winternitz places him between the 5th and 7th century.[2] That he must follow *Samantbhadra*, we have already said. Besides *Sarvārthasiddhi*, *Pūjyapāda* wrote a small book *Iṣṭopadeśa* consisting of 51 verses.

8. *Āśādhara*

Āśādhara, who is the author of *Anāgāra Dharmāmṛta* and *Sāgāra Dharmāmṛta* lays down the duties of an ascetic and a lay adherent, respectively. He belongs to the first half of the 13th century A.D., as his *Jinavijayakalpa* and *Sāgāradharmāmṛta* are dated 1228 A.D. and 1239 A.D., respectively. He also wrote a commentary on *Dharmāmṛta* in 1243 A.D. Premi has given a brief sketch of his life.[3] He also gives a list of his nineteen books, many of which are lost.[4] Mention of his commentaries on *Śivārya's Ārādhanā* and *Iṣṭopadeśa* may be made. *Āśādhara* cites *Samantabhadra*, *Jinasena*, *Cāmuṇḍarāya*, *Somadeva*, *Amitagati*, *Amṛtacandra* and *Vasunandī*.[5]

Āśādhara is said to have been influenced by *Śvetāmbara* tradition in many respects, specially by *Upāsakādhyayana*, *Nītivākyāmṛta* and *Śrāvakadharmaprjnapti*.[6]

9. *Vasunandī*

Paṇḍita Āśādhara in his commentary on *Sāgāradharmāmṛta* of *Vikrama Saṁvat* 1296 has referred to *Vasunandī*.[7] *Vasunandī* should, therefore, be placed before *Āśādhara*. Winternitz

1. Bhandarkar, R G., *Early History of Deccan*, (Second edition), p. 59.
2. Winternitz, M , *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 478.
3. *Premī*, *Nāthurāma*, *Jaina sāhitya aura itihāsa*, p. 342-358.
4. Ibid., pp. 345-346.
5. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, p. 27.
6. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra*, *prastāvanā*. p. 54.
7. *Āśādhara on Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, Bombay, *Vik. Saṁ.* 1972, 3.16.

places him between the 10th and 13th centuries.[1] A.N. Upadhye has placed him in the 12th century of *Vikrama* era.[2] *Vasunandī* in his *Ācāravṛtti* of *Mūlācāra* has quoted verses from *Amitagati*. He must, therefore, follow *Amitagati*.[3] *Paṇḍita Hīrālāla* places *Vasunandī* in the second half of the 11th century as *Nayanandī* who was the teacher of his teacher, wrote a work of *Apabhraṁśa*, *Sudarśanacarita* in *Vikrama Saṁvat* 1100.[4] Besides *Śrāvakācāra* and *Pratiṣṭhāsāra Saṁgraha* which, according to *Paṇḍita Hīrālāla*, should be ascribed to the same person,[5] three commentaries on *Āptamīmāṁsā*, *Jinaśataka* and *Mūlācāra* are also ascribed to him.[6] He has also shown that *Vasunandī* used *Bhāvasaṁgraha* of *Devasena* and was familiar with *Śrāvakācāra* of *Amitagati*.[7]

10. *Amṛtacandra*

Amṛtacandra is placed in about 900 A.D. by Winternitz.[8] Dr. Upadhye places him somewhere in the 10th century A.D.[9]

Besides writing commentaries on *Kundakunda's* work, he wrote the *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, which holds a unique position for stressing the cardinal virtue of non-violence. Besides *Tattavārthasāra*, a versified form of *Tattavārthasūtra*, is also ascribed to him.

11. *Amitagati*

Amitagati is placed at the end of 10th and the beginning of the 11th century by Winternitz.[10] His *Subhāṣitaratnasandoha* and commentaries on the *Pañcasaṁgraha* and *Dharma-*

1. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 577, footnote 2.
2. "*Jaina Jagat*" Bombay, (ed. Darbarilāla Satyabhakta), year 8, Vol. VII, (February, 1933), p. 20.
3. Mukhtara, *Purātana Jaina-vākya-sūcī, prastāvanā*, p. 100.
4. *Vasunandiśrāvakācāra, prastāvanā*, p. 18.
5. Ibid., p. 18.
6. Ibid., p. 18.
7. Ibid., p. 41.
8. Winternitz, M., *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 576 and p. 584.
9. *Pravacanasāra*, Introduction, p. CI.
10. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 481.

parīkṣā are dated *Vikrama Saṁvat* 1050, 1073 and 1070, respectively. Besides the three works mentioned above, *Upāsakācāra*, his *Saṁskṛta* versification of *Ārādhanā* of *Śivārya*, *Sāmāyikapāṭha*, and *Bhāvanādvātriṁśikā* are also ascribed to *Amitagati*.[1]

12. *Śubhacandra*

Śubhacandra has quoted a verse from *Puruṣārtha siddhyupāya* of *Amṛtacandra*, who has been quoted by *Jayasena* in his *Dharma Ratnākara* in *Vikrama Saṁvat* 1055. So we can fix this as the lower limit of *Śubhacandra*. The upper limit of his time can be fixed on the basis of a manuscript of *Jñānārṇava*, the *praśasti* of which mentions *Vikrama Saṁvat* 1248. According to Shri Premi, there is another manuscript of *Jñānārṇava* which must be at least 30 years older than the first one. Thus we can place *Śubhacandra* somewhere between 1055 and 1248 of *Vikrama* era.[2]

Winternitz places *Śubhacandra* at the close of the 8th or the beginning of the 9th century.[3]

We mention below some more works on *Jaina* morality, arranged chronologically, with their probable dates :

Author	*Works*	*Date*
Devasena	*Ālāpapaddhati*, *Nayacakra*, *Bṛhadnayacakra*, *Bhāva-Saṁgraha*, *Darśanasāra*.	10th cent. A.D.[4]
Cāmuṇḍarāya	*Cāritrasāra*	10th cent. A.D.[5]
Padmanandī	*Dharmarasāyana*	12th cent. A.D.[6]
Māghānandī	*Śrāvakācāra*	1260 A.D.[7]
Guṇa Bhūṣana	*Śrāvakācāra*	13th cent. A.D.[8]
Padmanandī	*Śrāvakācāra*	15th cent. A.D.[9]

1. Premī, Nāthurāma, *Jaina sāhitya aura itihāsa*, p. 280-281.
2. Ibid., p. 334.
3. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 583.
4. *Darśanasāra* was completed in Vik. Saṁ. 990. Cf. *Mukhtāra*, *Purātana Jain vākya sūci*, p. 116.
5. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, p. 17.
6. Ibid., p. 26.
7. Ibid., p. 28.
8. Ibid., p. 17.
9. Williams, R., *Jaina Yoga*, p. 17.

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